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1. 
Throughout the twentieth centuxy the United States of America 
has had a twooparty system of government, as the Democrats and 
Republicans alternately jostled fo r the favours of the electorate. 
This i s not to say however that the American people has only had 
a two-party choice, although i t i s true i t has frequently so 
restricted i t s e l f . Throughout the century other parties have been 
born, fostered, floundered, end died, Socialists, Progressives, 
Prohibitionists, Union Reformers, Conservatives, Farmer labourites, 
and many more too numerous to mention. Indeed because of a surfeit 
of parties, i t has been found necessary to l i m i t this paper to a 
number of the more important parties, these being arranged into three 
groups. 
The f i r s t group are those parties Which have depended upon the 
Charismatic appeal of one man fo r their support. Their reliance upon 
this man often l e f t a vacuum with regard to organisation, with the 
consequence that they fought one election and then disappeared from 
view. These are the Progressive parties of Theodore Roosevelt, 
Robert M* La Follette Snr., and Henry Wallace. 
Secondly, exemplified by the Socialists, and the Communist Party, 
which was formed i n the years immediately following the First World 
War, but never attracted a large electoral following u n t i l i t s alliance 
with Henry Wallace, there i s the party which possesses the organisation, 
but not the appeal to the electorate, so that i n consequence this party 
achieves l i t t l e at the ballot despite i t s comparatively long existence. 
Lastly there are the parties or interests which, whilst never 
achieving power nationally, did manage to secure a majority following 
i n a small area, or state, of the union* Such organisations are the 
Farmer-i&bour Party of Minnesota; the States* Rights Democrats of 
Governor J.Strom Thurmond, and the present-day American Independence 
party of George C.Wallace. 
2. 
Such a break~do*n i a purely personal, and arbitrary, some 
commentators indeed would even suggest that i t does not go nearly 
far enough* Hilton C^ Cumndngs. Associate Professor of Polit ical 
Science at Johns Hopkins University 1. considers there are not three 
but f ive types of minor party movement* as follows*** Parties of 
Economic Protest. Secessionist Parties, Doctrinal Parties. State 
Minor Parties, and Independent Candidacies. He l i s t s the Populists 
and the l a Follette Progressives as parties of eoanondo protest, and 
although he considers they possess the same salient characteristics 
as the secessionist parties*, being episodic*, having a weak organisational 
substructure, and whilst they may carry a number of districts fo r the 
presidency, they win no Congressional seats, their origins he asserts 
are different* The secessionists he argues are the Bull Moose and 
Dixieorat movements* However* could one place Thuxmond'e movement 
i n this group? In many states he possessed a sound organisation, 
although not of his own making, being blatantly stolen from the 
national Democratic party, and whilst i t i s true that the Dixiecrats 
did not >nn any seats i n Congress as a party, i t was also true that 
they did not formally contest any. their supporters being already i n 
control of the Southern Congressional seats, s i t t ing as Democrats. 
Cumntngs' th i rd category coincides with this paper's second 
grouping, and the old European doctrinal parties, of which the 
Socialist Party of imerica i s the best example. Despite a lack of 
success at the Presidential or Congressional po l l , the doctrinal party 
i s nevertheless persistent, mainly due to a f a i r l y well - developed 
organisational substructure i n a number of selected areas; as late as 
1952. the Socialists s t i l l had a large membership i n the torn of Reading. 
Pennsylvania, so large as to warrant the organisation of Presidential 
campaign i n order to boost the standing of the slate of candidates for 
local off ice . 
1. I n his book 'Congressmen and the Electorate'. Pf*<;£ /^Q 
3. 
In the group designated 'State minor parties* Oumroinge places 
the Farmers-Labour Party of Minnesota, and the Progressive Party 
of Wisconsin. Due to a strong local organisation, l ike the doctrinal 
parties they are persistent, and whilst carrying no districts fo r 
President, Cumn&ngs asserts, many win a number of seats i n Congress. 
Did not Senator l a Follette himself carry the state of Wisconsin i n 
the 1924 Presidential election, or was this an independent candidacy? 
Into this grouping might also be included the •American Labour 
Party, and the Liberal Party, i n New York state* The American Labour 
Party was founded i n 1936 with the intention of using i t as a vehicle 
by which to deliver to President Roosevelt as many of Hew York's 
radical votes as was possible* This guide was maintained u n t i l 194# 
when the party came very much under the influence of the American 
Communist Barty i n their bid to get Henry Wallace elected President* 
•As these two movements became one, another movement, the Liberal Party 
was bom. Again I t was a satellite party, confining i t s e l f mainly to 
the endorsement of Democratic candidates, although i n the 19&5 election 
f o r Mayor of New York, i t did nominate i t s own candidate, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Jnr., with disastrous results for both candidate and party. 
The independents are Cuinndngs' last grouping, and one which I 
would consider too small fo r the scope of this paper. They tend to be 
persistent, again because of a localised appeal, although charismatio 
appeal at times has to compensate fo r lack of organisation i n the bid 
for what are usually congressional honours* Only twice since 1924 have 
independent candidates secured election to Congress, J.Percy Priest i n 
1940, and Frazier Reams i n 1950 and 1952* Priest later joined the 
Democratic ranks, and i n fact secured re-election as a Democrat, whilst 
Reams remained an independent and was defeated, running for a th i rd term 
of office i n 1954* 
Basically, however, a minority party can be judged by i t s intentions. 
Some such groups have sought merely to influence either party poliay, 
4* 
or oholoe of party Isadora* examples of such pol i t i ca l phenomena 
being the two offshoots of the Democratic party at the 194& Presidential 
election* She Wallace Progressives, or at least those vho voted fo r 
Wallace, sought by means of the ballot to show their dissatisfaction 
at the way i n which the party vas being guided* I t was i n fact a 
genuine vote of protest, whereby the salient point i s made, action 
i s taken, and by the next election the wounds are healed, the enemies 
are allies once more* 
Thurmond1 s movement* however, l ike the American Independence Party 
of 196ft. the Presidential vehicle of George C. Wallace, was more probably 
motivated by the forever present Southern hope that they might, by their 
intervention, force the election of the President into the House of 
Representatives, thereby securing the election of a more amenable, to 
Sputherners, Chief Sxeeutive* 
Into this category of •influencing 1 parties, one might also include 
the Socialists, whose major contribution to American polities has been 
the implementation of so many of the planks of their platform by one or 
other of the two major parties. 
The other parties i n this paper might be considered to be those who 
deliberately set out to Influence not by compromise, pol i t ical blackmail 
or mere generosity, but those who sought to influence lay actually attaining 
power* To the obvious Presidential aspirations of Theodore Roosevelt, 
and Robert H* l a Follette, must be added the state •» wide hopes of 
Minnesota's Fajrmer-Iabour Party. 
Through these media i t i s the intention of this paper to attempt 
to show that th i rd parties are not merely pol i t ica l havens for the 
malcontents, the dissidents, and the disenchanted i n a predominantly 
two-party system, but that a l l are integral parts of the American 
body pol i t ic , and indeed of the American pol i t ica l tradition. 
5. 
Part I «» Chapter 1 
V® "Bull qoogg" ^ rofiress^yee 
American politics has known three parties with the empty t i t l e 
cf 'Progressive', each of them an independent party i n i t se l f , and 
each having no formal or organisational oonneotian with either of the 
other two* Here we ere to concern ourselves with the Progressive party 
which fought the election cf 1912 under the leadership of Theodore 
Roosevelt, and the Progressive movement which proceeded i t * 
The Progressive movement, from which the "Bull Moose" party was 
to eventually stem, was the more respectable successor to the Populist 
movement of the late nineteenth century* Whereas Populism tended to 
be e zns&L and geographically restricted provincial movement, Progressivism 
was urban, middle-class and nationwide* The greatest social difference 
between the two movements however, was that the Progressives were 
supported by the middle-olasses, and in some oases were aotually led 
by that group* Accordingly, whilst opponents of the Populists could 
paint a distorted image of them as wild anarchists, antagonists of 
the Progressives oould do no such thing* The Progressives were not 
only visible in every section of the community, but highly respeotable 
members of i t * 1* 
Thus many middle-class opponents of Bryan and his Populists, found 
themselves forsaking the Republican ranks and joining the Progressive 
movement, a movement which i t se l f had tafcen over so much of the Populist 
platform* As William Alien White i n his "Autobiography" wrote, the 
Progressive leaders "caught the Populists i n swimming and stole a l l of 
their olothes except the frayed underdrawers of free silver"* 
Such remarks however, whilst earthily eloquent, t e l l us l i t t l e 
of the sooio-eoonomio conditions i n which the two movements were spawned 
end developed* Populism, except for the Western silver men, was a 
movement that arose from agrarian distress in a period of acute depression* 
1* "The Age of Reform" R*Hofstadter. P131 
2. Ib id . P(32> 
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In that respect i t was not unlike the rural New Deal of Franklin D* 
Roosevelt, whereas Progressivism emerged from a period of relative 
prosperity* l«As George Mowry wrote, "i ts (progressivisms) reforms 
were more the results of the heart and the head than of the stomaoh". 2. 
Progressivism prospered upon a working coalition that was forged 
between the rural territories, tended lovingly by Bryan and the Populists, 
and the new reform movement in the oitiea. The latter movement tended 
to make the Progressives more informed and more moderate than the 
Populists, and also gave them a greater awareness of social issues. 5* 
Concerning the large financial and industrial corporations, the 
Progressives considered them to be a menace, a l l too often manipulated 
by unscrupulous man* On the other hand many Progressives were aware 
that the newer organisation of Industry and finance, emerging with the 
twentieth century, was a product of social evolution and was there to 
stay. 4. 
With regard to immigrants, the Progressives frequently shared 
Populist horror at ethnic mixture. However, such racism was no 
monopoly of the Progressives, f o r their views were shared to degrees 
by such men of differing pol i t i ca l opinions as Blihu Root, Henry Cabot 
Lodge, and Eugene V. Debs* Progressives did however have a sense 
of some obligation to the Immigrants arriving from Central and Eastern 
Europe, and reoognised that this Amarioanisaticn was a praotloal, not 
ideological problem that had to be met, and met with a humane and 
constructive programme. 
1* "The Progressive Bridge" Robert S.Maxwell (Indiana p c , 
Magazine of History - June, 1967). r ¥ 4 
2* "George E* Howry" The Bra of Theodore Roosevelt* P 
5* "Reconstruction of American History" Arthur Mann* Pt v If* 
4* 'The Age of Reform" R*Hafatadter. P-
7. 
The growth of union power, a new force i n American aoolologioal 
and pol i t ical affairs, posed a problem, even a threat, to the 
Progressives who were essentially middle-class, although perceptive 
enough to recognise that such local organisations had arisen i n 
response to a real need among the urban masses, that had to be 
satisfied i n some way. 1. 
Perhaps the Progressive movement oan best be understood by answering 
the following questions: Why did the middle-classes undergo this 
awakening at a l l , and more especially during a period of general 
prosperity i n which most of them seem to have shared? What was the 
place cf eooncmio discontents i n the Progressive movement? To what 
extent did reform originate i n other oanaiderations? Throughout the 
following chapter, i t is these questions which 1 w i l l endeavour to 
answer. 
The Progressive leadership did much to formulate the ideals of the 
movement* These Mugwumps, 2, as they beoame known, were progressives 
not because of economic deprivations, but primarily because they were 
victims of an upheaval i n status that took place i n the United States 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries* Progressivism was 
thus led by men who suffered from the events cf their time, not 
through a shrinkage i n their means, but through a ohanged pattern i n 
the distribution of deference and power* 
The typloal Mugwump was basically conservative i n his economic 
and pol i t ical views* He supported the doctrine cf "Laissee - fa i re" . 
1* "The Era of Theodore Roosevelt"* George B* Howry* W**?7, '00 - / o i 
2* From the Algonquin Indian, 'Mugquomp' •••• *en Important person 
the high muck - a mucks •••• used ironic a l ly ' • Mitford H* Mathews, 
*A Dictionary of Americanisms* * 
8. 
His eocnomio programme did not go muoh beyond t a r i f f reform and 
sound money, whilst his pol i t ical programme rested upon the foundations 
of honest, efficient government and c i v i l service reform. He was a 
"liberal" i n the classic sense* Tarif f reform he considered was the 
sovereign remedy fo r the huge business combines that were arising* 
However, he was shut off from the people as muoh by his social reserve 
and his amateurism as by his conservative views* He sought popular 
support on aristcoratio terms* The end of this insulation by the Mugwumps 
was one of the changes that made Progressivism possible* 
Progressivism modified the Mugwump*s dootrinaire commitment to 
"Laissez-faire" whilst aristooratio preferences were replaced i n a 
startling revival of enthusiasm for popular government* The 
movement's great talent, however, was that of dealing with demands 
of the discontented so as to forestall the latter from starting their 
own pol i t ical movement* 
A further strength of the Progressives was that they never suffered, 
even as a young movement, from the financial troubles which k i l l many 
pol i t ical parties before they are hardly off the ground* As Mowry points 
outl n •*••*•• few reform movements In American history have had the support 
of more wealthy men*" 
Surveys have shown that the Progressive leader was a professional 
or businessman, usually a native-born American, and Protestant by religion* 
Delving more deeply Howry found that the Californian Progressive was 
frequently a Freemason and a member of his towns Chamber of Comae roe and 
unt i l 1900 a conservative Republican* Of 41 oases studied, three-quarters 
of them were college educated*1 2 * 
Though many Progressives were wealthy men, the source of their 
fortunes seemed to matter l i t t l e * fo r the movement attracted self-made 
millionaires such as John P. Altgeld, the Mayor of Detroit, Hazen Plngree, 
the Governor Michigan and Samuel ("Golden Rule") Jones, the reform Mayor 
of Toledo whilst also beckoning to i t s ranks such men as Tom Johnson, 
1* "The Era of Theodore Roosevelt"* George E* Mowry* fcf 86 
2. Ib id . * * / f ) 
9-
and Joseph Pels, men of sec and and third generation of wealth. 1. 
A further group who proved to be influential i n the movement 
were the liberal clergy, who succeeded in restoring some of their 
prestige by making themselves a strong force i n the Progressive ranks. 
Progressivism was basioally a latter-day Protestant revival. No other 
major movement in American pol i t ical history, unless one classifies 
abolitionism or prohlbitionism as such movements, has ever received so 
much clerical sanction. 2. 
As I f to balance the influence of both business and the Protestant 
church, the Progressive era produced a number of social scientists from 
secular universities who as such tended to be able to oritiolse at w i l l 
those within the movement who had vested interests. Any l i s t cf these 
academics would be both incomplete and boring to the reader, suffice i t 
to mention a mere few. of the most influential* Economics was 
represented by man such as John R. Commons. 3. Richard T. Ely. 4. 
Thorstein Veblen* 5. and B.R.A. Seligman, pol i t ica l science had 
as i t s spokesmen Charles A. Beard, 6. Arthur F. Bentley and J .Allen Smith, 
whilst the other disciplines of the Social Soiences were represented 
1. "The Progressive Bridge*1 • Robert S. Maxwell (Indiana Magazine 
of History-June, 1960). P ^ j 
2. "The Bra of Theodore Roosevelt". George E. Mcwry. 
3. University Professor, f i r s t secretary of the American 
Institute of Christian Soolology, and author of such 
books as "Social Reform and the Church." 
4* University Professor, and one of the leaders of Josiah 
Strong*s Evangelictu Alliance, founded i n 1887. 
5. Author of "Theory of the Leasure Class". 
6. Author of such reference books on Amerioan Government as 
"An Ecoriomio Interpretation of the C ens t i t ut ion" and 
"The Supreme Court and the Constitution.n 
10. 
by E*A«Ross 1* and Lester Ward 2* (Sociology), John Dewey (Philosophy) 
and Roscos Pound (Law)* 
I t i s i n fact interesting to note that i n Wisconsin, the only 
state where Progressivism became strong enough to gain the confidence 
of the electorate over a period of time, even before the turn of the 
century there had been a close union between the la Follette regime 
and the Wisconsin State university at Madlsin. The aoademio 
scholar was soon to get national recognition which was to culminate 
in the election to the White House i n 1912 (albeit against a Progressive 
oandldate) of Woodrow Wilson, the Demooratio Governor of Now Jersey, and 
former President of Princeton University. 3. 
The beginnings of the movement oan be found in the Interstate 
Commerce Aot (1887), the Sherman Aot (1890), the Municipal reform 
orusade of the 1890's, the local reform asseolations, and the social 
legislative programmes started In the various states towards the end 
of the century* These were the timid beginnings of a movement that 
did not beeone nationwide un t i l the years after the start of the 
twentieth century*4* The period of insulation between the formative 
years of the mid-nineties and the active years after 1901, was due to the 
1* A former Populist who joined the Progressive ranks* Member 
of the l a Follette brains trust at Wisconsin State university, end 
author of "The Old World i n the New", a commentary en the Eastern 
European immigrant problem from a white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant 
viewpoint* 
2* Referred to by Howry i n "The Era of Theodore Roosevelt 
end the bir th of "Modern America" as the father of American sociology* 
A paleobotanist with the federal government unt i l 1906. he then 
accepted a professorship at Brown university. 
S* "The Age of Reform"* R*Hoftaater. P. 
4* Ib id . P ) 6 ^ 
11. 
middle-olasses, who, as we have seen, were the rank - and - f i l e 
of the Progressive movemento They were afraid to take further action 
in the nineties, and put aside their own discontents unt i l i t was 
safe to air them* They were most unwilling to air such grievances 
during the era of the Populists, who were often portrayed as agitators 
end preachers of social revolution, no doubt due to the Homestead and 
Pullman strikes, the march of Casey*a army, the slump in business 
activity, and the lengthening breadlines* Men such as Bryan, A I t geld, 
and Debs appeared to the middle-classes as revolutionary leaders, as the 
Cantons, Robespierres and Karats of the coming sooial upheaval* Whilst 
the Populists tended to be silver-haired veterans of old monetary reform 
crusades, Progressivism was firmly i n the hands of youth* The Progressive 
generation was that whioh cams of age i n the 1890*s* 
As Hafstadter states, 1 when Roosevelt became President, i t was 
merely the symbolic coming-of-age of a generation who f e l t the need of 
a new philosophy and a new politics* 
Whilst the Progressives inspired an enthusiastic, sometimes 
fenatioal, following, by speaking of returning government to the people, 
they were quite prepared to make use of state intervention In the 
economio sphore when I t suited their purpose* Ironically enough, on 
many national issues, the Progressives had reliable allies i n the same 
agrarian rebels for whom the "Mugwumps" had nothing but contempt.2. 
The beginning of the twentieth century was a period of great 
population growth for the United States* Growth not by natural 
reproduction, but by immigration* Indescriminate immigration usually 
leads to prejudice and host i l i ty, and America was certainly no exception* 
Hostility to Immigrants was probably most common towards the extreme ends 
of the pol i t ica l spectrum, even by those Progressives most influenced by 
the Populist inheritanoe.S* 
1. "The Age of Reform". R*Hcf stadter. ^'67 
2. "The Amerloan Poli t ical Traditions". R.Hofstadter. P*7? 
3* "The Age of Reform". R»Hofstadter. P / 7 7 
12, 
By 1912, the main parties had each been able to look at the , 
phenomena fa r several years, and to formulate their own policies* 
She regular Republicans had a platform that gestured vaguely towards 
the restriction of immigration, whilst the insurgent Progressives 
tended to be more humanitarian, and spoke of the necessity to aid, 
proteot, and Americanise the immigrant* She Democrats simply straiHed 
the problem by never mentioning i t , because their two most influential 
groups, the urban machines, end the radical agrarians, stood sharply 
at odds on this issue*l« 
Shis does not mean that the Progressives were never divided on 
the issue, because they frequently were* Those Progressives with 
Populist backgrounds were frank to express their dislike of the" 
immigrants end attacked the continuing policy of unrestricted immigration* 
Many labour leaders and SteUeotuals were included among this group, and 
i n faet radioals of the calibre of Ross, Coranons, and Edward Bonis lost 
their acedemio jobs because of their enti-immigrant outlook*2* 
Liberal Progressives however set out to Americanise the immigrant 
by educating him i n English and Civics* Wallst there is no doubt this 
instruction was given on humanitarian grounds, i t should also bo noted 
that those Progressives i n industry realised that on purely so anemic 
grounds, the courtship of the immigrant was a neeessity*S* 
I t i s indeed ironic to f ind that pol i t ical ly the immigrants 
were usually at odds with the reform aspirations of the American 
Progressive, and i n fact i t was the unswerving loyalty I f the 
immigrant voters to the urban bosses that was one of the reasons why 
local reform victories were so short lived 04* 
1* "The Era of Theodore Roosevelt"* George B* Howry* 
2. "The Age of Reform". R. Hofstadter. P ' 7 * 
3. "The American People", Oscar Handlln* A<« ^^y/S3S* 
4* "The Bra of Theodore Roosevelt"• George E* Mowry* P~}% 
13. 
The reason fo r the lack of appeal of the Progressive movement 
to the immigrant voter lies i n the contrasting social background of 
the Yankee Progressive, and the immigrant* The former was born into 
a society which existed upon the principles of democracy, whereas the 
Immigrants were from countries with autocratic sooieties and feudal 
traditions* They had no conception of the role of the active citlsen, 
and only assumed their civic role i n response to their Old World loyalties 
such as the First World War, or to their own immediate needs i n the 
struggle fo r survival* Thus the immigrant often fai led to understand 
the reformers especially those standing fo r such policies as women's 
rights, Sunday lews, and temperance, whilst understanding f u l l well 
the machine boss with his appealing favours* The immigrant wanted 
humanity not efficiency. 1* 
I t was this insulation of the Progressive from the most exploited, 
end most exploitable, sector of the population, which proved one of 
the main factors i n reducing the social range, and ultimately the 
radical drive, of the progressive programme, and kept the progressive 
genteel, proper, and safe* 
I f the weakness of the Progressive movement was i t s failure to 
exploit the immigrant class, then i t s most l ikely strength, apart from 
i t s leaders, lay i n i t s journalism, though hardly i n the quality of 
i t s journalism* The basic characteristic was one of exposure, using 
the sensationalist style of journalism known as "Muckraking''• Muckraking 
In the Progressive era, however, was neither new i n i t s ideas, nor i n i t s 
existence, i t was able to gain nationwide attention through the mass media 
with their national circulations* 2* 
Funds were provided fo r the investigations of the muckraking 
reporters* SoS.MeClure, the publisher, estimated that the articles of 
Ida Tarbell coot jS 4,000 each to produce, whilst those of Lincoln 
Steffens oost only 0 2,000 each* Whereas, most muckrakers had previously 
restricted themselves to naming taeipraotioes i n American business and 
1. The Age of Reform". R* Hofetadter. PP / I'J'ZX 
2* Thi rd Party Movements i n the United States". William B* Hesseltine. 
/>€7 
p o l i t i c s , the Progressives also named the malpraotitioners sad 
their specific misdeeds, and proclaimed these faots to the national. 
Suoh campaigns however,, due to the large costs involved^ were 
only possible through, the expansion of the newspaper circulation. 
Shis i n turn had only been achieved because of the rapid urbanisation 
of the country. In 1870 there were a mere 674 daily newspapers i n 
the whole of the United States* By 1899 this figure bad risen to 
1*610 whilst ten years later i t was as high as 2*600, Circulation 
accordingly increased over the same period from 2,800,000 copies 
daily to 24*200,000 copies*. Publishers saw that the popular press 
was a aeaas of not unly distributing news, but of also influencing 
tii© masses* 2* 
Within the limited framework of the reforms that were possible 
without structural alterations In the American social and economic 
system, the muckrakers did at least achieve s case thing i n the fore 
of legislative changes and social facewashing* She temper of the 
early writers of "McClures" must have beeii more akin to that of 
their middle-class audience than was the attitude of their 
Socialist counterparts suoh as Gustavus tfyers, Upton Sinclair* 
and Charles Edward Russell* who wanted to carry the implications of 
such exposures to their utmost practical conclusions. To the 
Progressives credit, the essential train of thought i n their Journalism 
was that of 'realism** 5* 
The main targets of the Progressive press were urban conditions* 
and corruption, a particularly fine issue for the moral energies of 
the average progressive who was always ready to be convinced that 
the country was thoroughly wicked, The muckrake rs accordingly 
supplied him with a wealth of plausible evidence* 4* 
1* "Ihe Age of Reform". R. Hoftadter. 
2* "The Bra of Theodore Roosevelt** George E. Howry* PP 6«f 
3. "The Bra of Theodore Roosevelt 0• George fi* liowiy* p 
4* "She Age of Reform". R* Hofstadter* P*L*o 
15. 
Y7e have so f a r confined ourselves to identifying the Progressive 
ideals, but who exactly were the Progressives, and from what social 
groups were they drawn? 
Progressivieffl appeoiled to the small businessman who hod been 
overwhelmed or outdistanced by the great competitors* I t also 
eppeailed t© the new middle - class of technicians, salaried professionals, 
olerioal workers, salespeople, and public service personnel, that 
multiplied with the coming of the great corpoEfcicms* Shis was the 
most rapidly expending stratum of society i n the era. I t accounted 
for 62^ of the middle: class i n 1910, whereas 40 years ea r l i e r i t 
Covered only 33^ of that class* The movement also inoluded over 
three million independent entrepreneurs self •-employed professional 
men* These were the classes who could not strike, f ix prices or 
support expensive lobbies, however, being literate they were able to 
read the Progressive magazines, and use their vote* Such votes were 
to have a groat moulding effect upon the American polity i n the early 
twentieth century* 1*. 
One sphere which the Progressives influenced was that of the 
Trusts, that i s the better regulation of the railways and the control 
of the great industrial combines. She Progressives were worried not 
only at the economic power wielded by such giants as the Standard O i l 
Company* 2, but at the possibility of them using this power for p o l i t i c a l 
ends, a move which would ultimately mean the end of American democracy* 
Such thinking i n fact displayed some of that same fear of some seoret 
plutocracy of conspirators, as was shown by the Populists* However, the 
Progressives were not suspicious of social plutocrats they were merely 
restive at the thought that v i t a l decisions were being made with which 
they had nothing to do* Such awareness i s a v i t a l theme i n trying to 
understand the Progressive movement and i s one to which we w i l l be 
constantly returning to i n this paper* 5* 
1. "The Age of Reform". R* Hofstadter, USr/lt$ 
2* After the publication of Henry Demarest Lloyd's book 
"health against Commonweal t l i n e The Standard Oil Company of Itew Jersey had come to represent to the American public 
the personification of the word 'trust* despite i t being one 
of only many national industrial combines* , 
3* "The Era of Theodore Roosevelt 0* George E* Howry* P/* 
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While today we readily accept the fact that industrial executives 
are paid more than our legislators, a not uncommon procedure i n most 
contemporary sooieties, the Progressives were always daunted by the 
spectre of private porar f a r greater than the public power of the 
state* 
I n 1888, Charles William E l i o t 1* discovered that a railway 
company with i t s offices i n Boston, employed a total of 18,000 
people, had gross receipts of $ 40 million, and paid a highest salary 
ofyfeS,000 per annum* The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, however, 
during the same period employed only 6,000 people, enjoyed gross 
receipts of only 0 7 million.and had a maximum salary of $ 6,500. 
Such discoveries led E l i o t to oomment that "the activity of 
corporations, great and small, penetrates every part of the industrial 
and social body, and their daily maintenance brings into play more mental 
and moral force than the maintenance of a l l the governments on the 
(American) Continent combined." 
Twenty years later Senator Robert l a Pollette Senior of Wisconsin, 
speaking i n the Senate, showed that by employing the practices of interlocking 
directorates fewer than 100 men, acting i n concert, controlled the great 
business interests of the country. I n 1912 the Pujo Committee found 
that interests of J .P . Morgan and Company at the peak of the financial 
system held S41 directorships i n 112 corporations with aggregate resources, 
sad capitalisation, of $ 22,245,000,000 equivalent to the value of a l l 
property i n the twenty two states West of the Mississippi River. 
Federal regulation of these financial giants was begun with the Interstate 
Commerce Act (1887) and the Sherman Act (1890) .2 . Legislative control of 
the trusts, was however only realised i n the Progressive era, when a large 
number of measures gained prominence on the Statute Book* 
1* I n his essay "The Working of the American Democracy*" 
2 . "The Age of Reform"* R* Hcfstadter* P^-So 
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The basis of trust control, as outlined by the Progressives, 
should be a dual programme of eoonomio remedies designed to minimise 
any dangers from both the extreme l e f t and right, on the one side they 
feared the power of the plutoracy, and on the other, the poverty and 
restlssness of the masses* The Progressives wanted p o l i t i c a l leadership 
restored to a responsible sdddleolass, who were neither ultra-oanservative 
nor "wild radical" as Theodora Roosevelt chose to c a l l those of Socialist 
tendencies.l* 
Progresslvism* s f i r s t ideals were believed to be a complete 
reformation of the business order with priority being given to monopoly 
regulation, restoration of competition, and an expansion of credit to 
help the consumer, small businessman, and farmer, rather than the great 
corporations who had previously reaped the benefits of credit solely for 
themselves*2* After a restoration of eoonomio order Progressivism was 
to deal with what i s termed "the Social question"• Already we have seen 
the humanitarian views of the Progressives with regard to immigrants, their 
policy regarding the social question was their answer to the exploitation 
of the working population* The Progressives had a passion for social 
justice expounding their views on labour and capital, slums, and the 
employment of female and child labour, although not a l l of such passion 
was on humanitarian grounds* The Progressives merely wished to grant 
the urban masses enough social rights to appease them* They saw any 
bid by ultra conservatives to deny the masses any rights as an omission 
that would increase social resentment, which would find expression i n 
radical and social progranimea.5. 
1* The American P o l i t i c a l Tradition". R* Hofstadter* P*oS' 
2* "Since 1900". D.J.Barok and N.M*Biake. ^ 3 3 
5. "British Essays i n American History". C.P.Hill* P P J i 6 A? J ? 
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YJhil3t sympathising with the problems of labour, the Progressives 
were genuinely troubled by the faot that i t oould become as menacing 
a giant as big big business i n an effort to counter balanoe the 
corporations. However, when the Lab our movement was moderate i t was 
accepted into the movement, although i n such places as San Francisco, 
where labour for a time dominated local government, Progressivism took 
on a decidedly enti labour tinge, yet i t must be remembered, when 
talking of labour-Progressive relations, that i t was Progressive 
insistence which made workmans compensation a fact within the lew, 
an achievement that I t s e l f would have made the Progressive movement 
worth while* Because of the Progressives, trade unions were accepted 
as legitimate labour organisations by the United States i n the early 
twentieth century* being proceeded only by such socially conscious 
countries as Great Britain and the Scandinavian nations.1. 
So f a r however we have confined ourselves to Progressivism as 
a social movement* we must now look at i t from another angle* that of a 
poli t i c a l movement end party* 
Although the Progressive movement was a middle Class movement 
spanning both the Republican and Democratic parties, the Progressive 
party i t s e l f was basically a bolt from the Republican party at the 
1912 election* t t supported former President Theodore Roosevelt* 
the nominee of the "insurgent" or "progressive" Republicans* rather 
than the conservative President William Howard Taft* However, to 
understand the f u l l implications of this bolt* i t i s necessary to go 
back to when Theodore Roosevelt himself was President.2. 
1* "The Age of Reform*. R* Hofs&dter* /* 2 
2* "Third Party Movements i n the United States". 
William B. Hesseltine. Pyx 
19. 
By 1907, i t was apparent that he was not going to offer 
himself once more as a Presidential candidate, i t was equally 
apparent that he would support the nomination for the Presidency 
of Taftp his secretary of War* Taft was very much a conservative, 
and his nomination alienated the more progressive members of the 
Bepuhlioan party*l* notably Senator Robert l a Follette of Wisconsin, 
and Governor Charles Evans Hughes of New 7ork*2* 
Taft won the eleotion of 1908, whereupon Roosevelt went to Africa 
for tore years on a much publicised hunting expedition* However, 
although he l e f t a conservative i n the White House, the p o l i t i c a l 
temper on Capital H i l l was beooming increasingly progressive, there 
being some thirty insurgent Republican congressmen including George 
W*Norrie (Massachusetts), Charles A. Lindbergh (Minnesota), and 
Victor Murdoch of Kansas, as well as freshmen Senators Albert B* 
Cummins cf Iowa and Cos Crawford of South Dakota* Whilst: they 
were a l l able politicians* they did however lack both knowledge 
of Senate procedure, and an acknowledged leader* New members such 
as Bristol,3* and Cummins were willing and eager, but inexperienced, 
whilst l a Follette, although more able, preferred to concern himself 
more with researoh*4* The group suffered from being unable to hold 
together* 
1* The Republican Party 1854-1964". George II. Mayer. P 3OA 
2* Elected 1906. served two terms as Governor, before 
becoming a Supreme Court Justice i n 1910, Republican 
Presidential Candidate i n 1910, later re-appointed to 
the Supreme Court of which he was Chief Justice* 
5* Joseph I** Brlstow was formerly an assistance Postmaster 
General i n the Roosevelt Administration, elected Senator 
from Kansas, 1908* 
4. "The Republican Party 1B54-1964". George H* Mayer* P 3*& 
20, 
They did, however, make one notable contribution to Congress i n 
the two Tears up to 1910, and that Has for their unstinting opposition 
to the new Aldrich t a r i f f s which had been l a i d on the floor of the 
Senate by the senior Senator from Rhode Island.1. The insurgents l e f t 
Taft i n a quandary, for he did not know whether to follow hie own 
viewpoint and support the minority of his party, or to bow to the 
Aldxioh cabal who, i t could be argued, reflected the true opinion 
of the Republicans. After playing a game of fence-sitting he decided 
to back the party regulars, a decision he must have regretted later, for 
i t alienated a large reform section i n bis party, a group notlcably from 
the territory of h i s own birth, the Middle West. 2. 
By each taking allotted sections of the Aldrich B i l l , and 
cr i t i c i s i n g that given section, the insurgents at the same time proved 
to themselves that they too were capable of working i n harmony. They 
were now a united faction i n Congress. 
On June, 16th, 1910, Roosevelt returned to the United States from 
his hunting* Waiting to greet him was Gifford Pinchot a personal friend 
of the former President, who now wanted to help convert Roosevelt's 
personal misgivings about the President into p o l i t i c a l ones, although 
Pinchot s own personal motives were somewhat doubtful. 3. Within the 
month Roosevelt had re-entered politics by securing his own election as 
temporary ehairiaan a t the Republican Convention of New York State* 
Roosevelt, I fe e l * believed that by his intervention, and his alone, 
the warring factions of the Republican party could be united again, hie 
motives I believe were genuine, however, his decision to re-enter po l i t i c s 
inevitably meant a conflict with the luckless Taft . 4 . 
1. "Baveridge and toe Election of 1912". James R.Parker. . 
(Indiana Magazine of History * June* 1967). ^ ° / '©** 
2* nThe Era of Theodore Roosevelt 0. George B. Mowry. 7 
3* Pinchot had been head of the Forestry Bureau i n the Department 
of Agriculture under both Roosevelt and Taft. He was dismissed 
by Taft however following a campaign to smeer the name of Riohard 
Achilles Ballinger, who had replaced Pinohots friend James I*. 
Garfield as Secretary of the Interior when Taft assumed the 
Presidency. 
4* "The Republican Party I854*»1964tt. George W. Mayer. 
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I n August 1910 Roosevelt plunged e step further into the 
p o l i t i c a l oauldron with his famous "Now Nationalism* speech at Qsawatomie, 
Kansas* In the speech Roosevelt presented himself as a "new" personality 
however there was l i t t l e new about his philosophy which was merely a 
repeat of his old doctrines, interspersed with some of the more challenging 
Progressive ideas. The Colonel assailed the federal judiciary f o r 
obstructing the popular w i l l , whilst proposing a whole slate of ideas 
for the elaotion*-consoious. He was i n favour of compensation laws 
and the limitation of the hours of labour, a graduated income tax and 
an inheritance tax. a physical evaluation of railway properties to enforce 
whcnest n capitalisation, plus government supervision of capitalisation of 
a l l types ef corporations engaging i n interstate ocmmeroe.l* 
Democracy, Roosevelt contended, was to be eoonomio. not merely 
p o l i t i c a l . 
Such a radical outburst by the former President only served to 
widen the s p l i t i n the Republican ranks, a fact that was emphasised 
only three months later at the mid-term elections. For the f i r s t 
time i n sixteen yearB the Democrats gained control of the House of 
Representatives, and although the Republicans retained their majority 
i n the Senate, i t was only a nominal one, since i t was a small group 
of progressive Republican Senators who held the balance of power 
between the almost evenly divided regular Republican and Democratic 
forces* 2* 
1* "The American P o l i t i c a l Tradition". R. Hofstadter. P2*$ 
2. "She Republican Party 1854-1964". George B* Bayer. ^ 3 / ? 
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The Eastern regulars in the Republican ranks suffered heavily, 
whilst only three of the 98 insurgent congressmen failed to secure 
re-election, thus changing radically the balance of power i n the 
G.O.P. on Capitol H i l l . Such a vote undoubtedly gave a vote of 
confidence in the polioies of the progressives, though not i n 
Roosevelt himself. Both of his favoured candidates, Henry L.Stimson 
who was trying to retain the governorship of New York, and Senator 
Beveridge i n Indiana were defeated.1. 
Although a Presidential election was two years in the future, 
the contest for the 1912 eleotion opened almost immediately after 
the mid-term election of 1910. On January, 21st, 1911, the insurgent 
Republicans organised the National Progressive Republican League, to 
be used as the vehicle for the stopping of any Taft renomination i n 
1912. 2. The movement was strongest, as might be expected, i n the 
Mid-Vest, where many Senators joined i t . However, i t failed to gain 
the support of Roosevelt, although the former President was invited to 
join the movement. He declined, confining himself to private expressions 
of sympathy with i t s objectives. 
During this period Roosevelt's intentions are d i f f i c u l t to 
estimate. Within two weeks of the November elections he spoke at a 
meeting of the Washington Press Club i n the manner of a Presidential 
oandidate, although earlier i n 1911 he had appeared reconciled to the 
renomination of Taft. Some po l i t i c a l commentators have suggested 
1. "Beveridge and the Election of 1912N. James R. Parker. 
(Indiana Magazine of History - June 1967). /*>° /cy//of 
2. "Since 1900". O.J. Barok & N.M.Blake. /* 7^* 
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that this apparent indeoision by Roosevelt was part of a well-
planned strategy, that he was in fact to be a candidate for the 
Republican Presidential nominations, not, however, i n 1912, but 
four years later* I t has been argued that Roosevelt foresaw a 
Demooratio landslide i n 1912, a protest against the reactionary 
Taft, who would now be discredited, a result whioh would have l e f t 
the party nomination very much for his choosing i n 1916, when he 
would s t i l l only be 58 years old*l» 
Why then did such an astute politician as Roosevelt throw 
what appeared to be a carefully worked out plan clean out of the 
window? I t could be argued that, like Van Buren and Fillmore 2* 
before him, he chose to lead a third party as a means of revenge 
on the party that had deserted him, or perhaps he saw that by 
using the name 'Progressive* which by the Summer of 1911 had 
acquired a form of p o l i t i c a l magic, he might reoover more quiokly 
his past position of leadership* I f this was so he might well have 
taken a lead from his Presidential predecessors who attempted a 
similar ooae-4>ack, for both Van Buren and Fillmore had fai l e d 5* 
I f the term progressive* stimulated the eleotorate, i t did 
l i t t l e to stimulate internal harmony within the insurgents ranks* 
Roosevelts progressive image suffered badly from his determination 
to work through the regular republican organisation, an organisation 
which had a reputation for dishonesty, although i t had been thoroughly 
1* "The American Politioal Tradition 0* R* Hofstadter* 
2, Martin van Buren and Millard Fillmore were, like 
Roosevelt, former Presidents who chose to lead third 
parties as a means to recover their former office* 
5 "Third Party Movements i n the United States*. William B*Hesseltine. 
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cleaned up by the time Taft became President. La Follette headed 
the faction pushing for the elimination of the Convention system and other 
impediments to direct popular control, proposals he had put into effect 
i n his horns state of Wisconsin, but towards which Bristow and the 
Senators from Iowa were somewhat cooler than their o olid agues. 1. 
They were even more vague about the proper role cf the national 
government i n regulating eoonomio l i f e . Borah and Bourne hoped to 
keep power decentralised, while the remainder tended to favour some 
enlargement of government authority over business. La Pollette was 
especially optimistic about his idea of supervisory commissions, 
whioh he proposed should be staffed by disinterested experts whose 
job was to keep big business i n l i n e . As the reform groups had 
failed to produce tangible improvement i n the economic position the 
discontented became responsive to the idea that the national government 
might take positive steps for promoting the prosperity of under 
privileged groups. Thus the insurgents appeared to be on the verge 
of a redefinition of Progressivism that pointed towards the New Deal. 2. 
In the Sumner of 1911 small groups of the more influential 
insurgent3,5, started to look for a possible Presidential candidate. 
1. "The Bra of Theodore Roosevelt*. George E. Mowry. 3 
2. Ibid. P?2 
5. These groups could be sub-divided themselves into three groups 
as followa:-
The intellectuals of the movement, suoh as, Amos Pinchot, 
Charles Crane, Harold Iokes and Gardner Gibson. 
The muckraking journalists E.W.Soripps, EJUYan Valkenberg 
and William Allen White. 
Those who could only be described as disciples of Roosevelt, 
notably Gifford Pinchott and the former Seoretary cf the 
Interior, James R. Garfield. 
25. 
They tended to be handicapped, however, f i r s t l y by a laok of co-
operation from the insurgent senators, and secondly by a difficulty 
i n deciding on a suitable candidate* The obvious choice as the 
insurgents' presidential nominee, Theodore Roosevelt, declined a l l 
attempts to get him to stand* The only apparent alternative was 
Senator l a Follette who appeared to have l i t t l e ohanoe of taking 
the nomination from Taft* La Pollette was a lover of lost causes, 
however, and a pledge of £* 100,000 towards his campaign fund was 
enough to coax him into a formal declaration of his candidacy on 
June 17th 1911* This was not to say that l a Follette was the 
undisputed candidate of the progressives i n the Republican ranks, 
indeed the majority of his backers s t i l l favoured Roosevelt as 
candidate, and many hoped that l a Pollette would stand down when 
the proper moment cams* The candidate himself, however, had no 
such intention, and set off across country an a oampaign that by 
October only too obviously showed that he was not making much 
headway i n his quest for convention delegates* Roosevelt himself 
was partly responsible for this by refusing to endorse l a Follette's 
candidacy, although he did give informal encouragement* This stand^ 
by Roosevelt slowly strangled the l a Follette movement, especially 
when he refused to disavow his own aspirations towards the 
candidacy. In fact by this time i t was obvious that Roosevelt was 
going to be a strong contender for the Republican nomination, he was 
merely refusing to shew his hand. 1* 
On January 16th, 1912, a formal Theodore Roosevelt organisation 
was established i n Chicago* Two days later the former President 
received carefully pre-arranged letters of solicitation from three 
1. "The Republican Party 1864-1964"'. George H. Mayer. P f > 321 5 
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Republican governors, asking him to run for the party nomination* 
He s t i l l made no move, however, merely using his replies to hint 
disoreetly of bis availability* Suoh manoeuvres show that Roosevelt 
did not want to offer himself as a candidate; he preferred a great 
popular movement to draft his nomination* I b i s he may have done out 
of vanity, but more probably to show that he was the choice cf the 
rank-and-file of the party and not merely of the bosses* 1* 
The campaign took a decisive turn, however, on February 2, 
when l a Follette, during a speech to the Periodic Publishers Association, 
1 ost his temper and with i t his p o l i t i c a l judgement, to give a rambling 
two hour tirade, which not only effectively removed him from the contest, 
but also gave his supporters a plausible reason for abandoning him 2* 
This event made i t more v i t a l for Roosevelt to make a forthright statement 
i f he wished to inherit l a Follette *s followers intaot. By this time, 
however, the Colonel was ready to put himself at the head of the insurgents 
i n the name of a new movement* He oonneoted the new Nationalism, a policy 
he had advocated i n the oampaign of 1910, to the Progressive movement by 
blaming the unfortunate President Taft for betraying the Progressive 
movement* This contention was an essential part of the complex 
motives that prompted Roosevelt to run* 3* 
Roosevelts oampaign managers by now had reoeived letters of 
support from a total of seven 4, Hep ub l i e an governors, and Roosevelt 
i 1. "The Republican Party 1854-1964". George H* Mayer, P 31 + 
2* "Roosevelt and Wilson". D.H*Elletson. PP 9T/S& 
3* "The Republican Party 1854-1964*. George H* Mayer. P3X$~ 
4* The seven were: 
Walter R. Stubbs (Kansas). J.M.Carey (Wyoming) 
W.E.Glasscock (West Virginia). Chase T. Osborn (Michigan) 
Chester H. Aldrioh (Nebraska). Herbert S* Hadley (Missouri) 
and Robert P*Bass (New Hampshire)* 
So eager were the Roosevelt Managers to obtain these letters, 
that Bass was interrupted whilst on his honeymoon* 
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regarding these as 'perfectly spontaneous* announced his candidacy 
by answering the letters on February, 25. The l a Follette boom 
collapsed. 1. 
Roosevelt had two advantages, both leftovers from his years 
as President which l a Follette as a candidate did not possess. 
F i r s t l y he was nationally known, whilst the Senator from Wisconsin 
was well-known only i n the Mid-West. Secondly the magic of the 
name Roosevelt ensured a rapid response to any financial appeal. 
Roosevelt commanded the support of many men of great wealth. Most 
notable of these were George W, Perkins 2. and Frank A. Munsey 3. 
who both pressed Roosevelt to run, and later supplied, according to 
the revaluations of the Clapp Committee over 0 500,000 to his campaign, 
and spent even larger sums i n indirect support.4« 
1. "Since 1900". O.J.Barck and N.M. Blake. P ~? 7 
2. Perkins was a former partner i n the House of Morgan, a 
director of International Harvester and an organiser of 
3. 
fCKlS 
trusts. He belonged to the wing of Business which was 
aroused by Taft's vigorous anti-trust policy, especially 
by the prosecution of so v i t a l a Morgan concern as the 
United States Steel Corporation. He thus preferred 
Roosevelt to either Taft or l a Follette. « 9 
Munsey was an influential publisher and a large 
stockbroker i n U.S.Steel. 
4. "Who Killed the Progressive Party". Harold L.Ickes. 
(American Historical Review - January, 1941 )• P^ 3c"} / 
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I n announcing formally that he was a candidate for the Republican 
nomination, Roosevelt had said "One of the chief principles for which 
I have stood i s the genuine rule of the people* I hope that the 
people may be given the chance, through direot primaries, to express 
their preference as to who shall be the nominee* 1* 
Taft held by patronage large bloos of delegates i n the South and 
East, therefore Roosevelt's only chance of convincing the Republican 
party that he was the logical choice for the Presidential nomination 
was to gain decisive victories i n the forthcoming primary elections* 
Primaries were then comparatively new to Amerioan po l i t i c s , being 
only introduced i n the early twentieth century i n Wisconsin. I n 
1912 thirteen states were to hold primaries giving a total of 588 
convention votes, l e s s than the majority needed to gain the nomination* 
Roosevelt's only hope was for large numbers of Taft delegates to defect 
to him, in the event of him winning decisive primary victories* 2* 
Roosevelt's decision to fight the primaries forced the very 
frontal encounter which Taft had been trying so hard to avoid. The 
election primaries developed into a series of nightmares for the 
President, who was totally unable to match Roosevelt as a mudslinger* 
In one contest after another, Taft was mercilessly defeated by the 
former President 5* 
In North Dakota Taft polled a mere 1,659 votes, sixteen more 
than the number of Federal office-holders in the state. Victory was 
denied Roosevelt on this occasion, however, by the intervention of 
l a Follette, who snatohed the spoils i n what was his own territory. 
La Follette had a following i n a few North-Central States, and this 
1. "Roosevelt and Wilson". D.H.Elletson* 
2. "A New History of the United States". William Miller.^/ 9 3 * 9 / 3 / 7 
5* "The Republican Party 1854-1964"'. George H* Mayer. P 3*. € 
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viotory i s only noteworthy as the high-water mark of his campaign. 
Elsewhere the spoils went to Roosevelt, who swept the states of I l l i n o i s 
and Pennsylvania with heavy majorities whilst sharing the Massaohusett's 
delegation with Taft* Even i n Ohio, the President's own state, and 
despite Warren G* Harding's support of Taft, Roosevelt won by a handsome 
majority* 1* 
The total votes gained by eaoh candidate i n a l l states i n which 
there were primaries were as follows:-
La Follette 551,045 votes* 
Taft 761,716 votes* 
Roosevelt 1,157,597 votes* 2* 
An analysis of these results d e a rly shows three things* F i r s t l y 
that President Taft was unpopular, a two-to-cne vote being registered 
against him* Seoondly that there was a growing demand from the 
Republican voter for a •Progressive Policy' and thirdly that Roosevelt 
was the voters* choice to Implement that policy* There was no 
doubt that the rank-and-file of the Republican party wanted Theodore 
Roosevelt as their Presidential oandidate* 5* 
This obvious popularity did not mean that he would secure the 
nomination* Taft, by using the power and the patronage of the 
Presidency, and his aides began organising State Conventions at 
which Taft delegates would be selected* I n the South the Republicans 
oould use patronage most effectively beoause of the high proportion 
of offices i n relation to the numbers actually voting* Nearly a l l 
delegates to Republican State and District Conventions i n the South 
were either office-holders or dependent upon the administration i n one 
way or another* The states of Florida, Louisiana, South Carolina and 
1. "The Republican Party 1854-1964", George H* Mayc 
"Roosevelt and Wilson** D.H. Elletson* 
yer* 
2* 
5* Ibid. PP S7/B2 
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Mississippi oast less than a t o t a l of 54,000 votes f o r Republican 
candidates at the Presidential eleotion of 1908, yet they sent as 
many delegates to the National Convention i n 1912 as did Oregon, 
New Hampshire, West Virgin ia , Connecticut and Kansas, who polled a 
combined Republican vote of 550,000* 1* 
Roosevelt could hardly complain at these anomalies, however, as 
he had insisted upon the maintenance of the status quo i n 1908 i n his 
anxiety to get Taft nominated. 2* 
In states where there were no primary elections, Roosevelt 
supporters organised r i v a l conventions to those organised by the 
Taf t machine. 5* Thus, when the Republican Convention met at Chicago, 
there were 254 contested seats out of a t o t a l of more than a thousand* 
These contested seats were judged by the Credential Committee, which 
l ike the Republican National Committee was controlled by Taf t . Final ly 
the Credential Committee gave 255 of these disputed seats to Taf t and 
nineteen to Roosevelt, probably a correct deoision i n that the Taf t 
delegates were elected under rules approved by Roosevelt himself only 
four years earlier* I n other contests, however, the Committee acted 
with t o t a l disregard to any notions of f a i r play and democracy* I n 
dealing with the states of Washington and Ohio, f o r example, they 
disregarded the results of the primary elections, which had voted 
overwhelmingly i n favour of Roosevelt, and awarded the delegates to 
Ta f t . 4 . 
Roosevelt, who had broken t rad i t ion and arrived at Chioago 
for ty-eight hours before the start of the Convention, was furious 
act the outcome of these oontested seats* nevertheless he concentrated 
his attack on the refusal of the ocmmittee to seat 72 of his delegates. 
1 . "Roosevelt and Wilson*. D.H. Elletson. 
2. I b i d . P 9t ^ 
5. "Third Party Movements i n the United States". William B* Besseltine. 
4. "The Republican Party 1854-1964". George H* Mayer. /*P3 *7/*i9 /3i? 
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I f these were not allowed to take their seats, he said, he would c a l l 
ton his own delegates to boycott the convention, a threat seen by many 
as a preliminary before a bolt by the Roosevelt delegates* 1* 
The major test of strength between the Taf t and Roosevelt forces 
came i n the election of a temporary chairman* The Roosevelt nominee 
was G-overnor Francis MoGovern of Wisconsin, a nomination designed to 
pick up votes i n the f avouri te-son delegations of l a Follet te and 
Cummins* He was defeated, however, 558 votes to 501, by the Taf t 
nominee, Senator Slihu Root of New York, who immediately ruled that 
delegates whose t i t l e s were i n dispute could vote i n every case except 
their own, thus enabling T a f t to p u l l his f u l l vote* Such a ru l ing 
foreshadowed a Taf t nomination* 2* 
For the next four days Roosevelt was merely biding his time 
before the inevitable bolt by his supporters* The reasons f o r th is 
s ta l l ing process were two-fold* F i r s t l y he wanted to show those 
Roosevelt supporters opposed to a s p l i t wi th the Republican parly 
that compromise was impossible, a fac t that Senator Warren of 
Wyoming found to his dismay when searching f o r a compromise candidate* 
Secondly, he wished to gain time to l ine up journalist ic and f inancia l 
support f o r a t h i rd party* 5* Eventually he obtained both commodities* 
Hunsey promising the backing of his newspaper chain, whils t Perkins backed 
the party f inancial ly* 4# 
On Saturday, June 22, nominations began* 
Taf t waa nominated by Warren Gamaliel Harding, an honour received 
thanks to puoh hard work behind the scenes by Harry Dougherty* 
There was no nominating speech made on behalf of Roosevelt 
beoause he had already forbidden his delegation to take any fur ther 
1* "Roosevelt and Wilson**. D.H.Blletson* ^ $3 
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part i n the proceedings u n t i l his 72 disputed delegates were seated* 
A nominating speech was made f o r l a Fol le t te , however, followed by the 
seconding speeches, and then the f i r s t , and only, ballot* The result , 
which was never seriously i n doubt, was as f ollows:-
Taf t : 561 votes* 
Roosevelt: 107 
La Follette 41 
Cummins 17 
Hughes 2 
A fur ther 544 delegates, a l l members of the Roosevelt delegation, 
abstained from voting* 
Later that day, as the Taft-Sherman t icket was being renominated, 
Roosevelt urged his supporters to bol t the party. The bolt ing delegates 
met at the Orchestra Hal l where they heard the former President c a l l f o r 
a Progressive Party enforcing the oommandment 'Thou shalt not steal '* 
The delegates were then urged to return home to sound opinion and to 
reconvene on August 5 to launch the new party* 2* 
Roosevelt was thus f u l l y committed to the formation of a new 
party* There was no going baok; a decision he probably regretted 
within a week of taking i t * The cause f o r his regret was the 
Democratic nomination f o r the Presidency* The Democrats i n 
Convention at Baltimore chose Governor Woodrow Wilson of New Jersey 
as Presidential candidate on a progressive platform coated with a 
vague 'states rights* patina to placate the conservative southern 
elements within the party* 5* 
Wilson was a newoomer to national p o l i t i c s , having gained an 
academio reputation, f i r s t as a professor and then President of 
1* "Roosevelt and Wilson*. D.H. Elletson. P'Uf, 
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Princeton University. His tiro years as reform Governor of New 
Jersey thrust him in to the p o l i t i c a l spotlight, and i n 1912 he 
defeated the favoured *Champ' Clarke f o r the Democratic nomination. 
The appearance of another progressive candidate undoubtedly damaged 
Roosev9lt,s chances. From the Progressive point of view Clarke would 
have been a better choice, i n order to s p l i t the conservative vote 
between Taft and the Democrat. 1* Governor Osborne of Mionigan, one 
of the seven governors who had asked Roosevelt to stand, now went so 
f a r as to consider a th i rd party unnecessary, although to his credit , 
his loyalty throughout the campaign was unswerving. However, apart 
from Senator Dixon of Montana, no Republican Senator or Governor who 
was due f o r re-election i n 1912 followed Roosevelt. 2* 
I n f ac t fern members of the Republican party i n Congress or i n the 
Governors* Mansions followed the Colonel. With the exceptions of such 
as Bristow of Kansas, Poindexter of Washington, Governor Hiram Johnson 
of California and ex-Senator Beveridge of Indiana, who thus signed his 
p o l i t i c a l death warrant, the upper echelons of the Progressive Party 
were, i n the main, s taffed by lame duck faot ionalis ts who were at odds 
with T a f t . 5. 
I n his 'History of the U.S.A. * Andre Maurois notes that *Roosevelt's 
tone was that of a f igh t ing parson* that by using 'B ib l i ca l imagery and 
voice l ike a s h r i l l i n g f i f e s t i r red men to wrath to combat and to antique 
vir tue*. Such-observations might have been taken di rect ly from the 
Convention of the Progressive Parly of 1912, where the atmosphere was 
nearer to that of a revival meeting than a p o l i t i c a l gathering. 
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Roosevelt's nomination was a foregone conclusion. He was joined 
on the t icket by G-ovesnor Hiram Johnson of California, and feted by the 
f a i t h f u l to the tune of 'Onward Christian Soldiers ' . The two candidates 
were the acclaimed advocates of Progressive ideals. Roosevelt commanded 
a following of average men and women whose devotion was almost religious, 
whilst Johnson was a state governor whose progressive record of 
accomplishments has not been matched to th is day. 1* 
The main points, of the Progressive platform (the complete party 
manifesto can be found i n the appendix to th is chapter) were straight-
forward and hardly novel. The party endorsed the prinoiple of protection, 
but denounced the Payne-Aldrich t a r i f f , a h igh - t a r i f f measure that tended 
to help eastern industry at the expense of the producers of raw material 
i n the South and the West. Also the party advocated most of the 
progressive measures approved at the Democratic and Republican Conventions. 
The fac t that the Progressives held the i r Convention last has made them 
appear to be stealing planks of the other parties ' platforms, whereas 
i n f ac t they were often the originators of such reforms. The Progressives 
fur ther brought out three novel doctrines. F i r s t l y they wanted the 
suspension of trust-4>usting which was; to be replaced by the regulation 
of business by a federal commission. Secondly, they sought a blanket 
endorsement of the various devices f o r direot government, obviously a 
move to placate l a Follet te and his supporters from the p o l i t i c a l l y -
conscious Mid-West. Thirdly, the Progressives proposed a variety of 
laws f o r 'social and indust r ia l justice*. 2* These included the 
improvement of health standards, the prohibition of chi ld labour, and 
the promotion of eocnomic welfare. These were popular measures with the 
1 . "Who Rilled the Progressive Party*. Harold L . Ickes 
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rank-and-file Progressive campaigners, and were also possible vote-grinning 
reforms appealing to areas previously Democratic or even Socialist . 
She Democrats advanced a platform akin to Laissez-faire liberalism* 
I t encouraged competition, but tempered by the need to curb monopolies* 
Wilson, however, tended to indulge i n high-sounding phrases and vague 
generalities, both l e f t over from hiB Princeton days* Roosevelt was 
f a r more speoific. Indeed Wilson said of the former President *he i s 
a real v i v i d person whom they have seen and voted f o r , and shouted 
themselves hoarse over, millions strong; I am a vague conjectural 
personality, more made up of opinions and academic prepossessions 
than of human t r a i t s and red corpuscles* 1* 
However, i f Wilson lacked the Colonel's personality, he did 
possess the most precious of p o l i t i c a l commodities - an organisation* 
Roosevelt had s t i l l to build up a national organisation, from local 
parties and individuals* Inevitably, therefore, organisation wi thin 
the Progressive party was piecemeal* I n six states Roosevelt 
controlled the Republican organisation, who would rebel i f ordered to 
do so, Roosevelt did not want rebellion at th is stage, however, 
he wanted organisation, and thus t r i ed to keep suoh states as these 
intact , aiming to take over the complete Republican organisation,2, 
This he accomplished i n the states of California and South Dakota, 
where the Progressives remainded i n the Republican party, and 
controlled i t so completely that they instructed Republican 
presidential electors f o r Roosevelt* Thus Republican regulars could 
only vote f o r Taft as a wr i t e - in candidate* A similar situation 
occurred i n Oklahoma, where a l l but two of the Republican eleotors 
1 . "Roosevelt and Wilson1*. D.H. Elletson* S* 
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were committed to Roosevelt. Elsewhere both Progressive and Republican 
eleotors appeared on the ba l lo t , although a fur ther four states managed 
to avoid a suicidal Republioan-Progressive contest f o r local o f f ices . 
Generally the old guard Republican candidates sought to arrest the 
disintegration of the i r parly by a fusion arrangement on state t ickets . 
This manoeuvre usually f a i l e d however due to the b i t t e r partisanship 
at the grass roots of the two parties* 1 . 
Following the Taft-fioosevelt battles of the previous spring and 
summer, the Presidential campaign i t s e l f was very much an anti-climax. 
This was because many observers thought that nothing could now avert a 
Wilson vic tory. Republican morale was thus very low. 
The campaign was a d u l l one, although three points i n i t stood 
out, each one affecting one of the three contenders f o r the Presidency*2, 
The chances of Taf t securing re-election, chances he oonfided to 
friends he had l i t t l e hope of f u l f i l l i n g , took a fur ther blow during 
the oampalgn when Vice-President Sherman suddenly died. He was 
replaced by Nicholas Murray Butler, the President of Columbia University* 
However, a change of candidate at suoh a late date only pushed Republican 
morale fur ther in to the depths* Taf t had realised by then that he was 
a beaten man, and confessed that he might as well abandon the f igh t* 3* 
Roosevelt meanwhile was using every small inoident to create 
sensations during the long l i s t l e s s campaign* The Colonel's f l a i r 
f o r drama was shown at Milwaukee when on October 14 he was shot, 
and superfioially wounded, whilst speaking from his oampaign t r a i n . 
Rather than ret i re immediately to have the wound dressed, Roosevelt 
1 . "The Republican Party 1854-1964*. George H. Meyer. 
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brash hero of the Cuban War, ohose to f i n i s h his speech f i r s t , even 
going t o the extreme i n emphasising points by waving a bloody 
handkerohief • 1 . Whilst i s i s not, of course, possible to state i f 
Roosevelt benefitted i n sympathy votes by this shooting, i t does 
serve as an example to show the difference i n personality between Taft 
the administrator, Wilson the academic and la ter statesman, and 
Roosevelt the p o l i t i c i a n . To the credit of Taf t and Wilson, they did 
show a charitable s p i r i t i n pal l ing a pause to the campaign, fol lowing 
this incident to the Progressive candidate. 2. 
Roosevelt, i n one respect at least, showed a similarly charitable 
s p i r i t to Wilson. During the campaign some of the Republicans had 
coupled Wilson* s name wi th that of a Mrs. Peck i n a campaign of l i e s 
and innuendo. The lady i n question was a twice-divorced American 
sociali te, resident i n Bermuda, whom Wilson had met whilst on 
vacation during his days at Princeton University. There was l i t t l e 
doubt that there was no t ru th i n the Republican charges, and 
Roosevelt went out of his way to make i t clear that he did not believe 
the rumours. 1Beside3* he said with typical abruptness ' i t would not 
work. You can't cast a man i n the part of Romeo, who looks and 
acts so much l ike the Apothecary*s c l e rk ' . 3. 
Again i t i s d i f f i o u l t to analyse what e f fec t these rumours 
had on Wilson, though probably they mattered very l i t t l e . Indeed they 
did not affeot i n any way Wilson*s public Image as President. 
L i t t l e surprise was shown when i t was announced that Wilson had 
won the election, albeit by a minority vote over Taft and Roosevelt. 
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The eleotoral college results, however, gave the Republican Party 
i t s worst reversal i n the college h i s to ry ,1 , 
The result of the eleotion was as f ollows:-
Wilson (Democrat) 6,296,547 votes, 435 Eleotoral Votes, 
Roosevelt (Progressive) 4,126,020 votes, 88 " " 
Taft (Republican) 3,486,720 votes, 8 w n 2, 
Almost a mi l l ion other eleotora showed the i r distrust of a l l 
three major candidates and voted f o r the Socialist candidate, Eugene 
V,Sebs,5, 
Roosevelt took defeat we l l , being quoted to reporters as saying, 
' I accept the result with entire good humour and contentment,• 4 , The 
Progressive party, surprisingly, had gained second place on the ba l lo t , 
whilst only two months before i t had possessed l i t t l e or no organisation. 
Such a factor only emphasises the f ac t that the majority of so-called 
•Progressive* votes, wi th the possible exception of the Midwestern 
states, were, i n fac t , purely personal votes f o r Roosevelt, This was 
shown i n the 1914 mid-term elections when the Progressive party, without 
the oharismatic appeal of the former President, lost almost a l l the ground 
gained i n the previous four years. The result clearly vindicated Roosevelt's 
1 , Twenty four years la te r Alfred Land on again only polled eight 
college votes, thus sharing th is dubious dis t inct ion with Ta f t , 
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claim to have been the choice of the majority of Republicans. 1. 
The Taft forces argued that Roosevelt had, by splitting the 
Republican party, presented the Presidency to Wilson. There i s , 
however, no evidence to this effect, and I would be more inclined to 
think that Roosevelt's intervention saved the Republicans from a 
landslide defeat in a straight fight with Wilson. Further I would 
consider i t ridiculous to suggest that Roosevelt alone had split the 
G.P.P.; surely the party had split i tse l f .2 . 
Roosevelt lost the Presidency in 1912 by failing to make inroads 
into the more traditionally Democratic strongholds of the East and 
the South. He carried a total of six states in the election, and 
four of these (Minnesota, Michigan, South Dakota and Washington) 
formed a scattered strong of states near the Canadian border, which 
doubtless voted for Roosevelt out of fear for Taft's reciprocity 
programme. He also carried the states of California, which was no 
doubt swayed by the presence of Johnson on the Progressive tickets, 
and Pennsylvania, a strong Republican state, which in 1912 preferred 
Roosevelt's brand of Republicanism to that of Taft, Elsewhere, however, 
the inroads which Roosevelt made into the Taft vote, without gaining 
any from the Democrats' column, meant a state given to Wilson. Wilson 
won the election of 1912, not because of the Taft-Roosevelt split, but 
because he himself was a progressive candidate who successfully rebuffed 
Roosevelt's charge in Democratic territory, a manoeuvre Taft was unable 
to accomplish because of his prior record of conservatism.3. 
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Throughout history, Taf t , f o r his unpopularity wi th the 
electorate, w i l l doubtless take the blame f o r the Republican defeat 
of 1912* The results of the Congressional elections showed, however, 
that the party i t s e l f was almost as unpopular. I t even lost seats 
held since the party's inception, over f i f t y years before, most 
notable i n defeat being 'Unole* Joe Cannon, the Speaker of the House 
of Representatives* 1 . 
The composition of the two houses af ter the 1912 elections was 
as fo l lows: - 2. 
House of Representatives 
Democrats. 291. Republicans 127. Progressives 17. 
Senate 
Democrats. 51 . Republicans 44. Progressives 11 . 
The Progressives now had to make up the i r minds whether to 
remain an independent party, or return to the Republican f o l d . As 
the party contained few practioal pol i t ic ians , and the rank-and-file 
did not understand how p o l i t i c a l parties were organised having bl indly 
followed Roosevelt i n 1212, the majority of Progressives believed that 
their party already constituted one of the country's two major part ies. 
They accordingly decided to oontinue the bol t and wait f o r 1914 and 
1916 and the ultimate eclipse of the Republican party. 5. 
I f the party up to the eleotion of 1912 had been that of 
Roosevelt, then the post-1912 party became increasingly that of 
George W. Perkins, who came to oontrol the National Committee of the 
1 . "The Republican Party 1854-1964". George H. Meyer. > ° 3 3 
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party, and ultimately the party i t s e l f* Under Perkins, Executive 
Committee meetings were neither frequent, nor even at f i xed intervals 
being held more at Perkins 1 own pleasure* 1* 
Following the Presidential campaign Roosevelt v is i ted Brazi l , 
but whereas i n 1910 he returned from Af r i ca ' f ee l ing l ike a Bul l 
Moose*, he returned from South America lacking i n his old vigour 
and dynamism* 
I n 1914, despite the obvious need f o r the Progressives to 
consolidate the position gained two years before, the party made only 
a half-hearted campaign, and, as such, lost the chance to get a large 
Progressive Congressional caucus to give the neoessary prestige f o r 
the 1916 campaign* 2* 
E f f o r t s were made i n 1914 to secure the election of Grifford 
Pinohott and Raymond Robins as Senators f o r Pennsylvania and I l l i n o i s 
respectively, both states where Roosevelt had a large personal following* 
Roosevelt, to his credit , made every possible e f f o r t to get them elected, 
but to no avai l , thus proving, to the Progressives* disappointment, that 
while a strong popular leader can win votes f o r himself, he cannot deliver 
even the most devoted followers to another* 5* 
Undoubtedly the disappointing results f o r the Progressives i n 
1914 were due to the inevitable defections back to the Republicans 
i n the two years following Presidential elections. The glamour of 
the protest vote i n 1912 had at last worn o f f , and the weaker of the 
rebellious Republicans were now returning to their former allegiance.4, 
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Many Progressive leaders s t i l l wanted thei r party t o carry on 
despite this las t spate of election results. Whilst they did not 
believe that they could defeat Wilson i n 1916 they reasoned that 
they oould at least give the Republicans another beating, wi th the 
hope that the G-.O.P. following two heavy eleotion defeats would then 
f o l d up, leaving the Progressives as one of the two main parties almost 
by default* 1* 
However, there was only one man capable of administering suoh a 
blow to the Republicans, and that man, Theodore Roosevelt, was unlikely 
to run again, unless put i n a position i n which he oould hardly refuse* 
Roosevelt, i n f ac t , had already suggested another, Senator Philander 
C*Enox, as a possible candidate, thus making i t clear to Progressives 
that i f the Colonel were to be the i r candidate i n 1916 he would have to 
be drafted* 2. 
Roosevelt was obviously hoping to reoeive both Republican 
and Progressive nominations, and thus unite the warring f actions*5. I f 
th is were h i a plan he was doomed to disappointment, f o r the leaders of 
the Republican party, led by the formidable Boise Penrose, s t i l l held a 
deep hatred f o r the man that they believed cost them victory i n 1912* 
Many Progressives believed, as Perkins wanted Roosevelt to believe, that 
the Republicans, having been taught a lesson i n 1912, might give Roosevelt 
their nomination i n 1916,4* 
Roosevelt wanted union wi th the Republicans, as did Perkins; 
the Republican Old Guard also wanted union, but not wi th Roosevelt* 
Perkins was w i l l i n g to support Roosevelt f o r President i f he would 
seoure his nomination without too much e f fo r t* He was equally w i l l i n g 
to support someone else i f he, George Perkins, was i n at the choosing, 
1* "Who Kil led the Progressive'Party*. Harold L . Ickes* 
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I t thus became olear that i f Roosevelt were to run, i t would be 
as the Progressive candidate only, a f te r he had suffered the humiliation 
of being offered to the Republicans, and been refused by them. 1* 
Meanwhile speculation amongst Republicans led to Justice Charles 
E.Hughea as a probable candidate f o r the Presidency. 2. 
So as to engineer a reunion of Progressives and Republicans, 
via the i r both nominating the same candidate. Perkins organised both 
party- conventions to be i n Chicago, and to both open on the same day, 
7th June. The Republican convention was to be held i n the Coliseum, 
whilst the Auditoreum Theatre was to be the venue of the Progressive 
convention. 
Perkins1 plan at the Progressive convention was to wait and 
see who was nominated by the Republicans, and then endorse th i s 
nomination. He did this af ter having been i n conference with the 
Republican Old Guard Leaders, and f u l l knowing that the majority 
of Progressive delegates s t i l l wanted Roosevelt as the i r candidate. S. 
Perkins, i f the plan were to succeed, thfts had to s t a l l f o r time, 
while the Progressive delegates, who only wanted to nominate Roosevelt 
and go home, beoame increasingly suspicious that they were to be defeated 
i n the i r attempt to nominate their hero. 
Unlike four years earl ier , Roosevelt was not present at the 
Convention, being at home i n Oyster Bay, although i n communication 
with convention proceedings via a private l ine to Perkins. The only 
view that Roosevelt thus had of the 1916 Convention was through the 
eyes of a former partner i n J.P.Morgan & Co., hardly an unbiassed 
view of the proceedings. 4 . 
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A number of Progressives, including Giflbrd Pinchot, Harold Ickes, 
Raymond Robins and William Allen White, then realised that there was 
no chance of the Republicans nominating Roosevelt, unless the 
Progressives did so f i r s t , thus showing to the Old Guard that the 
Colonel was s t i l l the i r hero* Perkins, they now realised, was 
sel l ing the Progressive party down the river* 
Thus as the Republicans were nominating their oandidate, so 
Bainbridge Colby, who was i n telephone oontaot with the Republican 
convention, rose and nominated Roosevelt as the Progressive presidential 
oandidate f o r 1916* The nomination was seconded by Governor Hiram 
Johnson and made unanimous* Johnson himself was then offered the 
Vice-Presidential nomination; he deolined, however, and the nomination 
eventually went to John M* Parker, a former Governor of Louisiana* 
Perkins world f e l l around him as the Convention Chairman, Robins, 
refused to give him the f l o o r and so block Roosevelt's nomination* 
So swif t was Roosevelt's nomination, that the Progressive Convention 
had adjourned before Charles E.Hughes was nominated by the Republioans*l« 
Theodore Roosevelt was nominated by the Progressive Convention 
on 12th June, 1916, at 12.04 p*m* He was immediately contacted by 
William Al len White, but Roosevelt made i t olear that he would not 
accept the nomination just voted him, whilst being annoyed at 
Perkins f o r having cut him off from contact with his friends at the 
Convention. Roosevelt wanted time to consider his verdict , being 
under great personal stress at th is time, following the death of his 
son, Quentin, who was k i l l e d behind German lines whilst serving wi th 
the A i r Force. He did not categorically refuse the nomination, 
1 . "Who Ki l led the Progressive Party"* Harold L*Iokes. 
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although, his decision was interpreted by newspapers as such* Many 
progressives thus were given to believe that Roosevelt had betrayed 
their party.l. 
Such a statement was hard for Progressives to believe, for more 
than once he had assured his followers that, win or lose i n 1912, 
he would carry on* They considered i t inconceivable that he 
had allowed them to convene, and now did not intend to abide by the 
decision of that convention. He was even distrusted by his former 
admirers for supporting a Progressive-Republican compromise candidate 
i n the arch-conservative Senator Henry Cabot Lodge* 2* Roosevelt 
was thus discredited by the very party who only a few weeks earlier 
had unanimously acclaimed him their choice for President* 
Undoubtedly Roosevelt placed too much trust i n Perkins, without 
consulting others, who for themselves, tml ike Perkins, had no ulterior 
motive* As Harold Ickes notes 'Perkins capitalised and betrayed the 
enthusiasm for, and devotion to, Roosevelt** 
The Progressive National Committee met again soon after Roosevelt 
declined the nomination, and decided by a vote of 52 to 6 to support 
Hughes, although Bainbridge Colby advocated the retention of an 
independent third party headed by Victor Murdock. Parker, the 
vice-Presidential nominee, also made a plea for a third party ticket, 
and even ran for vice •President alone, as the Progressive nominee* 
Such an act of defiance was, of course, doomed to failure, indeed on 
account of eleotion laws in many states, he was only able to get on the 
ballot i n seven of them* 5* 
1* "Third Party Movements in the United States** William B*Hesseltine* 
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The majority of Progressives, however, followed Roosevelt back 
to the Republican ranks, an act that doubtless pleased Perkins. On the 
Republican National Committee for the Presidential campaign of 1916 
there were besides Willoox, the chairman, eleven regular Republicans 
and six Progressives* 1« However, despite Old Guard and Progressives 
serving on the same committee, any efforts to amalgamate Progressives 
with Republicans f a i l e d . This was mainly due to the leaders of the 
Republican party being unwilling to re-admit the Progressives to the 
Republican fold without some period of probation. 
Hughes* campaign was conducted with a complete lack of vision 
by his managers. The unfortunate Hughes also had to tolerate and 
suffer the support of Roosevelt, who spoke during the oampaign on 
behalf of a candidate he had previously called * a very, very s e l f -
centred man*. 2. Suoh support was dubious as Roosevelt was at this 
time so pro-ally i n his views on World War I as to be a l i a b i l i t y 
to Hughes, i n a neutrality-conscious United States. The Progressive 
party had, i n 1912, made a Wilson victory possible i n that year; i n 
1916 there were s t i l l enough resentful and disillusioned Progressives 
to assure his re-^leotion. 5. At the National Committee meeting of 
the Republican Party held i n St.Louis i n February, 1918, Harold I eke a, 
1* The six werei-
Everett Colby (New Jersey) 
James L.G-arfield (Ohio) 
Harold L^Iokes ( I l l i n o i s ) 
George W. Perkins (New York) 
Chester H.Rowell (California) 
Oscar S. Straus (New York) 
("Who Killed the Progressive Party". Harold L.Ickes 
American Historical Review - January, 1941)* A-
2* "Roosevelt and Wilson*. D.H. Elletson. */3jL 
5. "T.R. The Story of Theodore Roosevelt and his influence 
on our times", Noel F. Busch. 
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himself a former Progressive, once more suggested union. Again 
such efforts were thwarted. There was no movement to reunite the 
two factions, as there had been a movement to split them, instead there 
was merely a dr i f t from the Progressive back to the Republicans, or to 
a new found allegiance i n the Democratic ranks. 
Many commentators accuse Roosevelt of betraying the Progressive 
Party, but one cannot help but f e e l that the true v i l l i a n of the 
piece was Perkins who by his oonniving, used the party as a tool 
for himself, i n order to further his own ambitions, both p o l i t i c a l 
and professional. 1* 
The Progressive Party was now dead; what lasting memory, i f any, 
had i t made upon both American l i f e and the p o l i t i c a l institutions of 
that country? 
Basically the Progressive movement helped to destroy the autonomous 
character of p o l i t i c a l parties. Party leaders now found i t harder to 
control and discipline; a direct result of progressivism whioh advocated 
the adoption of the secret Australian ballot, thereby barring p o l i t i c a l 
parties from printing their own voting papers, and also the enaction of 
legislation bringing the Primary election into being. Primaries, of 
course, stripped the party of much of i t s control over the nomination 
of candidates, although, as was seen i n 1912, such eleotions did not strip 
party bosses of complete control. 2. 
I n short, beoause of the Progressive revolution, politioal parties 
lost their private voluntary status, and became public institutions, 
the helpless prey of eleotoralopinion. 5. 
A function of a p o l i t i c a l party i s to influence opinion; the 
S. 
2. 
1. "Who Killed the Progressive Party". Harold L. Iokes 
(American Historical Review - January, 1941). ^ s3l 
"The Republican Party 1854-1964". George H. Meyer. P^J^yJit 
Ibid. PilJL 
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Progressives I f e e l did this without gaining oontrol of the federal 
government. Influence does not necessarily mean oontrol, as 
the Bull*4Ioosers showed - a factor that must be studied closely when 
evaluating i f the party was i n fact a success. 
CHAPTER 2. 
49. 
The Presidential Campaign of Robert M. l a Follette. 192A 
This chapter was originally to have been headed 'The Progressive 
Party of 1924 1. However, unlike Theodore Roosevelt i n 1912 and Henry 
Wallace i n 1948, La Pollette did not run as a candidate of a 'Progressive' 
party but as an independent nominee of the Conference for Progressive 
P o l i t i c a l Action. Thus, out of deference to the memory of La Follette 
I have, i n the t i t l e to this chapter, placed the emphasis not upon the 
organisation that supported the candidate, but upon the candidate himself, 
Senator Robert Marion La Follette 1. of Wisconsin. 
La Follette, of course, was no newcomer to progressive politics. 
A reform Governor and Senator he was instrumental i n the founding of the 
National Progressive Republican League i n 1911, only to have the mantle of 
'hero' of the progressive Republican stolen from him at the eleventh hour 
by Theodore Roosevelt.2. La Follette never forgave Roosevelt for this, 
and on election day, although La Follette's Republicans carried Wisconsin, 
the State's votes i n the electoral college were delivered to Woodrow 
Wilson 3. 
1. Robert M. La Follette (1855-1925) entered local politics 
following a short period of private practice as a lawyer. 
From 1885 u n t i l 1891 he was a representative i n Congress. 
In 1901 he was elected on the Republican ticket as Govenor 
of Wisconsin, and subsequently re-elected i n 1903 and 1905. 
His more notable achievements as Governor were i n securing 
the passage of state laws taxing railways according to 
valuation (1903), nominating a l l candidates for public office 
by direct voting of the people (the primary election^,) (1904) 
and for regulating railways i n the state through a state 
commission (1905). He resigned the governorship i n 1905 on 
election to the United States Senate, to which office he was 
re-elected for a further three terms. In 1915 be had been 
the Senate Sponsor for the Seamen's B i l l which provided for 
better working conditions and an increase i n the lifesaving 
equipment on board ships. He had been a contender for the 
Republican President nomination i n 1912, only to have his 
ambitions thwarted by Theodore Roosevelt and President Taft, 
who succeeded i n blocking his nomination f i r s t as regular 
Republican and second as a progressive. 
2. 'The Era of Theodore Roosevelt'. George E. Mowry. P^^+'/lfJ? 
3. 'Facts about the Presidents'. Joseph Natham Kane. J>/j?-j 
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In the legislation of the New Freedom, La Follette and the 
insurgent Republicans a l l i e d themselves with the Liberal Democrats 
i n Congress. However, i t was i n the sphere of foreign policy that 
La Follette became most c r i t i c a l of the Wilson Administration. 
During the F i r s t World War, the Wisconsin Senator endorsed a 
policy of s t r i c t neutrality, and even joined with the Socialists i n 
saying that i t was economic r i v a l r i e s which really lay at the base 
of the conflict. 'La Follette's Magazine* said that the Navy 
League was ' l i t t l e more than a branch office of the house of J.P. 
Morgan and Company, and a general sales promotion bureau for the 
various armour and munitions industries'. Then Wilson sent a 
punitive expedition to Mexico, following raids by Mexico, following 
raids by Mexican bandits into United States territory, La Follette 
unerringly scented o i l and industrial interests. 
1. 'Third Party Movements i n the United States'. William B. J° 
Hesseltine. 
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The policies he advocated, however, ensured that the Republican 
party would never accept him, being as i t was, very much influenced 
by both Socialist and pacifist thought. As a contender for the 
Republican nomination he denounced J.P.Morgan and the Navy League, 
advocated the nationalisation of the munitions industry and proposed 
an embargo on arms and ammunition. He also wanted a national 
referendum prior to any declaration of war by the United States, 
and supported a conference of nations to settle issues, and an 
international tribunal for settling international disputes.1. 
As i f to back up La Follette's claim to the nomination, the 
Wisconsin and North Dakota 2. delegates to the Republican convention 
presented a platform, different only from what La Follette advocated 
i n that i t was more comprehensive. Again there was a c a l l for 
government manufacture of munitions, a policy of s t r i c t neutrality, 
a conference of neutral nations, an international peace tribunal, and 
a referendum before an American declaration of war. The platform also 
wanted the end of secret diplomacy and dollar diplomacy, a scie n t i f i c 
t a r i f f , a patent law so designed as to not foster the creation of 
monopolies, a stronger pure food law, and as an appeasment to the feminist 
movement, female suffrage. 
The Republicans nominated Justice Charles E.Hughes, being more 
concerned with regaining the support of the Bull-Moosers than listening 
to the extreme proposals of La Follette. Undaunted, La Follette 
continued his crusade and following the Russian Revolution went so far 
as to applaud that people's efforts at reform, and condemn Wilson's 
'private war' against the Soviets. The circulation of 'La Follette's 
Magazine' grew and i t became apparent that the viewpoint of the 
Senator was at l a s t gaining attention. 
1. 'Third Party Movements i n the United States'. William B. 9* 
Hesseltine. 
2. The North Dakota State Republican organisation was i n fact 
controlled by an agrarian socialist movement, which i n 1916 
entered the Republican primary, and following their success 
was able to exact a Socialist programme under the Republican 
labels ^ 
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In the Senate, La Follette attacked American entanglement i n the 
League of Nations, and the Esch Oumrrri ngs Railroad Act, which released 
railways from government control at the end of the F i r s t World War. 
In 1917 a Committee of forty-eight had been convened at St.Louis 
for the purpose of causing as much po l i t i c a l agitation as possible to 
secure La Follette's nomination at the 1920 Republican Convention. 
At the beginning of 1920 La Follette was indeed hopeful of widespread 
support at the convention and said that his views were now more accepted 
because 'people were beginning to see that the war was fermented to feed 
the avaricious few'. However, despite this wakening i n the country 
towards La Follette the Republican Convention was not so earily impressed, 
and again would not even permit the reading of the Wisconsin platform 1. 
The Convention nominated Warren Gamaliel Harding, who, the folloidng 
November, defeated the Democrat nominee, James M.Cox, to become President 2. 
For two more years, while the Harding administration carried out i t s 
policy of 'Back to Normalcy' La Follette kept up what at times must have 
seemed a hopeless fight. I n February, 1922, however, his Presidential 
aspirations received a boost with the formation i n Chicago of the 
Conference for Progressive P o l i t i c a l Action or CP.P.A. designed as a 
vehicle with ^•^hich to push La F o l l e t t e ' s candidacy i n 1924.3. 
The CP.P.A. was not a party, i t was an association formed from a 
wide range of p o l i t i c a l groups who considered La Follette an able 
Presidential candidate. Prominent among these groups were the Railroad 
Brotherhoods, who considered themselves victimised by an extremely 
sweeping injunction obtained by Hardings Attorney-General, Harry Dougherty 
i n a major strike i n 1922; the Farmers' Union, who were doubtless feeling 
the effects of the agricultural depression; the Socialist Party of America, 
1. 'Third Party Movements i n the United States'. William B. ^S^r 
Hesseltine. 
2. 'Facts about the Presidents'. Joseph Nathan Kane. ^'97 
3. 'The Socialist Party of America'. David A.Shannon. SiV^y^ 
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who were hoping to eventually form a third party, very much on the 
lines of the British Labour Party; the Farmer-Labour Party of Minnesota, 
and the non-Partisan League. The committee of forty-eight, which was 
made up of Roosevelt Progressives who refused to rejoin the G-.O.P. in 
1916, also joined, as did the Church League for Industrial Democracy, 
the Methodist Federation of Social Service, and the National Catholic 
Welfare Council.1. 
The Communist Party tried to take over the organisation. However, 
their efforts were foiled, only for the Communists to then capture and 
wreck the Farmer-Labour Party. 
The C.P.P.A. next issued a statement of intent i n i t s 'Address to 
the American People', which was basically a 1922 version of Populism and 
pre-war Progressiveism, being against many things i t considered 
reactionary, but being for only the vague concept of 'government of 
the people by the people, for the people'.2. 
In the mid-term elections of 1922 radical La Follette Republicans 
won a number of seats, and i n December of that year, following a call 
for unity amongst the Progressives i n Congress from La Follette, they 
formed the People's Legislative Service, intent on driving 'Special 
Privilege out of the control of the government and restore i t to the 
people'. This group was responsible for three important entries into 
the Congressional Record. F i r s t l y , they forced a raise i n the surtax 
on incomes, thus making the direct taxation system a l i t t l e more 
progressive, secondly, they prevented the government from giving the 
Muscle Shoals power plant on the Tennesee River to Henry Ford, thus 
giving a smack i n the eye to big business, and la s t l y , they attacked 
the Interstate Commerce Commission forits favouritism to the railway 
networks. 
1. 'Third Party Movements in the United States'. William B. PS^. 
Hesseltine. 
2. 'The Socialist Party of America'. David A.Shannon. P 9 
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Two years later, however, at the Republican Convention, La Follette was 
spumed once more by that party, the presidential nomination going to 
Calvin Coolidge.l. the incumbent at the White House, amidst a charge 
of intrigue 2, on the part of William M. Butler, a Massachusetts textile 
industrialist, and Coolidge's cabinet advisers.3. 
The Progressive forces then decided to meet i n Convention at 
Cleveland to choose a candidate to contest the election as an Independent. 
La Follette was i n i t i a l l y the favourite for the nomination, but not after 
some opposition from William Gibbs Mc.Adoo, the war-time Federal 
Administrator of railways, who, however, lost a l l hope of the nomination 
when he was implicated i n the Teapot Dome Oil Scandals, a left-over 
from the Harding Administration. The National Committee of the C.P.P.A. 
accordingly invited La Follette to be the Presidential nominee. They 
did this even before the Convention opened mainly to prevent the 
formation of a third party. A floor nomination, they considered, 
smacked of organisation. This invitation was accepted by La Follette, 
with the proviso that he stood as an independent and not as a candidate 
of a new p o l i t i c a l party. The candidate did, however, predict that 
a new party would probably be formed after the election, thereby 
implying that the Presidential election was to be used to see i f , i n 
fact, there was sufficient demand for a third party.4. 
The Vice-^Presidential nomination was eventually given, at a meeting 
of the C.P.P.A. national committee to the Democratic Senator from 
Montana, Burton K. Wheeler.5, who had been subject to much publicity 
following his investigation of the scandals of the Harding Administration. 
1. Harding having died i n office during his f i r s t term. 
2. 'Since 1900' O.J.Barck and N.M.Blake. P 3*3 
3. Coolidge gained 1,065 Convention votes, La Follette a mere 
34 ('History of the U.S.A.'. Andre Maurois). />/// 
4. 'The Socialist Party of America'. David A.Shannon. 
5. Ibid. P'H 
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While such a running-mate added prestige to the ticket, and balanced i t 
politically, I f e e l that the C.P.P.A. lost many votes by not balancing 
the ticket georgraphically, both candidates coming from the mid-west. 
The ticket would probably have benefitted by having Justice Louis 
Brandeis, an early contender, as La Follette's running-mate, a good 
geographical choice being a New Yorker, as well as a popular choice 
with the Socialists, who had not nominated a candidate of their own. 
The C.P.P.A. platform was based upon fourteen points, and was 
almost entirely the work of La Follette himself. I t asserted that the 
power of the Federal government must be used to crush, not foster, 
monopolies. Public ownership of water power was to be established as 
well as the control of a l l other natural resources. A progressive tax 
system must be imposed upon large incomes and inheritances. There was 
a need for the enactment of a farm-relief programme, plus reform of the 
Federal Reserve System. Federal judges were to be subject to direct 
election, whilst Congress was to have power to override a l l j u d i c i a l 
decisions. The child labour amendment should be quickly ratified, 
and injunctions denied i n labour disputes. The foreign policies 
of the Harding and Coolidge Administrations were denounced as being 
mercenary, and were said to be primarily i n the interests of the o i l 
lobby, big business, and international bankers. Also i n the platform' 
was a plank calling for the general revision of the Treaty of Versailles 
to bring i t i n line with the armistice, together with the familiar 
La Follette call s for a speedy disarmament, the outlawing of a l l war, 
and a national referendum before the United States could become involved 
i n hostilities.1. 
The writing of such a platform was, of course, an achievement i n 
i t s e l f by La Follette, who had to be continually conscious of the different 
groups and opinions within the federation which made up the C.P.P.A. Thus 
the platform had to steer almost a middle course among the radicals i n his 
association. The platform, i f i t did nothing else, showed La Follette to 
be an extremely able man, who knew f u l l well that he was treading on a 
kife-edge. 
1. 'Documents of American History'. H.S.Commager., ^ * ^ } ^ / > f ? 7 
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I f both the Republican and C.P.P.A. Conventions were merely rubber 
stamps of an already-assured nomination, the Democratic Convention was 
anything but so.' The Convention was tied for 95 ballots between William 
Gibbs McAdoo, who had the Convention votes of the South and the West, 
and 'Al' Smith, the Roman Catholic Governor of New York, who carried the 
votes of the North and the East. Neither candidate being capable of 
securing the two-thirds majority demanded at this time at Democratic 
Conventions, the Convention was fi n a l l y forced to turn to a compromise 
candidate, John W.Davis, an unknown business lawyer.1. 
In August, 1924> La Follette received an unexpected, though welcome 
boost to his campaign, when the American Federation of Labour (A.F.L.) 
endorsed his candidacy. The A.F.L. however, did explain i n great lengths 
that i t had no sympathy whatsoever with some of the group who supported 
La Follette, a direct slight upon the Socialist. This support was only 
lukewarm, however, many individual unions supporting the major-party 
candidates. The A.F.L. also had promised financial support amounting to 
# 3,000,000 towards the campaign. The unions fi n a l l y gave only & 25,000. 2. 
The support of the A.F.L. was not La Follette's only regret, as he 
must at times have regretted ever entering into what amounted to an 
electoral pact with the Socialist Party. The endorsement of La Follette 
by the Socialists l e t i n both major parties to attack the Wisconsin Senator 
as a radical.3. A vote for La Follette was said to be a vote for 
revolution) and the overthrow of the government. Whilst there was, i n 
fact, no coalition of Socialists and Progressives at either state or 
local level La Follette did appear on some ballots i n the Socialist, 
i n others i n both Independent and Socialist columns.4. 
One could argue that such a working arrangement with the Socialists 
was essential to La Follette, i n that the Socialists had a ready-made 
1. 'History of the U.S.A.'. Andre Maurois. Z5'" 
2. 'Third Party Movements i n the United States'. William B. 
Hesseltine. P&S* 
. 3. 'Since 1900'. O.J. Barck and N.M.Blake. PitC 
4. 'The Socialist Party of-America'. David A.Shannon. P'JS 
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national organisation, which La Follette, did not himself have but one 
cannot help but think that on election day this Socialist support lost 
La Follette more votes than he gained. Unfortunately, however, we 
cannot t e l l how many votes La Follette obtained purely on a Socialist 
ticket, because i n some states, California was one of them, the only way 
one could register a vote for La Follette was to vote the Socialist 
ticket. 
The Socialist for their part honoured the agreement with La Follette, 
and undoubtedly their own local campaigns suffered at the expense of the 
Presidential campaign. The Socialist party was an exception, however. 
The failure of Labour to give adequate support was costly from the point 
of view of organisation, finance and morale, so that i n the end even some 
of the Mid-West farmers, La Follette's staunchest a l l i e s , lost interest 
i n the ticket.1. 
Socialist support apart, the campaign became almost a one-man affair 
La Follette's two best helpers being his two sons 'Young Bob' (Robert M. 
La Follette Jnr.) and 'Phil' (Philip F. La Follette). 
Apart from any smears of radicalism against La Follette, the 
Republicans used the slogan of 'Coolidge or Chaos' fearing that a large 
vote i n favour of La Follette might throw the election into the House 
of Representatives, which might thus give the Presidency, not to Davis, 
but to the Democratic Vice-Presidential nominee, Charles W. Bryan, the 
Governor of Nebraska and the brother of the Commoner.2. 
Whether such fears were true or not, Coolidge won i n a landslide. 
The results of those candidates gaining votes i n the electoral 
college are as follows:- 3. 
1. 'The Socialist Party of America'. David A.Shannon. P'J 7 
2. Ibid. 7? 
3. 'Facts about the Presidents'. Joseph Nathan Kane. /^-2o 3 
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Calvin Coolidge (Republican) 15,718,211 votes. 382 electoral college 
votes. 
3tohn V.'-Davie (Democrat) 8,385,283 votes. 136 " " 
Robert M. l a Follette 4,832,614 votes. 13 " " 1. 
(independent) 
La Follette thus succeeded i n polling more votes than any other 
third party Presidential candidate, despite finishing third i n an election 
where only about one half of the qualified electorate bothered to vote. 
He polled 17$ of the total vote and carried his home state of Wisconsin. 
He ran well i n a number of industrial counties, although his campaign 
was obviously not well received i n the East, for he carried only one 
county east of the Mississippi River, and that i n Southern I l l i n o i s . 
I t goes without saying that he did best i n the Spring Wheat, Ranching, 
Mining and Lumbering country of the North Central States and the North-
West. 2. He ran second to Coolidge i n eleven states, Minnesota, Iowa, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, Idaho, Washington, Oregon 
and California. Six of these states had been carried by Bryan, standing 
as a Populist candidate i n 1896. In several of them l a Follette carried 
many counties, whilst Davis, whose vote was concentrated mainly i n the 
South, failed to carry even a single county. I n such States La Follette 
appeared to have gained many votes from Republican ranks, although on the 
West Coast he obtained most support from Social Democrats who had hoped 
for a liberally-inclined nominee, and were disappointed with the 
Conservative Davis. Nor are these mere assumptions. At the Presidential 
election of 1928, of the 409 counties that were for La Follette i n 1924 
only 49 were carried by 'Al 1 Smith, the remainder going to Republican 
nominee Herber Hoover. This, of course, suggests that the La Follette 
vote was a Republican vote, but the 1929 election has i t s own individual 
factors, such as Smith's Roman Catholicism.3. 
1. This vote was gained from a total of 433 electoral d i s t r i c t s 
i n which the presidential candidate appeared on theballot. 
Pro-La Follette candidates also ran for Congress i n a total 
of 124 electoral d i s t r i c t s , gaining a total of 1,029,014 votes. 
2. 'The Age of Reform'. R.H.Hofstadter. -If*/ <*?Ji 
3. 'Ibid'. P*3Z 
/ 
i 
\ 1924 Presidential Election. Wisconsin (marked Blue) was 
carried "by the C.P.P.A 
\ I n States marked Red, the Progressives gained second 
place 
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Because of this I have yet to be convinced that the 1924 Progressive 
movement was just another Republican bolt. 
One can confidently say that a large proportion of the La Follette 
vote appears to have been anti-war, anti-British and pro-German. 
Certainly the Senator polled heavily amongst Germans and Irish-American, 
both ethnic groups being hostile to the British. 
The strength of La Follette i n the isolationist German-American 
counties had not been the Bull Moose counties of 1912, again a factor 
against a simple Republican bolt.!. 
Apart from their Presidential triumph, the Republican Party also 
maintained control of Congress, the houses being divided as follows :-
SMATE 
Republicans: 50. Democrats: 40» La Follette Radicals: 6. 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
Republicans: 232. Democrats: 183. La Follette Radicals: 20. 
In the years following the 1924 election the Republicans within 
the C.P.P.A. were to pay dearly for their bolting of the ticket. They 
frequently lost seats on key Congressional Committees, and lost a l l hope 
of Committee Chairmanships. In one instance, Republican senators even 
refused to seat one of their number, Senator Smith Brookhart of Iowa, 
and gave his seat to a Democrat. Such a purge as this, of course, only 
led to factional s t r i f e with the Coolidge Administration between 1925 
and 1927. These struggles were accentuated by the fact that the 
supporters of La Follette held what was almost the balance of power 
i n Congress, and to gain support for any measure which they sponsored, 
1. iThe Age of Reform1. R. H. Hbf stadter. PJt&> 
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they frequently a l l i ed with Democratic Congressmen to form an 
effective opposition to Administration b i l l s . 1 . 
The 1926 elections showed a defini te swing to the l e f t . Brookhart 
defeated the Admini stration-backed Albert Cummins i n the Iowa Senatorial 
Primary, and then defeated his Democrat opponent i n the November election 2. 
I n North Dakota, Gerald Nye was elected over a Presidential favourite, so 
that while the Republican majority i n the House of Representatives was 
s t i l l a healthy f o r t y , i n the Senate, the parties stood as fo l lows: -
Republicans: 4#« Democrats: 47. Farmer-Labour: 1. 3. 
Because the Republicans had such a small majority, and even then 
i t had to be assumed that La Fol let te 's supporters could be counted upon 
to vote i n the Republican lobby, the Old Guard were forced to restore 
the purged insurgents to t he i r r i g h t f u l committee posts and promise 
them legis la t ive concessions. By 1927, the process of reunion was 
completed and the Republican party was a whole ent i ty again. 4« 
What, therefore, caused the collapse of the movement so soon 
af ter the 1924 election? 
Perhaps the most important reason must have been the election result 
i t s e l f . The only real success that the C.P.P.A. had, was i n the states 
which bordered La Follet te 's home state of Wisconsin, and the vote there 
was almost that of a favourite son than of a candidate of a national t h i r d 
party. He did l i t t l e to at tract votes away from the weak compromise 
Democratic nominee John W.Davis. I t would probably be true to say that 
La Follette would have fared better four years earl ier when the term 
•radical' s t i l l had an a i r of romance about i t . By 1924 the country 
was i n the middle of a boom era, and under the honest administration 
of Calvin Coolidge, following the scandals of the Harding Administration. 5. 
1. 'Since 1900". O.J.Barck and N.M.Blake. /°Jof 
2. I b i d . P3+*j 
3. Henrik Shipstead of Minnesota, who served a t o t a l of four terms 
as a Senator, three as a representative of the Farmer-Labour 
Party, the last as a Republican. 
4. 'Since 1900'. O.J.Barck and N.M.Blake. / ^ / o 
5. 'Third Party Movements i n the United States'. William B. A 9J' 
Hesseltine. 
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A farther factor i n the dissolution of the CP.P.A. was the 
d i f f e r ing viewpoints of the several constituent groups. The railway 
unions soon withdrew from the movement, and even during the campaign 
labour leader Samuel Gompers showed much caution towards the La Follette 
movement. Doubtless he regretted the departure from the t rad i t iona l 
non-partisan stand of America labour, and swi f t ly put out peace feelers 
i n the direction of the old parties. The Socialists, who went so f a r 
as to claim one mi l l ion of the La Follette votes f o r themselves, were 
insistent upon moving towards the formation of a new party. 1. 
I t was thus decided to bring together a l l the interested parties 
at a conference to be held i n Chicago during February, 1925. The main 
groups were the Socialists, who proposed a new t h i r d party, the unions, 
who wanted a return to the i r former policy of non-alignment, and the rank-
and-fi le Progressives of the North-Western states, who wanted a new 
national party but were nevertheless suspicious of the Socialists.2. 
Not unnaturally the meeting ended i n dissent, and the CP.P. A. 
came to an end. 
Four months later , i n June, 1925, Senator Robert M.La Follette died, 
possibly from a broken heart, more probably worn out from his e f f o r t s . 
His death marked the end of any hope of a national t h i r d party, f o r 
La Follette himself was the single unifying element i n what was a 
diverse and heterogeneous movement. 3. Although Progressivism had now 
died a national death, i t s t i l l flourished u n t i l 1946 i n La Fol let te 's 
home state of Wisconsin. Up to 1934 Robert M. La Follet te Jun., and 
P h i l l i p F. La Follette kept Wisconsin within the Republican party. 
However, at that time differences between the Wisconsin progressives 
and the Republican regulars became too great and the Progressive 
Party of Wisconsin was organised. 
1. 'Third Party Movements i n the United States'. William B.Hesseltine. 
2. 'The Socialist Party i n America1. David A.Shannon. >^'f?0 
3. 'Third Party Movements i n the United States'. William B.Hesseltine. 
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I t succeeded that year i n securing the election of P h i l l i p F.' La Follet te 
to the Governor's mansion, and henceforth continued to dominate Wisconsin 
pol i t ics u n t i l a f t e r the Second 'World War. Despite a La Follette 
endorsement of the Roosevelt t icke t i n 1932, and again i n 1936, the 
Democrats were the t h i r d party i n Wisconsin, gaining a mere 8$ of the 
states' votes i n the mid-term elections of 1938. The Progressive 
domination could be attributed to the combination of the intel lectuals 
of the campus and the middle-class, who were proud of the innovations 
and achievements of the La Follette family, the working-class voters 
i n the largely Germanic big c i t i e s , whose po l i t i c s were heavily influenced 
by Teutonic beer-hall socialism, and the Scandinavian farming vote. The 
Progressives thus gained the votes of the three most i n f l u e n t i a l groups 
i n the state.1. 
I n 1938 P h i l l i p F. La Follette formed the National Progressive Party 
as a l i b e r a l opposition to the New Deal. However, i t received no 
support, and, i n fac t , was heavily condemned by New Dealers, Socialists 
and Communists a l ike, who argued that the party emblem, a voter's cross 
i n a c i rc le , was l i t t l e more than the Nazi swastika i n disguise. What 
suited the beer-halls of Wisconsin was not acceptable i n the country at 
large. 
That same year sawaswinig back to the Republicans, an occurrence 
that was common throughout the whole of the country, and the La Follette 
family began to lose the i r grip upon the state. The governorship was 
lost to the Republican candidate Julius P. Hei l to start the death throes 
of the Wisconsin Progressive Party. The party, however, did las t a 
further eight years, and i t was not u n t i l 194& that the Wisconsin 
progressives voted to re join the Republican ranks. That same year 
Robert M. La Follette Jun. was defeated by Joseph R.1 McCarthy i n the 
Republican Senatorial Primary, and an era i n American pol i t i cs died. 
Since 1901 a member of the La Follette family had held one or more of 
Wisconsin's highest of f ices . That era had now ended.2. 
1. 'The Making of the President - 1960*. Theodore H. White.^° 
2. 'The Making of the President - 1960'. Theodore H. White. 
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What then caused the eclipse not only of the Wisconsin 
Progressive Party, but also the family who had disorganised formal 
party po l i t i c s i n the state f o r nearly half a century. The answer 
I f e e l i s Robert M. La Follette Sen. His two sons were unable to 
measure up to his image. His example was too great. Some might 
consider that the organisation of the neo-fascist National Progressive 
Party i n 193& cost the La Fol let te 's eventual control of the state, 
but I f e e l that th is i s highly unlikely i n a state with such a large 
proportion of German-speaking peoples/ 
The f a l l of the La Follette family, was due to the great success of 
Robert M. La Follet te Sen., whose sons were unable to emulate his p o l i t i c a l 
successes and bring the acclaim of the nation upon the state of Wisconsin, 
and l as t ly to the electorate, who, I f ee l , voted f o r a new order, 
following the t o t a l domination of state po l i t i c s by one family f o r so 
long. 
CHAPTER 5 
64-
The People*a Progfrea3ive Party 
Basically the People*a Progressive party was a combination of 
the organisation of the American Communist Party, and the elect oral 
appeal of Henry Wallace, the former New Dealer who was dropped as 
the Democratic choioe for the Vioe-^residenoy in 1944 beoause of his 
outspoken radical views* Such a bald statement however does not t e l l 
one how and why these two interests should find themselves bedfellows 
in one of the worst conceptions in American politioal history.1. 
To find the reasons behind this pairing i t i s necessary to return 
to the f inal days of World War Two, and the f ina l days of Franklin D, 
Roosevelt and the remnants of his New Deal Administration- In 
February, 1945, as the war in Europe was drawing to a close, the 
"Big Three" of Winston Churchill, Franklin D* Roosevelt, and Joseph 
Stalin met for further consultations as to the conduct of the war, 
and of the following peace, at the Crimean resort of Yalta, in what 
was to prove to be the peak of the wartime entente between the 
West and the Communist bloo*2# 
Five months later the major powers were to meet again in 
Potsdam, by then however important changes had taken place within the 
coalition* A General Election in Britain had seen Churchill replaced 
as Prime Minister by Clement Attlee, whilst in the United States, 
Roosevelt, who had died the previous April, had been succeeded by 
his Vice-President, Harry S. Truman* The State Department was no 
1* "The Guardian11. 18th November, 1965 - Obituary of Henry Wallace. 
2* "Roosevelt and Modern America** John A* Woods* P'Jf 
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longer in the liberal heads of Cordell Ball, and Edward Stettinlus; 
Truman ohoae a new man In James F« Byrnes, a South Carolina Dixieorat. . 
The chilling of Soviet-Faeriean relations whioh started with 
the Truman - Molotov White House oonf rontation, whioh occurred within 
eleven days of the new President taking office, was completed at the 
Potsdam Conference. Sooner Welles, Under-Seoretary of State in the 
Roosevelt Administration traoed this source of change to the death of 
Roosevelt, whereby the direotion of American foreign policy visibly 
changed as i t passed into other hands.1. 
The deterioration of Soviet^Amerioan relations was further 
accelerated by Byrnes' handling of the nuclear destruction of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As early as May, 1945, Stalin had made plans 
to have the Soviet army in position to strike at the Japanese forces 
in Manchuria on 8th August. A show of force, Stalin believed, would 
be sufficient to bring about the Japanese surrender, a judgement later 
reinforced by the faot that in July, Sato, the Japanese Ambassador to 
Mosoow, was instructed to see Molotov, to put before the Soviet Foreign 
Minister, Emperor Hlrohito*s desires for a peace. Only the allied terms 
were believed to be in the way of a termination of hostil it ies. Stalin 
considered i t better for the al l ies to accept a modified form of 
surrender, and then impose their w i l l upon the Japanese people through 
the forces of occupation* 
On July, 26th, thirteen days before the Soviet Union was scheduled 
1. "She Ideas cf American Foreign Policy" - Michael L . Donelan. 
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to enter the war, and three months before the November the f i r s t 
deadline for a land invasion of Japan, the United States, Great 
Britain, and China issued an ultimatum to the Japanese, which 
demanded that they surrender unconditionally, or face 'prompt* 
and utter destruction in a way not defined* 
The Soviet Union was not oonaulted as to this latest move, and 
indeed i t appeared that Byrnes was now going out of his way to insult 
his Russian counterpart, Molotov, by sending the Soviet Foreign Minister 
a oopy of the ultimatum not by telegram, as was usual, but by special 
messenger* Molotov thus learned of the allied ultimatum at the same 
time as the American public did. Such a move by the United States 
would only serve to deepen the resentment between themselves and the 
Soviet Union, many thus wondered therefore why Truman was adopting 
this 'get tough* policy. On reflection i t appears that i t was in 
fact a move by the President to oheok Russian designs of imperialism 
in Eastern Asia. There i s now l i t t l e doubt that Truman and Byrnes 
wanted to f inish the war before the August 8th deadline, so as to keep 
the Russians out of the war, thus preventing the Soviet Union honouring 
the Yalta agreement. Such A- negleotiea. on the part of the Russians 
would give the Americans an adequate excuse for not honouring the 
agreement themselves, thereby thwarting any Russian plans of drawing 
Dairen and Port Arthur within the scope of their empire^l. Byrnes* 
problem was how to convince the Russians that the Americans intentions 
1. "From Yalta to Vietnam" • David Horowitz. PS'*/ 
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at th i s time were completely honourable and not just another 
example of manipulation i n international po l i t i c s . This he attempted to 
do by t e l l i n g Molotov that the United States had no desire to embarrass 
the Soviet Union by presenting i t with a declaration affect ing a 
country with which i t was not at that time at war. Molotov merely 
replied that he should nevertheless have been consulted. 1. 
There seems l i t t l e doubt that Molotov saw through Byrnes1 game, 
especially with regard to American duplici ty over international law, 
whereby on one hand the United States did not wish the Soviet Union 
to violate her neutral i ty, whilst at the same time appearing quite 
w i l l i n g to subject the c i v i l i a n population of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
to the affects of nuclear f iss ion.2 . 
Soviet-^American relations were thus by now at a low ebb, Byrnes 
however strained relations even fur ther when he accused the Russians 
of rigging the Bulgarian elections i n direct contravention of the Yalta 
agreement. S t r i c t l y Byrnes was r igh t , Stalin was gu i l ty of rigging 
the elections i n Bulgaria, however, while this action was i n contravention 
of the Yalta agreement, i t was at the same time supported by the secret 
Churchill-Stalin agreement on the Balkans made i n Moscow i n October, 1944» 
There i s l i t t l e doubt that Roosevelt disapproved of th is agreement, 
however, Stal in never t r i e d to take advantage of the western powers 
by capitalising on th i s disagreement. The Soviet leader placed his 
own nominees in to power i n Rumania and Bulgaria, yet allowed Bri ta in 
a free hand i n the suppression of the Communist-dominated EAM-ELAS 
resistance movement, supervised free elections i n 
1. "From Yalta to Vietnam''. David Horowitz. 
2. I b i d . ft? 
68. 
Hungary in 1945, and even at one stage tried to induce Tito to 
restore King Peter to the throne of Yugoslavia* 1* 
Some oommentators might consider such an account of the afi&rs 
of July and August, 1945, to be weighted against the Truman Administration, 
for this the author makes no apology* The purpose of this introduction 
i s to show why the Soviet Union was eager to have the President defeated 
at the next election, in the light of the United States apparently-
being anxious to resume an amended form of her pre^rsr isolationist 
policy* Relationships began to deteriorate at the Potsdam conference 
which opened on 18th July, the day following America's f i r s t successful 
atomic bomb test at Alamogordo, i t thus becomes clear that in fact Truman 
now considered the United States strong enough to face Japan without 
the aid of the Soviet Union, and, what i s more important, the President 
considered the West, lead by the United States, strong enough to face up 
to the future might of the Soviet Union.2, This brief synopsis helps to 
explain why the Amerioan Communist Party was eager to join a coalition to 
try to remove Truman from office at the next general election, but how 
and why did the other groups in the People*s Progressive Parly become 
implicated? 
Perhaps the largest non-Communist group within the Wallace movement 
was. a number of disillusioned Hew Dealers, who saw the new President 
allowing their former idols programme to lapse* Whilst i t i s true that 
the New Deal had not the same impetus in 1945 as i t had in 1933, this was 
1* "Prom Yalta to Vietnam". David Horowitz. ^ 
2* "The Ideals of Amerioan Foreign Policy". Michael Donslan. 
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no fault of Truman, in fact that period of American history known as 
the "Second New Deal" had ended in 1938, after a brief l i fe span of 
three years,1» Roosevelt himself had dropped a l l the electoral 
slogans of the New Deal in the 1944 campaign against Dewey, in favour 
of a greater effort in the war, 
Truman did not thus break up the New Deal, i t had already gone 
into voluntary liquidation some years earlier, this was cf no 
consequence however to the supporters cf Wallace who saw in 
Truman a conservative usurper upon a liberal throne, the throne 
that should have been rightfully occupied by their man, Henry A.Wallaoe* 
I t was this disillusioned element which f e l l an easy prey to the l ites 
of Eugene Dennis, and the American Communist Party* 
1. "Roosevelt and Modern America". John A.Woods. P 
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In order to poll well at any election, any candidate must f i r s t 
convince the electorate that his oandidature i s a serious one. An 
effective way of doing this i s to present oneself as a politically 
responsible man, and perhaps most important of a l l , acquire a good 
organisation* 
Henry Wallace, oandidate of the People's Progressive Party 
in 1948, oould point to his previous political record as a guide to 
his political responsibility, but his opponents could counter such 
credits by showing that the main constituent of the Wallace organisation 
was the Amerioan Communist Party. Nor was this an accident, for as 
early as 16th November, 1945, Eugene Dennis in his main report to the 
National Committee of the Amerioan Communist Party stated:*- (With 
regard to the American Presidential Eleotion of 1948) "The American 
people must have an alternative to the two-party strait-jacket; they 
must be in a position to have a choice in 1948 other than between a 
Truman and a Dewey or a Vandenberg •••••••••This i s why i t i s necessary 
from now on to create the conditions and base for organising a major 
third party nationally1**!* 
Thus, three years before the actual contest, the Communist Party 
was beginning to form an organisation to fight the eleotion of 1948. 
I t was not decided, however, i f the party should be similar to the 
Amerioan Labour Party in New York, that i s , endorsing suitable 
Democratic candidates, or a completely independent third party ticket* 
Before this could be decided i t was essential to be able to assess 
1* "The Deoline of Amerioan Communism"'• David A •Shannon* P f ' t f -
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the potential voting power available to the proposed new party. 
An opportunity to test this strength arose when Samual Dickstein, 
Congressman from Manhattans Nineteenth District resigned in order to 
take a state judgeship* The Democratic Party proposed Arthur G-* Klein, 
a former Congressman during the New Deal era* His main opponent was 
Johannes Steel, the candidate of the American Labour Party* The 
candidature of Steel, a non-Communist radio news commentator was 
endorsed by such varied people as the Hew York Congress of Industrial 
Organisations, the National Citizens Polit ical Action Committee, the 
Independent Citizens Committee of Arts, Sciences, and Professions, 
Henry Wallace (Truman's Seoretary of Commerce), and Fiorello l a 6-uardia, 
formerly the Fusion Mayor of New York*l» 
The result of the eleotion, held on 19th February, 1946, was as 
follows t-
Arthur G-. Klein (De moo rat) 17,360 votes 
Johannes Steel (American Labour) 13,421* 
William S* Shea (Republican) 4,514* 
Despite Steel's defeat, the Communists were delighted at the result, 
the candidate that they had chosen to endorse had oome within three 
thousand votes cf victory in a traditionally Democrat district of New 
York City. 
Communist delight however was not confined to electoral neaiMr&sses, 
for in the Autumn of 1946, the man the Communists most wanted as the third 
candidate in the 1948 Presidential election, resigned from the Truman 
Administration* 
In September, 1946, Henry Wallace, the Seoretary of Commerce, spoke 
to a joint meeting of the Committee of Arts, Soiences, and Professions, 
and the National Citizens Polit ical Aotion Committees. The speeoh, 
1* "The Decline of American Communism*. David A. Shannon* W 
2. Ibid. PJ'i 
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which was shown to, and approved by, President Truman before delivery, 
contained the assertion that Britain's imperialism in the Near East 
would provoke Russia into declaring war.l* This outburst brought an 
immediate protest from Secretary of State James F . Byrnes who was 
engaged at the time in delicate negotiations with the Soviet Union* 
He thus asked Truman to silence Wallace while these negotiations were 
progressing* Truman did not silence him, nor did he discourage Wallace 
from further outbursts, he even allowed the Secretary of Comma roe 
to publish a letter that he (Wallace) had written the previous July* 
The text of this letter was even more inflammatory than the speeoh, 
and Byrnes demanded, in the form of an ultimatum, the immediate 
dismissal of Wallace* The President, somewhat meekly, complied 
with this demand, and Wallace resigned* 2, 
The Communists had very much regarded Wallace, when he was 
Secretary of Agriculture in the Roosevelt Administration, as yet 
another bourgeois politician* However, left-wing opinion warmed 
up to him during the Popular Front period following 1955, and when he 
was publioally repudiated by Truman, Wallace was almost at once assured 
of the f u l l support of the Communists*3* 
On 29th December, 1946, the National Citizens Polit ical Action 
Committee, and the Independent Citizens Committee of the Arts, Sciences, 
and Professions merged to form the Progressive Citizens of America 
(P*C*A.) an organisation that had the aim of becoming a third party 
movement, with the ultimate goal of getting Henry Wallace to run for 
President on a Progressive tioket in 1948,4* 
Wallace was not a Communist, but there seems l i t t l e doubt that 
1* "From Yalta to Vietnam11 * David Horowitz* &*jCi 
2* "Third Party Movements in the United States". William B.Hesseltine. 
5* "The Decline of Amerioan Communism". David A. Shannon. 6 
4. "Third Parly Movements in the United States". William B.Hesseltine* 
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he was used by the Communist Party, i n order to further their own 
ends. Accordingly the former Vice-President was persuaded to speak 
at the f i r s t meeting of the new organisation, which he did, whilst 
s t i l l maintaining a public committal to the Democratic Party. At 
that f i r s t meeting Wallace to ld the audience:-
"We have less use fo r a conservative h i g h - t a r i f f Democratic 
Party than we have f o r a reactionary h i g h - t a r i f f , Republican. I f 
need be we shall f i r s t f i g h t one and then the other'.'l. 
I f Wallace thus hoped to use the F.C.A. as a vehicle with which 
to gain control of the Democratic Party, then i t would appear that at 
the time he was not i n agreement with the majority of the P.C.A. whose 
preamble to the i r programme stated: "We cannot . . . . . . rule out the 
possibi l i ty of a new p o l i t i c a l party . . . We, the people, w i l l not vrait 
forever - we w i l l not wait long f o r the Democratic Party to make i t s 
choice". Such a statement was, of course, more radical than that 
from Wallace, and suggested that i t was the intention of the P.C.A. 
to sponsor the i r own candidate from the f i r s t . 2 . 
Within a year the new organisation had a claimed membership of 
36,500 members who came to represent the nucleus of the Progressive 
Party. The co-chairman of the P.C.A. were the former heads of the 
constituent organisations, Dr.Frank Kingdon, and Jo Davidson. However, 
the real power behind the throne was the Executive Vice-Chairman, "Beanie" 
Baldwin, la ter to become Wallace's campaign manager. 
During the summer of 194^ i t became obvious that the more l i b e r a l 
members of society were not only disappointed with the Truman 
Administration, but also with the conservative alliance of northern 
1. "The Decline of American Communism". David A. Shannon. 
2. I b i d . P/± J 
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Republicans and southern Democrats during the course of the 79th 
Congress* The liberals, who assembled at the National Conference of 
Progressives held at Chicago in September, 1946, were very eager to 
revive the spirit common to the New Deal era* However, they were 
becoming increasingly divided over the spreading influence of Communism 
both at home and abroad* So divided were they, that no one at the 
Conference moved for the formation of a third party to avoid splitting 
the group* 
The Conference in fact was the last major gathering of both 
pro-Communist, and anti-Communist liberals* At Chicago a Continuations 
Committee was appointed in order to give the conference a semblance of 
permanence, and to oall a seoond conference to be held in January, 
1947* This second conference never in faot materialised, for by 
January the split in American liberalism was visible in organisational 
form, with the establishment of the P.C.A. at the end of December 
1946, and the founding of the A.D*A* (Amerioans for Democratic Aotion)*l» 
from the sooial-demooratio anti-Communist U*D*A* (Union for Demooratio 
Aotion)2* 
1* Unlike the P*C*A. the A.D.A. i s s t i l l an influential l e f t -
wing organisation in the United States, boasting an Under 
Secretary of State, and two Ambassadors amongst i t s members* 
At the time of i t s foundation i t s membership l i s t s included 
the names of labour leaders David Dubinsky, Walter Reuther, 
James Carey, George Baldanzi, End.1 Rieve, and intellectuals 
such as John Kenneth G-albraith (former Amerioan Ambassador to 
India under the Kennedy Administration, and present-day Chairman 
of the A.D.A.), Reinhold Niebuhr, Arthur M*Sohlesinger Jnr . , 
James A* Weohsler, himself a former Communist, and Bishop 
William Soarlett* Professional politics was represented by 
young Democrats such as Franklin D* Roosevelt Jnr*, Riohardson 
Dilworth and Hubert H*Humphrey, later to become Mayor of Minneapolis, 
Senator from Minnesota and Vice«*resident of the United States* 
The spirit of the New Deal was kept alive by the presence of 
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Leon K. Henderson, Wilson, Wyatt, Paul A. Porter, and the 
dead President's widow Eleanor Roosevelt* Unlike the 
P.C*A. whioh made the mistake of entering party politics 
only to, almost inevitably, quickly fade, the A.D.A. has 
remained aloof from the party struggle, to continue as 
a left-wing pressure organisation* 
2. "Third Party Movements in the United States*. William B* 
Hessdltine** 
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For 1947 the Communist Party set i t s e l f two tasks, t o be 
accomplished i t hoped, simultane ously • F i r s t l y i t was t o b u i l d 
a t h i r d par ty movement. Secondly i t was t o persuade Henry Wallace 
t o become the leader of the new parly* I t proved t o be successful 
i n both these objectives* Such resul ts were not achieved however 
without the Communists p lay ing a double game regarding the format ion 
of a t h i r d p a r t y . l . 
I n New York the Communists, merely stated tha t the Amerioan 
Labour Par ty should strengthen i t s e l f t o act as a stronger lever on 
the Democrats* Nothing was said about an independent t h i r d par ty 
nomination. This was done mainly t o avoid s p l i t t i n g the A . L . P . and 
t o unite the county pa r ty organisations. I t would have been an 
i m p o s s i b i l i t y had the 'Wallace - f o r - President* issue been placed 
before the separate county conventions of the A . L . P . f o r a vote* 
No such d i f f i c u l t i e s were experienced i n C a l i f o r n i a where there was 
no equivalent of the Amerioan Labour Party as i t exis ted i n New York. 
1 . "The Decline of American Communism". David A . Shannon* 
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To them f e l l the task of oreating a new par ty e i t h e r t o pressure 
the Bemooratio Party f rom the outside, as d i d the A.L*P*, or t o 
branch out, as Wi l l i am Z* Foster himself desired, t o form an 
independent t h i r d party* I n C a l i f o r n i a the Progressive movement 
i t s e l f probably owed i t s existence t o a Convention of the Marine 
Cooks and Stewards, whioh, meeting i n San Francisco passed a 
reso lu t ion c a l l i n g f o r the establishment of a na t iona l t h i r d party* 
Following t h i s statement, Hugh Bryson, President of the Marine Cooks 
and Stewards, 1* c i r cu l a t ed unions throughout the country, urging the 
passing of s imi l a r reso lu t ions ,2 , 
Bryson however f a i l e d t o get h i s ideas over at a meeting i n l a t e 
Ju ly of the C a l i f o r n i a Demooratio Committee* Nevertheless, undaunted, 
the union leader ca r r i ed on the s truggle, and oai led a conference 
t o be held i n Los Angeles on 24th August* When assembled the 
conference was oomposed mainly of C a l i f o r n i a n l e f t - w i n g union leaders, 
plus a few dissident l e f t - w i n g Democrats*3* Added t o these were a few 
"Share-the-Wealthers", fo l lowers of Dr*Francis E* Townsend, himself 
present, the author of a unique old-age pension plan* 
Following an at tack by Bryson upon Truman* 3 f o r e i g n p o l i o y , the 
conference declared i t s e l f t o be the founding convention of the 
Independent Progressive Parly* C a l i f o r n i a had i t s own A . L . P , 
Bryson at f i r s t combined the dut ies of both organiser and temporary 
chairman, but on assuming the permanent ohairmanship, he secured the 
services of E l i n o r Eahn, an Eastern lobbyis t f o r the Maritime unions, 
as state director , • 
1* Bryson was l a t e r oonvisoted of p e r j u r y f o r swearing on a T a f t -
Hartley a f f i d a v i t tha t he was not a Communist* 
2* "The Decline of American Communism** David A*Shannan* 
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The p r i o r i t y of the new par ty was t o seoure a plaoe on the b a l l o t * 
Ca l i fo rn i an law requires an e l e c t i o n p e t i t i o n t o contain 300.000 
signatures before a par ty gets onto the b a l l o t . This task became the 
party*s f i r s t consideration. The regular Communist organisation i n 
C a l i f o r n i a was supplemented by an i n f l u x of pa r ty workers f r c m outside 
the s ta te , notably par ty leader W i l l i a m Z . Poster, and New. York C i t y 
Councilman, Peter V . Cacohione. When the signatures were f i n a l l y 
obtained by a combination of hard work and thorough organisation, 
Poster could scarcely hide h i s de l igh t i n c a l l i n g the f e a t , *a major 
achievement* . 1 . 
I n common w i t h the pract ice of organising a s a t e l l i t e par ty i n 
C a l i f o r n i a , as l a te as September, 1947, the Communist p lan was s t i l l t o 
use the par ty as a lever against the Democrats w i t h Caochione and V i t o 
Marcantonio, A . L . P . Congressman f rom New York, urging a f i g h t i n the 
Democratic primaries, and state conventions f o r delegates pledged t o 
Wallace at the 1948 Democratic National Convention* 
Near the end of September, the "Worker*, the Communist paper, 
published de ta i l s of a speech given tha t month by Eugene Dennis i n 
the Madison Square Garden, i n which he said he d i d not favour the 
launching of a t h i r d party* Such outbursts were soon t o cease 
however when the Russian Communist Par ty began t o press f o r an 
independent t h i r d t i o k e t . 2 . 
This Russian stand was made i n order t o provide a source of 
embarrassment t o the Trtman Administrat ion* The countries of the 
Eastern bloc could poin t t o the American t h i r d pa r ty , and state 
j u s t i f i a b l y t ha t the Amerioan people were uni ted behind ne i ther the 
Marshall Plan, nor the res t of American f o r e i g n p o l i o y . Such a 
1* "The Deoline of American Communism". David A* Shannon* 
2 . I b i d . A * 
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statement could of course f i n i s h w i t h the observation tha t American 
p o l i c y was the r e s u l t of a c a p i t a l i s t society, working not f o r the 
ocanmon good of the people, but f o r the robber barons of Wal l Street* 
By October, 1947, the Communist par ty was agreed upon an 
independent candidacy at the 1948 Pres iden t ia l E l e c t i o n ; however, 
the Communist hierarchy decided t o delay reveal ing any plans f o r a 
f u r t h e r two weeks so as not t e endanger the Communist pos i t i on i n the 
C . I . O . , due t o hold i t s annual convention i n Boston between the 15th 
and 17th of October* Such a reve la t ion , i t was thought, could 
possibly cause a l o t of anti-Communist sentiment w i t h i n the C.I*0* 
However, a measure of the Communists* success i n not declar ing t h e i r 
t h i r d par ty in ten t ions , can be shown-by the f a c t t ha t although Secretary 
of State Marshall addressed the C . I . O . , the l e f t - w i n g of the movement 
was s u f f i c i e n t l y w e l l organised t o prevent a convention reso lu t ion on 
f o r e i g n p o l i c y f rom supporting the Marshall Plan e s p l i c i t l y . l . 
The day f o l l o w i n g the C. I .O. Convention, Eugene Dennis t o l d 
Mike Q u i l l , Harry Bridges and other union leaders t o ignore the 
happenings of the convention, a t h i r d par ty was t o be formed, w i t h 
Wallace as the Pres iden t ia l candidate* A l l l e f t - w i n g movements 
should s t a r t organising e l ec t ion pos i t ions and p u b l i o i t y for thwi th*2* 
Party organisation was thus w e l l on schedule, however, i t was 
s t i l l a par ty without a candidate* She Communists next immediate 
task was t o persuade Wallace t o stand* 
Despite the former Vice-president 's understandable h o s t i l i t y 
towards the Demooratio Par ty , such a task was nevertheless a d i f f i o u l t 
one* F i r s t l y , Wallace was not a Communist, nor even sympathetic t o 
1* "The Decline of American Communism" • David A*Shannon* 
2* "The Strategy of Deception"• Jeane J* Kirkpa t r iok* P 3&X 
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Communism's basio aims* However, he d i d prove an easy ta rge t f o r 
p o l i t i c a l confidence: t r i c k s t e r s , suoh as the Communists, i n t ha t he 
knew l i t t l e of e i t h e r l e f t - w i n g p o l i t i c s or methods, w h i l s t being 
devoted t o the cause of peace. His main reason f o r endorsing the 
candidature of J ohannes S tee l i n 1946 was because of S tee l ' s a n t i -
Nazi record. I t can be said i n Wallace's defence tha t he knew of 
ne i ther KLein's good New Deal v o t i n g record, nor of S tee l ' s work f o r 
the extremist ' D a i l y People*a World,*.1. 
Fol lowing h i s res ignat ion as Secretary of Commerce, Wallace 
became the e d i t o r of the 'New Republio* at tha t time published i n 
New York .2 . This j ou rna l served as a p o l i t i c a l stage f o r Wallace, 
who was s t i l l eager t o preserve h i s image of a l i b e r a l pub l ic f i g u r e * 
By March, 1947, however, the former Vice-President was. beginning t o 
h i n t t ha t he was considering the leadership of a t h i r d par ty movement, 
should one be formed* Two months l a t e r at Olympia, Washington, he 
went so f a r as t o t e l l newsmen tha t he would be w i l l i n g t o lead a 
t h i r d pa r ty i f he himself considered i t would be a genuine con t r ibu t ion 
towards world peace* Despite suoh apparent leanings towards a new 
t h i r d pa r ty , there was s t i l l l i t t l e doubt t ha t during the spring and 
summer of 1947, Wallace was s t i l l very much w i l l i n g t o oontinue working 
w i t h i n the Democratic party*5* 
Following a somewhat cont rovers ia l t r i p t o Great B r i t a i n and 
Europe, where h i s a c t i v i t i e s were considered by some t o be i n 
contravention of the Logan Ac t of 1799, being contrary t o the American 
na t iona l i n t e r e s t , Wallace made a long t r i p throughout the United States* 
During h is tour h i s personal aide 'Beanie* Baldwin, was t r y i n g t o assess 
pro-Wallace or anti-ffruman sentiment amongst Lae&l Democratic leaders* 
1* "Henry Wallace: The Man and the Myth"* Dwdght MaoDonald* ^ / o / 
2* "The Guardian". 18th November, 1965 - Obituary of Henry Wallace* 
5* "Henry A* Wallace: Qtdxotio Crusader 1948"* Ea r l M. Schmidt* /*J/ 
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From h i s probings he considered Wallace could count on approximate3y 
120 votes at the 1948 Democratic na t i ona l Convent ions . 1 . 
As l a t e as September, 1947, Wallace stated p u b l i c l y tha t he would 
continue f i g h t i n g w i t h i n the Democratic Party so as t o 'prevent i t 
f rom committing suicide} however, he q u a l i f i e d himself by warning 
tha t i f the Democrats chose t o continue i n t h e i r present d i r e c t i o n 
•the people must have a new par ty of l i b e r t y and peace*2. Wallace 
thus appears, on the surface, t o be committed t o a r e v i t a l i s e d 
Demooratio par ty i n 1948, although h i s own personal viewpoints were 
becoming enmeshed w i t h the o f f i c i a l Communist pa r ty l i n e . Not t h a t 
Wallaoe was. becoming a Communist; he was no t ; i n f a c t , although 
the Progressive People's Party was very much a Communist t o o l , no-one 
has ever suggested tha t Wallaoe himself was a Communist. He was, 
however, influenced, by the Communists,3, and none probably inf luenced 
him mare than d i d Lewis Frank J n r . Frank, who had l ed a pro-Communist 
group at the Convention of the Michigan Amerioans Veterans* Committee 
during the Autumn of 1946 was the p r i n c i p a l ghost w r i t e r f o r many of 
Wallace's speeches f rom ea r ly 1947, u n t i l immediately p r i o r t o the 
1948 Pres iden t i a l e lec t ion* Though Wallaoe never suspected Frank of 
being a Communist, he d i d consider him too r a d i c a l , and thought tha t 
many of h i s views, as they appeared i n Wallace's speeches, were too 
exlitnue.4. 
Although he constant ly denied being a Communist, Wallaoe was 
always open t o t h e i r support, a mistake also made by Floyd £ . Olson 
i n Minnesota i n 1924. For t h e i r p a r t the Communists responded warmly. 
During the May Day celebrations of 1947, Communists car r ied a f i f t y f o o t 
photograph of the d i sc red i ted Democrat through the s t ree ts of Hew York, 
and a t the I .W.O. na t iona l convention, Wallaoe was praised by many speakers. 
1 . "The Decline of Amerioan Communism1*. David A.Shannon. J^^Y-i 
2 . "Henry Wallaoe; She Man and the Myth*. Dwight MacDonald. ^ ' ^ * ? 
5. "Thi rd Party Movements i n the United States". W i l l i a m B . PQM 
Hesseltine. 
4 . "The Decline of Amerioan Communism1*. David A.Shannon. 
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The popu la r i ty of the former Yioe-President was not confined t o 
the supporters of the Communist pa r ty , however* Seen by many as a 
symbol against reaction* Wallace was also a f a v o u r i t e w i t h many non-
Communist l i b e r a l s * whose popu la r i ty had an inverse re la t ionsh ip 
w i t h tha t of President Truman*l* 
Clear ly any ideas of a t h i r d pa r ty were not merely oonfined t o the 
Communists, nor was Wallace urged t o stand by a mere handful of 
Communists tak ing t h e i r d i rec t ions f rom Moscow* I n June, 1947, 
sixty—seven professors f rom North-Western Univers i ty addressed an 
open l e t t e r t o Wallace as Roosevelts t rue h e i r , urging him t o form 
and lead a new party* They believed r i g h t l y tha t Truman the 
conservative was betraying the l i b e r a l Roosevelt t r a d i t i o n , something 
tha t the President was t o remedy i n the next year when he earned 
himself the nickname of j'G-ive 'em h e l l Harry*,2* 
D ive r s i t y was probably one of the major reasons f o r the f a i l u r e 
of the party* According t o Morris M.Rubin, the anting a l l ace e d i t o r 
o f the 'Progressive* Wallace's f o l l ower s oould be d iv ided i n t o f o u r 
d i s t i n c t categories* F i r s t l y , there were the l i b e r a l s , a group of 
people who found peace of mind i n any haven tha t d i d not belong t o 
e i t he r of the major par t ies* Secondly, there were the p a c i f i s t s , who, 
I would contend, overlap t o a degree i n t o the t h i r d category, tha t of 
Wallace's personal fo l lowers* A f o u r t h group were those Democrats 
who were disgusted w i t h Truman, but were unable t o b r i n g themselves 
t o vote Republic an.3* 
Apart f rom the s o l i c i t a t i o n of Wallaoe by 67 un ive r s i t y professors 
i n June, 1947, tha t month also marked the beginning of Truman's climb 
t o ascendency w i t h Marshal l ' s Harvard Commencement Address and h i s 
1* "Henry Wallace i The Man and the Myth"'* Dwight MaoDonald* ^'£o 
2* "The Decline of Amerioan Communism** David A.Shannon. 
3 . I b i d . 
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overridden veto of the Ta f t -Har t l ey A c t . She President now began 
t o win back former supporters of Roosevelt, and, as Truman's 
popula r i ty rose, so Wallace's waned. 
Following the announcement of the format ion of the Cominform i n 
Ootober, 1947, the Communists i n t e n s i f i e d t h e i r pressure on Wallace, 
t h e i r sole object now being t o get him t o announce h i s independent 
oandidacy. Wallaoe slowly y ie lded , or at leas t var ied at times f rom 
h i s professed Democratic stand. He t o l d a Labour Day r a l l y i n 
D e t r o i t t ha t h i s main p o l i t i o a l objective was t o prevent Truman f rom 
having what amounted t o a blank cheque f rom the l i b e r a l s i n Amerioan 
sooiety. However, the f o l l o w i n g October he revealed h i s Democratic 
face by showing apparent oonoern f o r the pa r ty whose incumbent President 
he thought would not carry ten states should he run f o r r e - e l e c t i o n . 1 . 
I t was, however, noticeable tha t Wallaoe moved closer t o the 
idea of a t h i r d pa r l y f o l l o w i n g the Ootober convention of the C . I . 0 . 2 . 
By ear ly November there was greater convic t ion i n h i s voice when he 
t o l d a v i s i t i n g delegation of I t a l i a n Communist women, l ed by Mrs. 
Palmira T o g l i a t t i , w i f e of I t a l y ' s leading Communist, tha t a t h i r d party-
would be formed should the peace require i t . A month l a t e r h i s tone 
was one of even greater oommittal, when he t o l d a group of Corne l l 
Univers i ty tha t ' i f i t i s apparent tha t the Democratic pa r ty i s a war 
pa r ty , I s h a l l do a l l I can t o see there i s a t h i r d pa r ty .*5 . The 
b a i t was obviously proving too tempting f o r Wallaoe t o r e s i s t , but he 
s t i l l had t o be cleanly hooked. For t h i s t o happen, the former V i c e -
President had t o be convinced tha t he would receive strong support, 
having previously stated tha t he would run i f he thought he could secure 
1 . "The Decline of Amerioan Communism'*• David A.Shannon .PPt t+^ / t t+ j 
2 . "Third Par ty Movements i n the united States*. W i l l i a m B . 
Hesse I t i n e . P 9 ¥ 
3 . "The Deoline of Amerioan Communism'*• David A.Shannon* Z 5 / 
three m i l l i o n votes on the peace issue. Such a t o t a l d i d not seem 
unreasonable i n 1947, when the popula r i ty of Wallace was a t i t s peak. 
Undoubtedly the Wallace candidacy d i d f i n a l l y s u f f e r from h i s 
entanglement w i t h the Communists, who were d iscredi ted during 1948, 
both a t home and abroad. 
The Progressive vote d i d undoubtedly s u f f e r because o f , f i r s t l y , 
the Soviet coup d ' e t a t i n Czechoslovakia despite the f a c t that i t was 
p r a c t i c a l l y bloodless and, secondly, the Russian blockade o f West 
B e r l i n . 1 . These were fo re ign issues; the Communists f u r t h e r d iscredi ted 
the Progressives by t h e i r ant ics a t the Progressive party convention 2. 
and, as i f to dr ive the l a s t n a i l i n t o Wallace's p o l i t i c a l c o f f i n , 
President Truman s tar ted h i s campaign towards re -e lec t ion w i t h a number 
of t r u l y l i b e r a l proposals, designed t o win back dissident supporters o f 
former-president Roosevelt. 3. 
Before these attacks, however, the Progressives received a great 
boost during the Chicago j u d i c i a l e lect ions o f November, 1947. The 
l o c a l Progressive party received a t o t a l o f 113,000 votes out of 
the 700,000 cast f o r the 2! judgeships on the Cook County Superior 
Court tha t were up f o r r e - e l e c t i o n . J + . 
Wallace was duly impressed w i t h the r e su l t s . However, i t would 
have served him w e l l t o have f i r s t noted a number o f l o c a l issues, 
which undoubtedly a f fec ted the r e s u l t . F i r s t l y there was what the 
Americans r e f e r t o as the 'Jim Crow' f ac to r .5 • Democrats and 
Republicans a l i k e had, f o r many years, refused to nominate a negro 
f o r Superior Court o f f i c e . The Progressives played t o negro sentiment 
and unrest by nominating several w e l l - q u a l i f i e d negro attorneys f o r 
county judgeships. Secondly the good showing o f one pa r t i cu l a r 
1. "From Yal ta t o Vietnam n . David Horowitz. Z9 ' o / 
2. "Third Party Movements i n the United States". Wil l iam B. P^S" 
Hesseltine. 
3. "A New History of the United States". Wil l iam M i l l e r . />fSl. 
4. "The Decline o f American Communism". David A.Shannon. 
5. I b i d . 
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Progressive oandidate, Professor Homer F.Carey of the North-Western 
Univers i ty Law School mainly resul ted f rom h i s opponent being exposed 
as a p a r t i c u l a r l y close f r i e n d of a lawyer whose c l i e n t s were usual ly 
Chicago gangsters. Suoh an exposure gained the support of every 
Chioago newspaper f o r Carey* These issues were not of course Wallace 
issues* as Wallace would have found out had he taken the trouble t o 
do a l i t t l e research of h i s own* Instead he oar r ied on b l i n d l y 
be l i ev ing tha t Chicago was r ap id ly emerging as a Progressive stronghold*l* 
Fearing a l i b e r a l State of the Union message by Truman i n January 
1948* and a corresponding reduction i n t h i r d par ty sentiment, the 
Communists made every e f f o r t t o get Wallace t o declare h i s candidacy 
i n December*2* 
A t a P*C*A* na t iona l committee meeting held i n Harlem i n a i d -
Deoember, a power straggle developed as t o whether t o ask Wallace t o 
run as an independent candidate* The notable advocates of suoh a 
course who sat on the committee were V i t o Maroantonie A»L*P* Congressman 
f o r East Harlem* John Abt , and the then Communist w r i t e r Howard Fast* 
Ranged against them were Frank Kingdan, a co-chairman of the P*C»A*, 
Bart l ey C*Crum, a San Francisco at tourney, and Robert W*Eenny, a former 
C a l i f o r n i a Attourneymeneral , Almost i n e v i t a b l y the v i c t o r s i n t h i s 
struggle were the Communists and t h e i r a l l i e s , whereupon Kingdom and 
Crum resigned f rom the movement, the f i r s t of many resignations, which 
reached t i d a l proportions as the year progressed, and the Communists 
gained f u r t h e r oontrcGUS* 
A t t h i s juncture the l e f t ^ r i n g union leaders moved t h e i r Wallace 
endorsement programme i n t o top gear, f i n i s h i n g w i t h a three day spurt 
1* "The Decline of Amerioan Communism"* David A*3hannon* 
2* "Henry A.Wallaoe: Quixotio Crusade 1948"* Ea r l M* Schmidt* PSC 
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of act ion tha t could be t imetabled thua : -
Deeember 27 
She Nat ional Executive board of the Bridges Union endorsed the 
candidature of Wallaoe and the format ion of a t h i r d pa r ty , an ac t ion 
repeated by two loca ls of the Rubber Workers meeting a t Akron* 
December 28 
She Ford Local 600, which was America*a largest U*A*W* l o c a l , 
as w e l l as the l a s t remaining t o have a strong Communist caucus, 
telegraphed Wallaoe, urging him t o declare himself as a oandidate 
f o r President* 
December 29 
Wallace was met i n Chicago by Hugh Bryson, Elmer Benson and 
other Progressive Leaders, who, a f t e r confer r ing w i t h t h e i r p o t e n t i a l 
oandidate, issued a press release which stated the happenings per t inen t 
t o par ty a f f a i r s as f rom December 1 6 . 1 , 
La ter tha t n ight Wallace spoke on a na t iona l radio network, m d 
announced h i s candidacy, i n doing so saying *We have assembled a 
Gideon* s army, small i n number, powerful i n convic t ion , ready i n 
action** She Communist pa r ty , and the People's Progressive pa r ty , 
had i t s oandidate.2* 
Wallace's decision t o contest the e l ec t ion was greeted w i t h 
enthusiasm by the Communists. Thei r j o y , however, was shor t l ived* 
As w i t h tha t other lef t-*?ing federa t ion of groups, the S o c i a l i s t 
pa r ty , there was a great deal of i n t e r n a l feuding w i t h i n the People's 
Progressive pa r ty , and one could say w i t h complete j u s t i f i c a t i o n tha t 
the c o a l i t i o n tha t was the People's Progressive party- began t o dissolve 
almost immediately a f t e r Wallace's announcement* 
1* "The Decline of American Communism** David A.Shannon. 
2* I b i d * 
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The A.L*P* leaders i n New York greeted Wallace*s decision w i t h 
such enthusiasm tha t w i t h i n three days the Amalgamated Clo th ing 
Workers, and a number of other non-flommunist C . I .O. unions i n 
New York l e f t the party* More serious, however, was the r i f t 
tha t occurred at the January group of the C. I .O. Executive Board 
held i n Washington, when the al l iance between the Murray group and 
the Communists completely broke down.l* 
The n igh t before the Executive Board met, a meeting of l e f t - w i n g 
union leaders was held i n the room of Communist labour secretary 
3. 
John Williamson i n the Hays-AdamB Hotel* 2 . A t t h i s oaucus they were 
ins t ruc ted by Williamson t o t r y and seoure the passage of a p ro -ga l l ace 
resolu t ion at the next day's meeting* However, t h i s p lan was f o i l e d 
when the Board Meeting ran over i n t o a second day* A t a second caucus 
i n Will iamson's room, the n igh t between the board sessions, the l e f t -
unionis ts reported i t h igh ly u n l i k e l y tha t any such pro-Wallace 
resolu t ion would pass* Williamson then direoted them t o s t a l l , i n 
order t o t r y t o get the C. I .O, t o take no p o s i t i o n at a l l an the t h i r d 
par ly issue f o r another month*4* 
I t was hoped tha t a month's delay would be adequate t o inf luence 
the C. I .O. t o come out i n favour of Wallace* This was l a rge ly 
because i n a month a speoial Congressional e l e c t i o n was t o be held 
i n the Bronx i n whioh the Communists expected Leo Isaacson, the p r o -
Wallace A.L*P* oandidate t o do w e l l * A good showing, i t was f e l t , 
would inf luence the C . I .O . decision* 
1* "The Deoline of Amerioan Communism0'* David A.Shannon* Pf ^" ^ 
2 , "The Strategy of Deception*. Jeane J*Eirkpatr ick* ^ ^ C / 
5* Among those present were such notable radicals as 'Bed Mike* 
Q u i l l , Harry Bridges, James Matles, Ben Cold, Abe Flaser, 
Joseph Selby, John Santo, I r v i n g Potash and Donald Henderson* 
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A t the next day 1 s session, however, the l e f t - w i n g unionis ts l o s t 
t h e i r motion t o postpone, when the board voted by a ma jo r i ty of 55 
votes t o 15 t o condemn the Wallace candidacy* As i f t o rub s a l t 
i n open wounds, the C. I .O. then passed a f u r t h e r resolu t ion which 
gave t h e i r t o t a l support t o the Marshall Plan* She worst was y e t t o 
cane f o r the C. I .O. Communists, however, f o r w i t h i n two weeks of the 
January board meeting, Lee Pressman was forced t o resign* I n March, 
Bridges was sacked as C. I .O. reg ional organiser f o r not hern C a l i f o r n i a * 
W i t h i n two years the l e f t - w i n g unions were expelled f rom the C. I .O. 
al together, and by 1956, the year of Hungary and of Poland, there were 
almost no l e f t - t r i n g unions l e f t , i n existence. 1* The Communists pa id 
a h igh p r i c e i n r e t r i b u t i o n when they attempted t o sever the l i n k 
between the C.I.O* and the Democratic Party*2* 
Such setbacks w i t h i n the labour movement, however, were more 
than compensated, or so the Communists thought, by the r e su l t of the 
special congressional e l ec t ion held on February 17, 1948, i n the 
24th Congressional D i s t r i o t of New York* Leo Isaacson, running on 
the A.L*P. t i c k e t won the e l ec t ion by an almost two t o one major i ty* 
Isaaoson po l l ed a t o t a l of 22,697 votes, over 10,000 more than h i s 
Democratic opponent who gained 12,578 votes*S* 
Suoh a r e su l t , which proved t o be the high t i d e of Wallace success, 
perhaps deserves greater analysis . F i r s t l y , the 24th Congressional 
D i s t r i c t was a poor community, whose ethnio or igins were somewhat mixed* 
About t w o - f i f t h s of the community were Jewish, but the area also oontained 
1* "The Decline of American Gommunismtt* David A*Shannon. P ' 
2* "The Strategy of Deception". Jeane J* Ki rkpa t r iok* P 3ys* 
5* The L i b e r a l oandidate, standing independent of the 
Democrat gained 5,840 votes, w h i l s t the Republicans 
gained a t o t a l vote of less than 5,000. 
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large pockets of I r i s h , Negro and Puerto Rio an peoples* The 
Communists explo i ted the d i s s a t i s f a o t i o n of these groups f o r t h e i r 
own advantage* 
Jewish sentiment proved the easiest t o sway, f o r the e l ec t i on 
was held before I s r a e l ' s independence, and at a time when many Jewish 
voters considered Truman's Palestine po l ioy t o be one of appeasement 
t o the B r i t i s h * Isaacson's workers r a l l i e d hundreds of Jewish votes 
w i t h a pamphlet, p r i n t ed i n Yiddish , oharging tha t 'Truman s p i l l s 
Jewish blood f o r Arab o i l ' * Such charges, of course, oould not f a i l 
t o win votes* More notable, however, were the A.L .P . successes i n 
the I r i s h Catholic neighbourhood* I n 1946 the A.L .P . po l l ed only one 
vote i n ten i n the predominantly I r i s h e l e c t o r a l d i s t r i c t s . I n the 
speoial e l e c t i o n , however, Isaacson ca r r ied f i v e I r i s h neighbourhoods, 
and d i d reasonably w e l l i n a l l the others* 
Samuel L u b e l l , a contemporary p o l i t i c a l analyst, a t t r i b u t e d 
t h i s increased I r i s h vote t o the anxiety of tha t community over the 
changing ethnic character of the area* 
The strength of the Negro and Puerto Rio an vote was obtained 
purely by hard work* The Congressional d i s t r i c t i t s e l f had between 
800 and 1,000 resident Communist pa r ty members, whose vigorous campaign 
was supplemented by a f u r t h e r 500 members of the A . L . P . On e l e c t i o n 
day i t has been estimated t ha t Isaacson had an organisation of 4,000 
people working f o r him.1* 
She Isaacson organisations ethnic campaign i s best exemplif ied by 
the composition of the p l a t f o r m speeches at the t r a d i t i o n a l eve-cf-
p o l l r a l l y * Isaacson, who was himself Jewish, was jo ined by Henry 
Wallace i n denouncing Truman's Palestine pol icy* Wallace also 
attacked the American a t t i t u d e of ' J im Cress', and t o tha t end was 
1* "The Decline of American Communism** David A.Shannon. 
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aided by Negro singer Paul Robeson, l a t e r t o surrender h i s passport 
because of Communist a c t i v i t i e s * Robeson f i r s t pointed out tha t 
Southern white supremacists were Democrats, and then introduced a 
young negro veteran, the v i c t i m of a b r u t a l Southern policeman* 
The combination of Robeson's observations and the y o u t h f u l veteran's 
s i l e n t testimony undoubtedly served t o deny the Democrats many votes* 
Hegroes then, as at the present t ime, were u n w i l l i n g t o acknowledge 
the obvious d i f ferences between Northern and Southern Democrats* 
That Robeson's speech was i r r e l evan t mattered l i t t l e ; i t s t i l l fanned 
anti-white supremioists and thus: prcCsaacaon f e e l i n g * 
The ethnic composition of the p l a t f o r m was completed by 
Congressman T i t o Hareantonio, who could amass a large Puerto Rican 
f o l l o w i n g i n his d i s t r i c t , and Mike Q u i l l , the I r i s h leader of the 
transport workers*l* 
By thus p lay ing for the support of minor i ty groups, which i n New 
York happen t o be m a j o r i t y groups, the Wallace forces gained an 
overwhelming v i c to ry* The r e su l t d i d much t o cause j u b i l a t i o n i n the 
Wallace oamp, as w e l l as great ly alarming the Democrats* W i t h i n two 
days of the Bronx e l e c t i o n , Senator J •Howard BcG-rath, chairman of the 
Democratic p a r t y ' s na t iona l oommittee, i n a broadcast speech, a l l 
but i n v i t e d Wallace t o re turn t o the Democratic f old*2* 
Democratic hopes were j o l t e d f u r t h e r , however, the f o l l o w i n g 
week when Democratic Senator Glen Taylor , a homespun Idaho mixture of 
p o l i t i c i a n and singing cowboy, oast h i s l o t w i t h Wallace, and announced 
that he would seek the Vice-President ia l nomination* Whi ls t even at 
t h i s po in t few thought tha t Wallace oould win the e l eo t ion , many d i d 
t h i n k that the Progressives would s p l i t the Democratic votes as 
Theodore Roosevelt had s p l i t the Republicans i n 1912* A t t h i s time 
1* "The Decline of American Communism1** David A*Shannon* P / S ' f 
2. "Henry A.Wallace: Quixotic Crusade 1948"'* K a r l M.Schmidt* 
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the Wallace group was both confident and o p t i m i s t i c Communist and 
non-Communist eaoh real ised t ha t the one was complementary t o the 
other* The Wallaoe part isans were g r a t i f i e d w i t h the organisat ional 
job tha t the Communists could accomplish, w h i l s t the Communists f o r 
t h e i r pa r t were pleased w i t h Wallace's apparent appeal t o the e lectorate*]* 
The oontext of Wallace's speeches dur ing the l a t t e r h a l f of 1947 
and ear ly 1948 r e f l eo ted the-Communist l i n e more accurately than before* 
This Communist breakthrough was oaused by the inadequacy of two young 
people* The f i r s t was Lew Frank, who was Wallace's pro-Communist 
p r i n c i p a l speech w r i t e r , and who was ca l l ed upon t o w r i t e on subjeots 
such as the Marshall Plan i n Congress 1947-8, and the Communist group 
i n Czechoslovakia, subjects a more experienced w r i t e r would have found 
d i f f i o u l t t o handle* Frank was helped by a young newspaperwoman, 
named Tabitha Petran, who, a f t e r serving w i t h *P*M**2* and 'Time* jo ined 
the f e l l o w - t r a v e l l i n g 'Nat iona l Guardian' • To supplement her knowledge 
of p o l i t i c s and in t e rna t iona l a f f a i r s , she helped t o organise a research 
group of i n t e l l e c t u a l s which met weekly i n the Manhattan home of Frederick 
Vanderbi l t F i e l d t o disouss the oontext of Wallace's speeches* Prominent 
members were F i e l d himself , an expert on Eastern As ia , and a frequent 
cont r ibu tor on tha t subjeot f o r ' P o l i t i c a l A f f a i r s * , Marion Baohraoh, 
l a t e r a Smith Act defendant, and V i c t o r Per lo , once an economist f o r the 
War Production Board and the Department of Commerce* Other members were 
David Ramsey, a cont r ibu tor t o the 'Communist* as ea r ly as 1956 as an 
expert on German a f f a i r s , and Walter Sohlieper, a German refugee who wrote 
f o r the overseas News Agenoy, a non-Communist press association, under 
1* "Henry W/allaoe: The Man and the Myth" * Draight MaoDonald* * 
2* A magazine owned by Max Ltimer and oonsidered t o con t ro l 
the A .L .P . 
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the nom-de-plume of Maximil l ian Soheer. Following the e l e c t i o n 
Sohlieper was t o defeot t o the Communist b loc , and was known l a t e r t o 
be working i n Fast B e r l i n . 
This group ensured tha t Wallace was reading t h e i r words, words 
w i t h whioh the candidate d i d not agree, and some of whioh he was l a t e r 
t o regret* One such instance ooncemed the Communist group d ' e t a t i n 
Czechoslovakia, an aot whioh outraged American publ ic opinion, She 
p o s i t i o n tha t Wallace took, or rather the group took on behalf of 
Wallace, was what the candidate termed f o u r years l a t e r as h i s 
greatest raistake*l. 
This mistake by Wallace gave r i s e t o many charges, of Communist 
oont ro l of the Progressive par ty , and was one of the reasons f o r the 
increasing number of defections f rom the Progressive pa r ty , especial ly 
i n the Western states. 
I n Colorado, so obvious was the Communist take-over b i d , t ha t the 
s ta te ' s most important Progressive, Charles G-raham, a former regional 
chairman of the War Labour Board and nominee t o the na t iona l p l a t fo rm 
committee, l e f t the movement, and d i d not even go t o the na t iona l 
convention* Simi lar Communist i n f i l t r a t i o n oost the Progressive 
movement the state chairman of Nevada, G-eorge Springmeyer, and some 
of t h e i r most able leaders* 2* 
As ear ly as January, 1948, the Progressive Cit izens meeting i n 
convention at Chicago had adopted a number of resolut ions whioh were 
destined to form the framework of the par ty p l a t f o r m , 3 . This framework 
was very much a Communiat-inspired document, denouncing the Marshall Plan, 
and Truman's f o r e i g n a f f a i r s p o l i c y ; demanding tha t the manufacture of 
atom-bombs should be discontinued; promising the publ ic ownership of s t ee l , 
coal , the railways and publ ic u t i l i t i e s , and condemning red b a i t i n g as a 
1* "The Decline of Amerioan Communism1** David A.Shannon* P'&t 
2 . I b i d . A* 7 ^ / ' * S' 
3 . "Third Par ty Movements i n the united States*" Wi l l i am B . 
Hesse I t i n e . 
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• H i t l e r i a n technique*• Wallace already committed t o being a t h i r d 
candidate i n the e l ec t ion , appeared at the Convention, and f u r t h e r 
echoed the Communist standpoint by blaming b ig . business and the Truman 
administrat ion f o r i n f l a t i o n i n the na t ion ' s economy, by condemning 
pr iva te monopolies, and by pronouncing the ttro main p a r t i e s as uni ted 
i n a programme leading t o war. 
I t was not u n t i l s ix months l a t e r , i n Phi ladelphia , however, 
that the par ty received i t s fo rmal c h r i s t e n i n g . l . The Progressive 
party was born during la te Ju ly i n the c i t y of Brother ly Love. The 
atmosphere i n convention, however, was serious and f a r f rom brother ly* 
The conventions of minor pa r t i e s , unl ike Demooratio and Republican 
conventions are, by t r a d i t i o n , quiet and s t a i d , the convention of the 
People's progressive par ty was ne i ther . The Convention presented a 
f r o n t of enthusiasm, ensured by the t ranspor ta t ion of 10,000 supporters 
by t r a i n f rom New York, and synthetic f o lk s ine s s . The l a t t e r was 
supplied by profess ional a r t i s t e s , such as People'a Song I n o . , and 
Pete Seeger, amateur f o l k - s i n g e r s , and olimaxed by the appearance of 
Vice-*res iden t ia l candidate, 6-len Taylor, who strummed his gu i ta r 
w h i l s t singing the campaign hymn, 'F r iend ly Henry Wallace* . 2 . 
Behind t h i s innocent facade the Communists were stamping t h e i r 
author i ty upon the movement, manoeuvres which were t o cause f u r t h e r 
defections f rom the p a r t y . 
Whi l s t the Communists d i d not fo rm a major i ty of the p la t fo rm 
committee, there were enough nan-communists who agreed w i t h some parts 
of the par ty l i n e t o allow Communists and t h e i r close a l l i e s t o w r i t e 
most of the p l a t f o r m . I t was olear that the p l a t fo rm oommittee was 
divided on the issue of Communists admission t o the par ty so much so tha t 
1 . "Third Party Movements i n the United States". Wi l l i am B . ^<?s* 
Hesselt ine. 
2 . "The Deoline of American Communism" • David A .Shannon. 6 & 
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Rexford G.Tugwell of the Univers i ty of Chicago, the temporary chairman 
of the committee, almost immediately began t o withdraw f rom the pa r ty , 
and i t was only w i t h great reluctance d i d he accept the unopposed 
Tugwell himself was i n the centre of the convention's biggest 
controversy, t ha t of Puerto Rio an independence, an objeotive which the 
Communists supported and fos te red by t r y i n g t o make i t appear tha t 
Puerto Ricans suffered under American imperial ism. She prodndependenoe 
f a c t i o n on the committee was l ed by T i t o Marcantonio, who found himself 
opposed by Tugwell, who had previously seen service as Governor of the 
i s l a n d . Eventually Marcantonio was forced t o y i e l d on tha t issue, and 
Tugwell had the s a t i s f a c t i o n of seeing h i s own p lan of se l f -determinat ion 
f o r Puerto Rioo on the par ty m a n i f e s t o . l . 
On the Convention f l o o r i t s e l f , the Communist a and t h e i r allies also 
made t h e i r influence f e l t , the most notable instances being i n the keynote 
speech of Charles P.Howard, an Iowa negro, and Wallace's acceptance speech. 
Both of these were w r i t t e n understandably w i t h a Communist s lan t , by two 
radio w r i t e r s , M i l l a r d Lampell, himself a Communist, and A l l a n E.Sloane, 
a man who w h i l s t no longer being a card-oarrying Communist, oould 
adequately f i t i n t o tha t bloc of l e f t - w i n g humanity known as ' f e l l o w -
t r a v e l l e r s * . 2 . 
On only three occasions were the Communists challenged i n Convention 
by the non-Communists, each occasion b r ing ing f a i l u r e t o the non-communists• 
The f i r s t dispute was concerned w i t h the composition of the Progressive 
pa r ty ' s na t iona l committee, which was so organised as t o ensure packing 
by Communists and f e l l o w t r a v e l l e r s . The second occasion arose over 
a p la t fo rm c a l l i n g f o r l i b e r a t i o n of those Macedonians who were s t i l l 
l i v i n g i n a state of 'oppression* i n Greece, so as t o b r i n g them i n l i n e 
nomination of permanent chairman of the p l a t fo rm committee. 
1 . "The Decline of American Communism*. David A . Shannon. 
2 . I b i d . />0 * 
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w i t h t h e i r brothers i n Bulgar ia and Yugoslavia* Suoh obvious p r o -
Communist p o l i o i e s , brought about the t h i r d dispute* This took the 
form of a reso lu t ion on f o r e i g n po l i cy termed the 'Vermont Resolution* 
whereby James Hayf ord, Chairman of the Vermont delegation, strove t o 
give the f o r e i g n po l i cy section of the p la t fo rm a less-Russian look* 
Such e f f o r t s , however, were t o no a v a i l i n the face of steam-roller 
act ion by the Communists*l* 
The Communists also manipulated the conventions of the 'Young 
Progressives of America' held d i r e c t l y a f t e r the main convention, 
although, i n t h i s instance, the co-chairman, Chris t ine Walker of 
D e t r o i t , and A l v i n Jones, a negro f rom the Southern un ivers i ty Law 
School at Baton Rouge, met greater resistance f rom the non-Communists 
t h a i d i d t h e i r senior counterparts* 
The f i r s t day ended i n chaos f o l l o w i n g an indecisive vote, a 
s tate of a f f a i r s which apparently alarmed the Communists, who secured 
the passage of a vote e f f e c t i v e l y ending the convention* The vote 
i n f a c t granted the Y.P.A. na t iona l counci l power t o act as the 
convention's agent regarding a l l unfinished business* The convention 
then adjourned without even adopting a platform*2* 
A t the main convention, however, the Communists ca r r ied a l l 
before them, not because they formed a ma jo r i ty of the delegates — 
they d i d not* The Communist convention v i c t o r i e s were due sole ly t o 
the f a c t that the Communists were an organised, uni ted group, w h i l s t 
t h e i r opponents were disorganised and divided* There was no non-
Communist Progressive leader w i l l i n g t o step forward and lead an 
anti^ommunist caucus* 
For h i s p a r t , Wallace never dlsoouraged the Communists, although 
1* "The Decline of American Communism1*. David A.Shannon* P'"p% 
2 . I b i d . '7 V 
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he d i d see them as a th rea t t o h is oandidacy, and even once 1* asserted 
tha t i f the Gommunists chose t o run t h e i r own p res iden t i a l candidate 
the Progressives would lose 1©,000 Communist votes* but gain three 
m i l l i o n non-Communist votes* On what grounds he made t h i s assumption 
one w i l l never know, however; i t would seem l i k e l y tha t an independent 
Communist candidature would have resul ted i n a ne t t gain of votes by 
the Progressives, especia l ly i n view of the happenings w i t h i n the 
par ty a f t e r the Convention* Wi th in a week of the Convention, s i x 
prominent New Mexican Progressives, inc lud ing the State Treasurer 
and Organiser, l e f t the movement* The same day, the Chairman 
of the Colorado Convention delegation resigned, to be fo l lowed i n 
ea r ly August by twelve Progressive leaders f rom San Mateo County, 
C a l i f o r n i a , who resigned due t o the defeat of the 'Vermont Resolution* * 
Other Progressives inc lud ing Rexford Tugwell ohose t o withdraw qu ie t l y 
f rom the meeting* Such resignations, w h i l s t weakening the par ty as a 
whole, only served t o strengthen the Communists* con t ro l of the pa r ty , 
t o the extent tha t oopies of the * Dai ly Worker* were now sold at Wallace 
meetings*2* Wallace, i n f a o t , began t o suggest tha t the Communists were 
now de l ibe ra te ly embarrassing h i s candidacy i n order t o keep the Progressive 
par ty small, and eas i ly con t ro l l ed , and, i n October, he engaged a new ghost 
w r i t e r whose ideas more nearly matched h i s own»3* 
I n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , however, the assumption made by Wallace was 
inaccurate, f o r there i s reason t o believe tha t the Communist Party 
1* A t a speech i n New Hampshire p r i o r t o the Party Convention* 
2* "The Decline of American Communism". David A*Shannon* PP * ? ?7 
3. Henry Wallaces "Quixotic Crusade 1948". E a r l M. Sohmidt* 
/>/» / f f 
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These f i v e incidents were themselves damaging; f a r more damaging, 
however, was the osmpaign of President Truman, who toured the country 
i n s i s t i n g tha t a vote f o r Wallace was a ha l f -vo te f o r Thomas Dewey, 
the Republican candidate* Truman thus cap i ta l i sed upon the f e a r 
of re-aot ion tha t a few months e a r l i e r had stimulated the Wallace 
movement* 
A f u r t h e r damaging f a o t o r t o Wallace's candidature was the 
Diaiecra t r e v o l t i n the South which helped Truman i n the North, f o r 
w h i l s t the President 's c i v i l - r i g h t s p o s i t i o n proved too strong f o r the 
Dixiecrats t o stomach, i t appealed more than ever t o Northern negroes . l , 
Wallace, r e a l i s i n g he was. los ing ground t o the President, made a v a i n 
e f f o r t t o capture the Northern negro vote by re fus ing t o speak t o 
segregated audiences i n the South* Whi l s t he f a i l e d t o increase h is 
Northern popu la r i t y , t h i s act ion d i d reveal the Southern p o l i t i c a l 
o i l mate t o the Progressive candidate, who was several times the ta rge t 
f o r bad eggs and tomatoes.2. 
The r e su l t of the e l ec t ion held on November 2, 1948, contained 
two surprises* F i r s t l y , Wallace proved t o himself tha t he had made 
a f a t a l blunder i n launching the People's Progressive Par ty , by p o l l i n g 
l i t t l e over one m i l l i o n votes, and, secondly, overa l l v i c t o r y went not 
t o Thomas Dewey, but t o Harry S.Truman, oontrary t o a l l predict ions.S* 
The vo t ing f o r those candidates p o l l i n g more than one m i l l i o n 
votes was as f o l l o w s s - 4 . 
1* "The South Since 1865", John Samuel E z e l l . ' 7 
2* "The Decline of American Communism"1. David A»Shannon .A* 
5* "Thi rd Party Movements i n the United States". W i l l i a m B.He3sjltine. 
4 . The complete s t a t i s t i c s regarding the 1948 e leo t ion resu l t s 
w i l l be found i n the appendix t o t h i s chapter. 
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Popular E l ec to ra l 1» 
Votes Votes 
Harry S.Truman (Democrat) 24,105,695 303 
Thomas Dewey (Republican) 21,969,170 189 
Strom Thurmond (States 1 Right * 1,169,021 39 
Democrat) 
Henry Wallaoe (Peoples* 1,156,103 -
Progressive) 
Such a r e su l t f o r Wallaoe was, of course, miserable, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
when one considers tha t the previous A p r i l he had spoken op t im ia t i oa l l y 
of gaining twenty m i l l i o n votes* 
Of greater in t e res t than the t o t a l vote , i s the analysis of tha t 
vote , f o r , of h i s t o t a l vote , w e l l over h a l f of i t came f rom New York 
Ci ty and C a l i f o r n i a , The Wallace vote i n New York State was 501,167, 
w h i l s t the C a l i f o r n i a vote was 190,581, I n C a l i f o r n i a , however, h i s 
vote mainly came from three oounties - Los Angeles County, where he 
po l l ed 101,085 votes, San Francisco County, 21,492 votes and the 
East Bay area of Alameda County 16,853 votes .5 . 
Elsewhere the Wallace vote i n the states could only be measured 
i n tens of thousands, w i t h the f o l l o w i n g states reg i s t e r ing s i g n i f i c a n t 
votes f o r the Progressive Candidate:— 
Pennsylvania: 55,161 votes . 
New Jersey: 42,683 " 
Michigan: 38,955 • 
Massachusetts: 38,157 "" 
Ohio: 37,596 * 4 , 
Washington: 29,745 " 
1 . "Facts about the Presidents*. John Nathan Kane, ^ J J / 
2. Dix ieora t . 
3 . "The Decline of American Communism". David A,Shannon, 
4 . The b a l l o t i n Ohio contained only names of Wallace e leotors , 
wi thout mentioning Wallaoe or the Progressive Par ty . 
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The Wallace vote was of s igni f icance , however, i n the states of 
New York, Maryland and Michigan, which Truman would have he I d , had a l l 
those who voted f o r Wallace, supported the President . A f u l l y 
representative Progressive t i c k e t i n I l l i n o i s , where only a w r i t e - i n 
vote f o r Wallace was possible, and Ohio, might also have given those 
Democratic states t o Dewey* 
I n a l l , however, Wallace oar r ied only t h i r t y of the nation* s 
preoinots . Seven of these were near t o Ybor C i t y i n F l o r i d a , an ares 
inhabited mainly by Cuban oigar workers. A f u r t h e r f i v e precincts 
were gained i n the urban area of Los Angeles, w h i l s t the remaining 
eighteen preoinots were a l l i n New York, e ight of them i n V i t o 
Maroantonio*s d i s t r i c t , whioh sent him baok t o Congress.l . 
Wallace also car r ied two e l ec t i on d i s t r i c t s i n East Bronx, 
where there was a large workers* co-operative block of f l a t s , founded 
by the Gommunists i n the 1920*s and l a t e r known as ' L i t t l e Stal ingrad*. 
Despite these minor successes i n New York C i t y , the ' D a i l y Worker* 
s t i l l complained tha t Wallace d i d not even carry some of the t r a d i t i o n a l l y 
American Labour Party strongholds i n the Jewish working-clas3 d i s t r i c t s , 
where the Democrats increased t h e i r vote more than d i d the A . L . P . 
Although the e l e c t o r a l defeat meant the end of Wallace's p o l i t i c a l 
career 2, as w e l l as the end of Communist in f luence i n the trade unions 
and i n many l i b e r a l c i r c l e s , the Communists stuck w i t h the Progressives 
f o r a f u r t h e r f o u r years. The Communists undoubtedly looked t o 1952 
w i t h optimism, f o r on surveying the e l ec t ion resu l t s they said tha t 
the 1948 resul ts • • • • ' r e i n fo rce the view/ tha t the foundation of a 
nat ional t h i r d pa r ty , capable of successfully challenging the reactionary 
program of American monopoly was l a i d i n t h i s oampaign.5. 
1 . V i t o Maroantonio oarr ied the en t i r e New York 18th E l e c t o r a l 
D i s t r i c t f o r the American Labour Par ty , whereas Wallace could 
only carry e ight of the d i s t r i c t s preoinots , thus f a i l i n g t o 
emulate h i s f e l l o w - t r a v e l l i n g l i eu tenan t . 
2 . "The Guardian" 18th November, 1965. Obituary of Henry Wallace. 
5 . New York State Committee of the Communist Party -The Eleo t ion 
resu l t s i n New York*. 
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The Communists were unable t o regain t h e i r former p o s i t i o n , 
however, due t o the probings of the Un-American A c t i v i t i e s Committee, 
and the prose out ions under the Smith Aot , as w e l l as other d i s c r e d i t i n g 
f ac to r s against Communism such as the Korean War* 
Thus any i l l u s i o n s the Communists had of regaining t h e i r inf luence 
were shattered at the 1952 Pres iden t ia l e l ec t i on , when the Progressive 
candidate, Vincent Hal l inan received the meagre t o t a l of 152,608 v o t e s . 1 » 
Of t h i s t o t a l , some 64,000 votes came f rom the Amerioan Labour Party of 
New York .2 . 
Gideon's Army was defeated* I n 1956 even Communist leaders were 
w i l l i n g t o admit p u b l l o a l l y that t h e i r t h i r d par ty venture had been a 
s tupid mistake* Wallace, the i d e a l i s t , was mined as a p o l i t i c i a n , 
and was l a t e r t o t u r n f u l l c i r c l e and support the Truman Adminis t ra t ion ' s 
p o l i c y i n Korea* His Progressive pa r ty , or ra ther the e l ec t ion , was a 
year too l a t e , f o r there i s l i t t l e doubt tha t had the e l ec t ion been held 
i n 1947 and not 1948, he would have p o l l e d more than he d i d , t o go down 
i n t o h i s to ry as another p res iden t i a l also-ran, and not as a seemingly 
embittered i d e a l i s t thrashed i n Truman's tr iumphal year* 
1* 1952 was a disastrous year f o r the l e f t - w i n g elements i n 
Amerioan p o l i t i c s * Hal l inan received more votes than 
Ho opes the S o c i a l i s t candidate, thus ending S o c i a l i s t 
P res iden t i a l hopes* ("The S o c i a l i s t Party of America"' ? •* 
David A.Shannon) * 
2* "Third Par ty Movements i n the United States*. Wi l l i am B.HesseItine. 
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Part I I - Chapter I 
Socialism i n Amerioa 
She Soc ia l i s t movement i n the United States combined elements of 
Europe an Marxism or " S c i e n t i f i c " socialism, w i t h a native American 
utopain form of socialism* 1* 
The Soc i a l i s t p a r t y ' s & olden Age coincided w i t h the Progressive 
movement of the ear ly twent ie th century, though i n f a c t socialism came 
t o the United States a generation e a r l i e r . I t drew upon the t r a d i t i o n 
of Utopian communities tha t f l ou r i shed before the C i v i l War, and on 
past American humanism, radical ism and non-oonf ormity. The impetus of 
the movement, however, was derived f rom the r i se of i n d u s t r i a l society* 
The Soc i a l i s t Labour Party o r i g i n a l l y formed as the Working Men's 
Party of the United States i n 1876, was fos te red a f t e r 1890, mainly by 
Daniel de Leon, a man of Dutch Jewish o r i g i n who taught In t e rna t iona l 
Law and Philosophy a t Columbia Univers i ty i n the la te 1880*3* 2* 
He l e f t the middle-class Na t iona l i s t Club Movement, and i n 1891 won 
nearly 15,000 votes i n the New York State gubernatorial e l eo t ion . 5* 
He was, however, opposed t o any half-way measures and demanded a p ro le ta r i an 
revo lu t ion aimed at the uncondit ional surrender of capi ta l i sm, showing 
mi l i t ancy , even h o s t i l i t y , towards the established labour union movement, 
something which at times tended t o repel even the most dedicated of h i s 
f o l l o w e r s . He t r i e d t o spread marxism i n a country which l i k e d nei ther 
theor i s t s nor i d e a l i s t s , being himself oonvinced that workers directed by 
Soc ia l i s t s , could b r ing oapi ta l ism to an end, and then form a new 
s o c i a l i s t labour movement which he himself hoped to organise* 4* 
1* "Third Party Movements i n the United States*" 
Wi l l i am B . Hesselt ine. ¥ 
2* "American Socialism 1900-60" :. H.Wayne Morgan* ^ A 
3. "Third Party Movements i n the United States." 
Wi l l i am B . Hessettine* 
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He exerted great inf luence i n the Knights of Labour u n t i l 
he formed an independent Soc i a l i s t Trade and Labour A l l i ance , an 
act ion which won him the jealous enmity of both the dec l in ing Knights 
of Labour and the r i s i n g American Federation of Labour ( A . F . L . ) 
De Leon never suooeeded i n ass imi la t ing h i s S o c i a l i s t Labour 
par ty i n t o the American way of l i f e or winning over the labour movement. 
He was a dect inaire Marxis t , preaching class antagonisms and excluded 
Chr i s t i an Soc ia l i s t s , Fabians, Trades Union soc i a l i s t s , and groups whioh 
hoped t o work w i t h the Populis t pa r ty , 1 , 
A f t e r 1900, having made l i t t l e headway, the ma jo r i ty of soc i a l i s t s 
began t o support the S o c i a l i s t Party of America, w h i l s t the party of 
de Leon became l i t t l e more than a r i g i d sect. The f a i l u r e of de Leon 
and his f o l l o w e r s thus gave opportunity t o a new, more American, s o c i a l i s t 
pa r ty , 2 . 
I n 1897 Eugene V i c t o r Debs, President of the Amerioan Railway 
Union, organised the Social Democracy of America at the Union's l a s t 
convention. This body planned t o colonise a Far Western Sta te , 
However the era of Utopian i so la ted communities was over. I t s 
declarat ion of p r inc ip les Stemmed out of the defunct n a t i o n a l i s t 
movement, and i t suf fered f rom the usual l e f t - w i n g growing pains 
of f a c t i o n a l dissension, personal r i v a l r i e s of leaders and v i o l e n t 
disputat ions over po l i c i e s* 
I n 1898 i t merged w i t h the Sooial Democratic Party l ed by V i o t o r 
L*Berger - a movement whioh enoouraged socialism v i a democratic act ion 
and representative government* The key t o success of t h i s 
1* "Sinoe 1900". O.J,Barok and N.M,Blake* ^ 7 
2* "Third Party Movements i n the United States". 
Wi l l i am B. Hessettine. 
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movement being education not r evo lu t ion , a doctrine f a r b e t t e r suited 
t o the United States than were those of the revolut ionary de Leon* 
Berger*s great s o o i a l i s t experiment was car r ied out i n the "laboratory"' 
of Milwaukee, 1* a town owing i t s importance t o some extent as being 
the lake po r t f o r the State of Wisconsin, and probably more important, 
the por t of entry of the Immigrants (among whom were many Germans)) 
of tha t state* 2 . He cap i ta l i sed upon l o c a l needs w i t h a s o o i a l i s t 
success formula , forming i n the process a powerful l o c a l machine, 
w h i l s t making himself a na t iona l spokesman w i t h i n the p a r t y . He 
himself was the f i r s t member of the par ty to s i t i n Congress, being 
the representative f o r his Milwaukee d i s t r i c t f rom 1911 t o 1915, and 
again f rom 1925 to 1929. 
The Social Democrats however, constructive po l ioy makers although 
they were, laoked the f l a i r and oo^-our necessary t o an aspi r ing p o l i t i c a l 
movement, a f a u l t whioh was r e o t i f i e d when Debs jo ined the p a r t y . 
This move, i t must be noted, w h i l s t g iv ing prominence t o the Social 
Democrats, also brought Debs i n t o the publ ic eye, and helped him 
become America*s best known S o c i a l i s t , c e r t a in ly i n the f i r s t two 
deoades of t h i s century. 3 . 
Eugene V . Debs was the product of f r o n t i e r Indiana, a y o u t h f u l 
veteran of hard rai lway l i f e and a dynamio labour organiser, combining 
qua l i t i e s of leadership w i t h a love of mankind so as t o beoome a 
formidable p o l i t i c a l leader and soc ia l evangel is t . I n 1893 he 
formed the American Railway Union along i n d u s t r i a l l i n e s , and i n 
1894 r e luc t an t ly entered the Pullman s t r i k e , f o r which he was l a t e r 
t o serve a pr ison sentence f o r contempt of cour t , f o l l o w i n g a 
1 . "American Socialism 1900 - 60*. H.Wayne Morgan. ^ ^ 
2 . "North America". Rhodwel Jones & Bryan. ^•'76 
5. "American Socialism 1900-60". H.Wayne Morgan. ^ 3 
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court i n j u n c t i o n ordering a l l union a f f i c e r s t o cease s t r i ke a c t i v i t i e s * 
He emerged f rom pr i son leaning towards socialism, and f o r a time l e n t 
h i s prest ige to h i s Utopian comrades i n Social Democracy, although 
w i t h i n three years he had become a convert t o complete r ad ica l socialism, 
and rap id ly beoame a na t ional f i g u r e w i t h i n the p a r t y . 1 . 
The Soc i a l i s t Labour Party ran candidates f o r na t iona l o f f i c e 
i n the 1890*3 but w i t h l i t t l e success, w h i l s t the Socia l Democratic 
pa r ty working on l o c a l l e v e l , and under Berger*s guidanoe i n the 
l a t e 1890* s showed great strength i n the states of Wisconsin, Massachusetts 
and New York* 
I n 1900, Debs ran f o r President f o r the f i r s t t ime, on the 
Socia l Democratic t i c k e t , w i t h support f rom a Soc i a l i s t Labour 
s p l i n t e r group. The p l a t f orm however was the work of Berger, and 
demanded complete government ownership of the means of production 
and d i s t r i b u t i o n , and advocated independent p o l i t i c a l act ion and 
trade: unionism. 2 . 
That year, Debs po l l ed a t o t a l of 94,777 votes 5, supported by Jahr. 
Harriman the Vice-President ia l nominee f o r the party* This credi table 
performance was accomplished without a u n i f i e d organisation behind them, 
a f a c t o r which made a s o c i a l i s t e l ec to ra l break-through i n t o a s o l i d 
e n t i t y rather than a dream* 
Confusion among Soc ia l i s t s regarding f a c t i o n a l and organisational 
d i f f i c u l t i e s , was soon eradicated, by the formation i n 1901 of the 
Soc ia l i s t Par ty of America. This par ty , f rom i t s formation u n t i l the 
present day, was t o contain the ma jo r i ty of American soc ia l i s t s* I t d i d 
however lose members to other l e f t - w i n g ' f ac t ions which emerged p a r t i c u l a r l y 
1 . "American Socialism" 1900-60* H.Wayne Morgan* ^3 
2. "Since 1900". O.J.Barck and N.M.Blake. >*«?7 
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i n the per iod immediately f o l l o w i n g the F i r s t World War, a per iod whioh 
can only be described as one of r ad ioa l confusion, and one which w i l l be 
dealt w i t h i n greater d e t a i l below. 
The Soc ia l i s t Party of America was founded i n the Masonio H a l l 
at Indianapol is , t o become the f i r s t uni ted soo ia l i s t organisation, 
although formed f rom a c o a l i t i o n of c o n f l i c t i n g in te res t s , as i t s 
h i s to ry was t o reveal . 1 . 
S t i l l i n s i s t i n g upon maintaining a separate, existence, however, 
were the S o c i a l i s t Labour Party of de Leon, and a group of r a d i c a l 
reformers ca l l ed the Fabian S o c i a l i s t s . 
As wi th a l l p o l i t i c a l pa r t i e s , there were d i f f e r i n g views i n 
the Soo ia l i s t Par ly both on socialism, and how those ideals should 
be applied t o socie ty . On the r i g h t of the par ty stood V i c t o r Berger 
and his step-by-step s o c i a l i s t s , a group committed t o the education 
of the people and the democratic process, b e l i e f s whioh had already 
brought them considerable success at a l o c a l l e v e l , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n 
Milwaukee. Towards the centre stood a group of moderates who, l i k e 
Berger and h is supporters, were committed t o education and the b a l l o t , 
but who also sympathised w i t h a stronger s o c i a l i s t tone i n t h e i r 
programme. On the l e f t f l a n k stood a group whose ideals might be 
termed * revolut ionary *. They had no, one, spec i f ic backer, and w h i l s t 
they claimed Debs as t h e i r i d o l , he was o f ten found f l i r t i n g w i t h the 
other two groups i n a b i d t o keep harmony w i t h i n the p a r t y . This move 
by Debs shows h i s shrewdness, not merely as a p o l i t i c a l leader, but as 
an apostle of a new soc i a l and moral movement, a movement whose only 
ohanoe of success lay i n pu t t i ng forward a United f r o n t . The l e f t wing 
were m i l i t a n t i n t h e i r desire f o r pa r ty recognit ion of r ad i ca l labour 
unions, and d is t rus ted "Slowoial is ts" , as they dubbed the supporters of 
1 , "The S o c i a l i s t Party of America"', David A , Shannon, r A 
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Berger. This l a t t e r group looked mere reformers to men who talked 
of workers revol ts and soc ia l revolu t ion i n a jargon more common t o 
European s o c i a l i s t s , such as Ee i r Hardie and Jean Jaures, than 
t o a conservative United States of America, Such varying opinions 
among Party members i n v i t e d dissension, and the h i s to ry of socialism 
i n Amerioa i s one of i n t r a - p a r t y s t r i f e , rather than, success at the 
b a l l o t box* 1* Because i t was a o o a l i t i o n , the par ty d i d not enforce 
r i g i d d i s c i p l i n e , something which has become a common feature of European 
socialism* This loose structure and semi-independence of i t s component 
par ts however merely served t o heighten the tendency t o f ac t i ona l i sm . 
During t h i s per iod, the ul t imate s o c i a l i s t goal was a co-
operative commonwealth, although i t s immediate demands oould only be 
pa l led as an advanced form of populism, a dwindling r a d i c a l movement, 
whose views are thought by many t o be re-incarnated i n the progressive 
movement of the ea r ly twentieth century* Socialism*s aims were the 
publ ic ownership of rai lways, publ ic u t i l i t i e s , and mines; government 
r e l i e f f o r the unemployed; a shorter working week; a b o l i t i o n of c h i l d 
labour; soc i a l securi ty l e g i s l a t i o n ; income and inheritance taxes; equal 
suf f rage; the establishment of the in i t i a t ive and the referendum i n 
government; propor t ional representation i n b a l l o t i n g ; and the a b o l i t i o n 
of the Supreme Court 's veto* 2* This programme, which, i f one applied 
the relevant aims t o B r i t a i n , would, w i t h the exception of the f i r s t aim, 
r e c a l l Shaftesbury, Beveridge, P i t t and Chartism, but not modern socialism* 
1 . "Amerioan Socialism 1900-60". H.Wayne Morgan. 
2. " s i nce 1900". 0.J.Barck and N.M.Blake. PJ t 
108. 
As Immediate aims, however, they had muoh to applaud them i n their efforts 
to attain a similar standard of sooial welfare as had previously been 
enjoyed i n Great Br i ta in and Scandinavia* Such a programme did help 
to educate the American publio to the idea that government was j u s t i f i e d 
i n i t s intervention into economic l i f e i f i t helped promote sooial 
just ice* 
up to World War I , and the "Bed so are* the party grew i n 
membership, vote and influence* Never before or since, has a 
p o l i t i c a l organisation with any kind of Sooialist orientation grown 
as the Sooialist Party did during the f i r s t ten to f i f t een years of 
i t s existenoe. Morris Hi11 quit estimated la ter that i n 1900, 
membership of the Sooialist Party of America was as high as 10,000 
dues-paying members, although this figure seems anasag.geration, and 
was never i n fac t checked at the time. The important fac t , however, 
i s that i n 1904, the o f f i c i a l party membership stood at 20,765, and 
that Debs* running as the Sooialist Party's f i r s t - ever Presidential 
candidate polled 402,285 votes. 1. 
Between 1900 and 1904, the party had acquired many l ibera l s 
and intelleotuals within i t s ranks, but also gained other less pleasant 
adherents from among the wmuckraking" journalists and publishers who 
seemed to abound at the time* 2* By 1908, however, the representatives 
to the Social i s ts Convention, made i t evident that the working classes 
were now a minority within the party, whilst lawyers, small businessmen, 
editors, former polit icians and protestent ministers dominated the party* 
That year the soc ia l i s t s f u l l y expeoted to p o l l nearly a mil l ion 
votes i n the Presidential eleotion* However, Democrats and Republicans, 
then proclaimed their devotion to reform, and the A . F . L . endorsed Bryan* 
1* "The Socia l i s t Party of America" * David A* Shannon* PS-
2* "The Age of Reform". R* Hafstedter. / ° ' 9 $ 
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Thus i n 1908, while the parly boasted a membership of 41,751, Sabs 
presidential vote grew to only 420,715* This despite the use of some 
of the such eleotion campaign devices such as a speoial t r a i n f o r Debs 
and his entourage, which was soon dubbed "She Bed Speoial". Any 
enthusiasm there was on the campaign, however, was not f o r Debs himself, 
but f o r his cause* Hie was not an ©rator Hire Bryan, but an apostle, and 
very conscious of the fact* Be even admitted to being unf i t ted by 
temperament and taste, f o r the of f ice of President, and was once believed 
to have said to Lincoln Steffens " I f there were any chance of my eleotion, 
I wouldn't run* The Party wouldn't l e t me* "". 1* Whilst the statement 
may i n f a c t be true, the sentiments behind i t are hard to believe, i f 
only f o r the f ac t that Debs was never seriously r iva l led as his party* s 
presidential candidate f o r ever twenty years* 
The period of greatest growth of the Socialist party was between 
1908 and 1912, and during the last two years of that period the Socialists 
secured over one thousand of the i r members i n publio off ice* Their 
membership figures at this period olaimed 100,000 members* 2* 
They gained two big break-throughs i n 1910 when Brail Seidel 
was elected Mayor of Milwaukee, and Victor Berger was sent to Congress 
as Representative f o r his Milwaukee d i s t r i c t . I n 1914, Meyer London, 
a Socialist running f o r one of Hew York's congressional seats* was 
returned to Washington, and from this period u n t i l the mid 1920* s 
there were usually one or two socialists i n of f ice on Capitol H i l l * 
By 1911, the socialists had gained control of thir ty-three 
c i t i e s and towns, the more important, besides Milwaukee, being 
1* "American Socialism 1900-60"* H*Wayne Morgan* ^ 
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Berkeley (Cal i fornia) , Butte (Montana) and F l i n t and Jackson i n 
Michigan* 1 . 
Neither the La Foliat te Progressives nor the Socialists were 
content wi th Rooseveltian morality and Wilson*a academic i»m. 
She Socialists, however, although continuously torn by internal 
controversy, by "splinter"' movements, by conf l ic ts between foreign 
working groups and native American nriddle-olass radicals, made thei r 
basic c r i t i c i sm of Roosevelt and Wilson by claiming that the i r 
programmes were mere reforms that l e f t the oapitaliat structure untouched. 
As, the Socialists looked upon Roosevelt, so the former President 
looked upon them, and saw them as a growing threat* Be considered that 
i f the major parties did not take steps to reform sooiety themselves, 
then the Socialists might take more drastic action* 
During these years the Socialist Party was not a r i g i d doctrinaire 
party, but rather a coal i t ion of regional groups that had d i f fe ren t , 
even conf l ic t ing , points of view* Diversity was the party*s strength, 
and i n th i s way the Socialists themselves unconsciously followed the 
pattern of the major parties* Their deoline i s the story of movement 
away from an all-embracing p o l i t i c a l party to a monolithic seot*2* 
She most art iculate, and one of the most important centres of 
socialism was New York, where i n lower Manhattan there was socialism 
before the party* Here, i n some neighbourhoods, itrmttrgrants grew up 
as socialists, as some Americans grew up Republicans* These were 
mainly garment workers, though thei r leaders were mainly evolutionary 
socialists who l ived by the pen, wri ters , such as William James Ghent, 
1* "She Era of Theodore Roosevelt*1* George E* Howry, ' 6 » 
2* "She Socialist Party of •America"'* David A* Shannon* /V* ^ / 
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Gustavus Myers (author of "The History of Great American Fortunes") 
Ernest Poole (author of "The Harbour") and his wife Margaret, 
Howard Brubaker, Floyd Hel l , Max Eastman, Robert Hunter, Charles 
Edward Russell, the muckraking journal is t , and William English Walling* 
Not a l l the leaders, however, were men who earned a l i v i n g as authors* 
The main figure' among New York socialists was Morris H i l l q u i t , a 
lawyer, who was supported among his own profession by Louis B*Boudin 
(author of "Government by Judioiary"7} and Meyer London, sometime 
member of the House of Representatives* Aoademics were represented 
by Jessie Wallace Hughan, a Ph*D* from Columbia University, and 
Algernon Lee, Head of the Rand Sohool of Social Science, a socialist 
bridge between the intellectuals and the rank-and-tfile members of 
the party* 1* 
That the rank and f i l e was quick to give honours to intellectuals 
and others l i k e l y to bring the party prestige i s shown by Charles 
Edward Russell who joined the party i n 1908, was nominated f o r 
Governor of few York i n 1910, and f a r Mayor of New York City i n 1913, 
whilst gaining 54 Convention votes f o r Socialist presidential 
candidate i n 1912* 2* 
I n other states and regions, the socialist movement prospered, 
or f a i l e d to prosper i n d i f f e r i n g degrees* Socialism i n Massachusetts 
was said to have reached i n high-water mark i n 1900, that is before the 
Socialist Party i t s e l f was really of f the ground* Pennsylvania 
socialists however could boast as many members, as few York, although 
they were unable to get such s ta r t l ing results as few York, except 
i n the town of Reading, because the i r votes were spread across the 
state, and not concentrated i n a small area* 
2* "The Socialist Party of Amerioa*. David A* Shannon* PP'* • ?J 
1* "The Age of Reform"* R*Hofstadtor. 
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Further West i n Ohio. Indiana and Michigan, the tone of socialism 
was d i s t inc t ly more radioal, f o r i t was here that Debs formed his plans 
f o r industr ia l unionism i n the economic f i e l d , and mi l i tan t social ist 
agitation i n the poli i ical f i e l d * Debs offered a Socialist programme 
to gain a Socialist vote, unlike the more conservative elements i n the 
party who minimised the ant i -capi tal is t aspects of the i r programme, 
i n order to attract the non-Socialist vote . l* 
She Chicago organisation, although strong i n terms of membership 
and presidential votes, was never able t o show a united f r o n t , and 
never had the success enjoyed by New York and Milwaukee* Despite 
i t s eleotoral successes, Milwaukee was one of the most conservative 
centres of Socialism i n the country* Bu i l t by Berger in to an 
organisation whioh covered every precinct, the organisation was 
closely a l l ied to the trades union movement, and appealed mainly 
to the Germans i n a c i t y which also contained many Yankees and 
Poles* I t was this ignoring of these two ethnic groups which 
oaused the socialists to lose the i r strong position i n the Mid-West*2* 
Whereas Socialism i n Milwaukee was conservative and methodioal, 
West of the Mississippi River, i n Missouri, Kansas, Arkansas* Texas 
and Oklahoma, i t was emotional and radio al* Here the movement was 
lead by Kate Richards O'Hare, who organised encampments, wi th 
speeches, singing, olasses, and fund-raising, whioh not only added 
many Great Plains farmers to the cause, but also close-knit the 
socialist community whioh was spread over many miles* I n a fur ther 
e f f o r t to make converts the socialists published a cheap periodical 
called the "Appeal t o Re as on*, Shis strategy, had, by 1910, made 
1* "The Socialist Party of America"* David A.Shannon* 
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the Oklahoma socialist organisation the largest i n the union, and 
within the state i t s e l f the Socialists were almost as strong as 
the major parties* 
I n 1910. the Oklahoma socialists had 5,842 dues-paying members, 
800 more than did Hew York* The socialist vote i n the state, however, 
indicated even greater strength* I n 1912 Oklahoma polled 41,674 votes 
f o r Debs, that i s 16,5$ of the t o t a l votes cast f o r Presidential electors 
i n the state* By the Congressional elections of 1914, 52,965 voted the 
Socialist t ioket , whilst i n three counties the party polled one t h i r d 
cf the t o t a l vote* Af t e r the 1912 election, the Oklahoma socialists 
showed themselves to be the best organised state i n the Union* Each 
precinct had i t s own party loca l , bringing Socialist-voting non-members 
in to the party i n a l l but 200 of the states 2,565 preoincts* As w e l l 
as th is organisation, i t formulated a state programme which mixed 
Socialism and Populism, which was di rect ly aimed at the farm tenant vote, 
a large and important part of the Oklahoma electorate. 
For the Socialists, the South was barren land* The party 
reoeived l i t t l e support except from the two parishes of Vernon 
and Winin i n Louisiana, where i n 1912, Debs ran ahead of Taf t wi th 
5,249 votes due to a combined " H i l l b i l l y " and lumberjack vote* By 
1916 lumber conditions had improved i n the area, and that year the 
Socialist candidate-, ftTjow Benson polled only 292 votes* 
I n the Rocky Mountains and Pacif ic Northwestern states the 
socialist vote was s igni f icant . I t s members were also radical , 
f o r th is was the stronghold of B i l l Haywood, and the Indust r ia l 
Workers cf the World, a group whose views have since been termed as 
"anarchosyndicalism"• 1* 
1* "The Socialist Party of America". David A.Shannon. 
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I n 1912, Debs polled over 10$ of the popular vote of Washington, 
Idaho, Montana* Nevada, California, where conservative Socialists were 
more dominant, and Arizona. Their ultra-radicalism however 
prevented them from becoming a real p o l i t i c a l party, or using the i r 
strength to advantage by refusing alliances with less radical factions 
i n state legislatures* An example of this was the Washington 
socialists who refused to co-operate wi th farmer and labour blocks 
of representatives* To these socialists* the Socialist Party was 
an educational or propagandist agency, not a p o l i t i c a l group. 
The Socialists i n the state of California, up to 1909-10, never 
resolved themselves, however, as to whether they were l e f t or right* 
Los Angeles was conservative i n i t s views* whilst San Francisco socialists 
were radio a l i n theirs* During the winter of 1909-10 th i s dispute was 
settled with the conservatives gaining f i n a l control of the state 
organisation* Almost immediately the conservatives gained another 
victory when one of the i r number, JT*Stitt Wilson, was elected Mayor 
of Berkeley, running a reform administration on similar lines to 
Milwaukee* 
The high tide of California Socialism was the mayoralty election 
of 1911 i n Los Angeles* Socialist expectations were high as they 
united behind the i r oandidate, Job Harriman, who was Debss running 
mate i n 1900*2* However, during the oampaign, the party i n California 
received a blow from whioh i t never recovered* Some months earl ier , 
i n the autumn : of 1910, the headquarters of the "Los Angeles Times" 
was bombed, the culpri ts were never found, u n t i l i n the middia of 
Barriman's oampaign, James and John McNamara, two known Socialists* 
admitted that they had oarried out the outrage* The party was 
immediately discredited* On eleotion day, Harriman received 
1* "The Socialist Party of America"* David A Shannon* 
2. "Since 1900". 0*J*Barok and W.M.Blake* 
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50,827 votes against his opponents 87,165, and although the party 
went on to elect two state legislators i n 1914, i t never again 
showed the promise attained before the IffcNamara a f f a i r . 1 . 
Socialists did not see th is as oause f o r alarm however. By 
May, 1912, a t o t a l cf 1,059 Socialists had been eleoted to o f f i ce , 
including 56 mayors, 160 oounoilmen and 145 aldermen. She 
Socialists forsaxr a great fu ture i n these f igures, whereas the 
electorate were real ly using socialism as another variant of the 
general protest vote. They rarely showed a genuine interest i n 
creating a socialist society, by electing Socialists to Congress or 
even state legislatures, they merely preferred to vote sooialist i n 
municipal elections, largely i n connection wi th protest against 
local corruption. 2. 
The Socialists d id however see a need f o r a Sooialist press, 
and, apart from the "Appeal to Season" which by 1912 had a circulat ion 
of 500,000, they had eight foreign-language, and f i v e English dai ly 
papers, plus 262 English, and 56 foreign-language weeklies. Again, 
whi ls t showing the growth of the social is t press, i t does also show 
the reliance the movement placed upon the American immigrant and the 
foreign language associations. 5. 
As the party prospered, however, i t s internal weaknesses 
magnified and i t s external enemies mult ipl ied. At the 1912 Convention 
i n Indianapolis, Berger even went so f a r as to suggest that Debs 
might not accept the nomination, even i f i t were offered him. He 
was soon put r ight by Lewis J . Duncan the pro-Debs chairman f o r that 
day. Debs was opposed by Seidel and Russell f o r the Presidential 
nomination. On a r o l l - c a l l vote, he polled 165 votes, being 
1 . "The S ooialist Party of America". David A.Shannon. 
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strong i n the West and Mid-West, with the exception of Cal i fornia , 
Oklahoma, Missouri, and Wisconsin, which Seidel took f o r 56 votes and 
seoond place* Bus se l l gained 54 votes mainly from the state of New 
York* Seidel was then elected f o r the Vice-Presidential candidacy 
over Dan Hogan of Arkansas and John W* Slayton of Pennsylvania. 
Morris H i l l q u i t then managed to get J"»Manion Barnes* a cigar 
manufacturer whose morals were the cause of much dissent, appointed 
oampaign manager. This appointment was made af ter a lengthy struggle 
between the radicals and the conservatives wi th in the party, however, 
despite Deb's upset at the issue being revived, and attacks from 
Christian Socialists at the appointment being made, Barnes stayed, 
to do a good job, f o r even i f his morals were suspect, his ability-
was, beyond reproach, 1* 
I n the November eleotion Debs polled 897,011 votes, or Q% of 
the national vote, and that against such l iberals as Woodrow Wilson 
and Theodore Roosevelt, Socialists looked once more to the future , 
as workers, intellectuals and farmers joined the i r ranks* 2* 
Some commentators believe that th i s dream ended wi th the advent 
of World War One, but even as the last results were coming i n , i n 
November, 1912, the party was beginning to break up. The s p l i t was 
a fami l ia r one, between conservatives and radicals* 
F i r s t l y , during the oampaign of 1912, the party had inourred a 
d e f i c i t of $ 12,000* Barnes, due to his previous background, was 
accused, mainly by the Ohio organisation, of mismanaging the oampaign* 
Secondly, an internal doctrinal f i g h t led to the expulsion of 
B i l l Haywood and his group of aotionist revolutionaries who advooated 
sabotage i n industr ia l disputes, - Within four months membership of 
1* "The Socialist Party of America"* David A*Shannon. 7+/*7& 
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the party dropped to 40,000, and i t s middle-claa3 character beoame 
more pronounced with the victory of the Morris H i l l q u i t - Victor Berger 
factions. 1* 
The legislat ion of Wilson ,s New Freedom had l i t t l e Sooialist 
endorsement, however, and i t was foreign a f fa i r s and more especially 
European a f fa i r s which disturbed the socialists most* The Socialist 
Party was opposed to the War i n Europe, a stand which had already 
oost i t i t s connections with the Second International, as the l a t t e r 
had not taken any steps to stop the War* Furthermore, socialists 
i n Germany, France and Great Br i t a in backed the decisions of the i r 
own governments* Amarioan socialists therefore lent the i r e f for t s 
to preventing the United States entering the War, rather than attempting 
to end the War i n Europe, i n the bel ief that the War was a concern only 
of businessman, and no a f f a i r of the working olasses* This stand was 
la te r to cost the Socialist party many votes, many members, and many of 
i t s leaders* 2. 
Perhaps the f i r s t viotim was Charles Edward Russell who undoubtedly 
los t the 1913 Sooialist Presidential nomination when advocating not war, 
but merely preparedness f o r i t * He said at a meeting of the Intercollegiate 
Sooialist Society late i n 1915, " I believe that America ought to be 
prepared to defend i t s e l f as the las t bulwark of democracy." Debs, 
although disagreeing wi th Russell, said of him, "There i s no instance 
i n Amerioan pol i t ios where a man, i n order to be true to his own 
conscience, deliberately fo r f e i t ed the nomination f o r the Presidency 
of the United States such men, however, mistaken, are a l l too rate 
i n the World*" 5. 
1* "The Sooialist Party of America"1* David A* Shannon* ^ 7 7 / j f 
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Haywood, forever the extreme radical, proposed that a general 
strike should be held i n the event of war being declared* This 
was hardly a practicable measure however* A more sound proposal 
oame from the s t i l l comparatively unknown Allan Benson, who said that 
a referendum should be held before any declaration of war* This 
proposal was endorsed by none other than William Jennings Bryan* 1* 
Benson had earl ier gained prominence wi th in the party f o r his 
anti-war ar t icles i n the "Appeal to Reason", ar t icles whioh advanced 
him from a party unknown, to Presidential candidate i n 1916* Included 
i n Benson's platform was the demand "That no war shall be deolared or 
waged by the United States without a referendum vote of the entire 
people, except f o r the purpose of repelling invasion*" 2* 
So attracted to the principal of direot-legislat ion were the 
socialists that i n 1916 they nominated the i r national candidates 
by party referendum, rather than at the t radi t ional carnival, wherein 
America i s seen to be a p o l i t i c a l union, the party convention* 
Debs refused to be considered as Presidential nominee, f i r s t l y 
because of his poor health, seoondly because of his wife ' s wishes, 
and th i rd ly he wished to make way f o r a younger man* Both H i l l quit 
and Berger were already out of the running because of the Constitutional 
artiole requiring the President to be a natural born Amerioan* 3* 
The f i e l d was thus l imited to three candidates, Allan Benson, 
James Hudson Maurer, a trade unionist from Reading, Pennsylvania, and 
Arthur la Sueur, from Minot, North Dakota, and Vice-President of the 
1* "The Socialist Party of America"* David A. Shannon. f <?° 
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People's College, Port Soott, Kansas* I n the election Benson 
narrowly defeated llaurer, whilst le Sueur finished a poor th i rd* 
The second place on the t icket went t o George R.Kirkpatriok of 
Newark, New Jersey* A teacher i n the Rand School i n New York, 
he was a vigorous ant iwar speaker and pamphleteer, who gained 
the nomination by beating Kate Riohards O'Hare, the party organiser 
i n Oklahoma* 1* 
Benson however proved an uninspiring leader, pol l ing only 
585,113 votes, about two-thirds of Debs voting-strength four years 
earlier* I n only one state of significant sooialist strength, 
Oklahoma, did Benson better the Debs vote, and th i s can probably 
be attributed to the f ac t that i t was here that the "Appeal to 
Reason", by which Benson had made his name, had i t s greatest 
circulation and influence* I n Indiana the Presidential candidate 
actually ran behind the rest of his ticket* 
Not a l l the blame f o r th i s reversal should be shouldered by 
Benson however* There were several other important factors which 
oounted towards his defeat* The party i t s e l f was weaker than i n 
1912, the party membership r o l l s being some 35,000 names shorter 
than four years ealter* The party also los t votes beoause of i t s 
anti-war stand, whilst the expulsion of the Haywood Syndicalists and 
the defection of others to Wilson and the New Freedom, was of no 
use when i t came to the hard f ac t of voting* 2* 
I n 1917, when the United States entered World War One, the 
socialists held an Emergency Convention i n St .Louis to deolare the i r 
opposition to i t * The delegates were predominantly middle-clas3 
native bom Americans, who voted, by a three-to-one majority, that 
1* "The Sooialist Party of America"'* David A*Shannon* 9t 
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entry into the war was a oriminal act, pronounoed the war to be a 
capi ta l is t conf l i c t , and called f o r a l l socialists to resist 
conscription* 
This dogmatic stand oost the party suoh men as Charles Edward 
Russell, William English Walling, John Spargo, author of a pro-war 
report to the Convention, A.M.Simons, W.J.Ghent, Al lan Benson, 
G.G.Phelps Stokes, and Gustavus Meyers. 1* Not only was thei r 
influence lost to the party but i n some places i t was actively 
raised against the i r former socialist colleagues. Simons and 
Meyers even went so f a r as to associate during the war with an 
anti-socialist pa t r io t organisation, although the majority of these 
pro-war socialists preferred to organise themselves into a society 
oailed the Social Democratic League of America, an organisation 
H i l l q u i t sarcastically, though r igh t ly , called "An organisation of 
leaders without followers*" I n the summer of 1917, this group 
t r i e d to form a oommon cause wi th the Progressives, who had been 
l e f t stranded by Roosevelt i n 1916, Prohibitionists and Women 
Suffragettes. They held their f i r s t national conference i n 
Chicago, i n Ootober, 1917, when i t took the name of the National 
Party. 2* I t formulated a platform whioh, whilst progressive, could 
hardly be said to be radical* Po l i t i c a l l y the party supported Women's 
suffrage, direct legis la t ion, the short ba l lo t , proportional representation, 
better absentee voting provisions and prohibition* Economically the 
party was f o r the extinction of land monopoly, publio ownership (the 
party refrained from using the term*socialisation') of railways and 
publio u t i l i t i e s , the abolition of grain speculation, the extension of 
postal savings services, the provision of old-age pensions, better 
1. "The Socialist Party of Amerioa". David A* Shannon. 9f/'C0 
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factory inspection, and the aboli t ion of ch i ld labour, Despite such 
a platform, the Nationalists proved effective as a bridge f o r some 
socialists to oross over to the Democrats. 1* The anti-war position 
of the socialists therefore proved, i n the end, an element of strength. 
Whilst i t was true that many intellectuals were los t to the parly, 
the majority of the rank-and-file members stood f i r m . Membership i n 
some of the Western states did drop, but this drop was compensated by a 
strengthening of the Socialists position on the Eastern seaboard, 
par t icular ly i n New York* 
I n the nationwide elections during the autumn of 1917, the 
Socialists of New York were more speotaoular i n defeat, than were 
the i r victorious party colleagues i n other parts of the Union* 
Their joy was f o r Morris H i l l q u i t , who polled 145,352 votes i n the 
New York mayoralty election* This was the largest vote any 
Socialist candidate f o r that of f ice has polled before or since. He 
s t i l l , however, finished t h i r d i n a four-cornered race* Whilst 
Socialists could rejoice i n the f ac t that he was only s l igh t ly 
behind John P. Mitchel l , the Fusion candidate and ran nearly 
100,000 votes ahead of the regular Republican candidate,William P. 
Bennett, no one could deny that John P. Hylan, candidate of Tammany 
Ha l l , won easily* 2* 
Certain aspeots of H i l l q u i t ' s vote, however, do deserve fur ther 
consideration. His t o t a l vote showed an increase of 400J& over 
Russell's vote i n 1912 and was heaviest i n neighbourhoods dominated 
by f i r s t and second generation immigrants, especially from Eastern 
1 , T h i r d Party Movements i n the United States," 
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Europe* This may have been i n part a personal vote f o r H i l l q u i t who 
was himself a Russian Jewish immigrant, with a oommand of some 
Eastern European languages, but there was also probably a vote 
caused by the ferment of social revolution i n Russia* Despite 
the f ac t that he was not eleoted, H i l l quit did manage to carry in to 
o f f ioe , ten state assemblymen, seven c i t y aldermen and one munioipal 
judge* 
The New York results, plus the f ac t that i n 15 selected North-
Eastern c i t ies the Socialists polled 21.6% of the t o t a l municipal 
vote, led Debs to write "The tide has sharply turned* The Socialist 
Party i s r i s ing to power. I t i s growing more rapidly at th is hour 
than ever i n i t s history."' 1 . Unfortunately f o r the Socialists 
however, th is view was shared by war-inspired nationalists who 
brought the f u l l force of government and mob action upon the 
Socialists. So-called pa t r io t ic organisations not only denounced 
the Socialists, but even enoouraged mobs and local law off icers to 
proceed against them* Seven states passed laws abridging freedom 
of speech, assembly and press* A fur ther blow came when Congress, 
i n June 1917, passed the Espionage Act, whioh imposed censorship 
and made obstruction of the d ra f t a federal offence* The man who 
impaired the Socialist movement most, however, was Postmaster-General 
Albert S.Burleson* Under powers granted by the Espionage Aot he 
could deny not only f u l l mailing privileges, but second class mailing 
privileges to newspapers containing material considered to be i n 
viola t ion of the Act . 2. The "Amerioan Socialist", whioh was 
published i n Chicago, f e l l f o u l of this less than one month af ter 
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the act was passed* Other socialist publications were similarly 
denied the use of the mails, u n t i l the socialist press was effect ively 
muzzled* 
I n Oklahoma* the "Appeal to Reason'* defected to j o i n those i n 
favour of the war and the party collapsed af ter being implicated i n 
the Green Corn Rebellion* This was a shareoroppers revolt which 
planned to maroh on Washington, seize the government, and end the war* 
The attempt f a i l e d miserably, the rebellion being suppressed without 
even a declaration of martial law* Whilst i t cannot be denied 
that i t ruined socialism i n Oklahoma, this was the only organised, 
and mi l i tant protest against the war* 1* 
Apart from these exohanges, the Socialists also ran afoul of the 
Department of Justice* The blame here however, should l i e wi th 
judges, distriot-attournies and juries who were over-zealour i n carrying-out 
their duties. I t would be unfair to level any cr i t ic ism at Attorney-
General Thomas W.Gregory who showed more restraint and judiciousness than 
did his cabinet colleague Burleson* Despite Gregory's e f fo r t s , however, 
proseoutions were numerous* One i s outstanding, f i r s t l y beoause i t 
involved Eugent V.Debs, secondly beoause i t showed the lengths to which 
the government was w i l l i n g to go, even stoop, i n order to suppress 
radioal dissent* 2* 
Debs was seized following an anti-war speech which he delivered 
to the Ohio State Convention of the Socialist Party i n June 1918, at 
Canton, Ohio* He offered l i t t l e defence at his t r i a l , and was 
sentenced to ten years imprisonment* Following appeals, Debs 
f i n a l l y went to prison f i v e months af ter the war was over f o r making 
1 . "Third Party Movements i n the United States". William B. ^ ?7 
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a speech whioh the Department of Justice i t s e l f had not been convinced 
was i n viola t ion of the law, Wilson's administration had obviously 
deoided to make and example of the Socialists, and who better to 
use than Deb3. I n fac t Debs was not released u n t i l Christmas Day, 
1921, when President Harding signed the documents neoessary f o r 
his release.1, 
Following a National Executive Committee meeting i n St.Louis i n 
1918, whioh produced a clash between the r ight and l e f t wings of the 
party, party membership dropped that year to 74,519, An increase 
was shown during the f i r s t half of 1919 of 65JS over the previous 
year, no doubt due to the impact of the revolutions taking place i n 
Eastern Europe, Stat is t ics , however, taken out of context can be 
deceptive, and despite the rise i n membership f igures, other factors 
must be taken in to account when comparing the party's strength wi th 
other years. F i r s t l y the party press was impotent, Seoondly many 
of the party leaders were either i n prison, or on b a i l pending appeal. 
Thirdly, internal s t r i f e wi thin the party was more intense then ever 
before. Fourthly, relations with organised labour were more strained 
than before the war. F i f t h l y , there was the widespread hos t i l i t y of 
a large segment of the public towards socialists and radicals, and 
l as t ly the western fact ion of the party was i n the same weak and 
disorganised position as i t was at the turn of the century. Thus, 
despite any increase i n membership figures, the Sooialist Party was 
f a r weaker i n 1918, than i t had been a year previously, 2, 
Nor did the end of the war bring any slackoning i n the government's 
anti-Socialist campaign. Anti-radical hysteria was s t i r red up by 
ul t ra-pat r io t ic organisations such as the American Legion and actively 
1 . T?acts about the Presidents"', Joseph Nathan Kane. «^ <^ <* ? 
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supported by A*Mitchell Palmer, the new Attourney General* Palmer 
auoceeded Gregory i n March, 1919, to comnssnce a new period of Socialist -
"baiting, a leading feature of which was the deporting of alien radicals .1. 
The weakening of the party*s position beoause of such deportations was 
balanced by a large amount of sympathy received by the Socialist fol lowing 
the refusal of Congress to seat Victor Berger* I t was i n A p r i l , 1919, 
that Congress met i n a special session, and refused to seat Berger, 
who was the duly-eleoted representative of his Milwaukee d i s t r i c t . 
He was denied his seat not beoause he was a socialist , but because 
he was gui l ty of v iola t ing the Espionage Act. To refuse him his seat 
on these grounds, however, was i n anticipation of f ac t , beoause Berger 
was on b a i l pending appeal* I n December, 1919, a special election was 
held to f i l l the vacancy* Berger was again nominated, and re-elected, 
despite the intervention of a fusion candidate. That Berger was 
the undoubted choice of his d i s t r i c t , made no impression upon the 
House of Representatives who again denied him his seat. 2* 
This was; not the only case of a duly elected socialist being 
denied his seat* I n November, 1919, two New York socialists, 
Algernon Lee and Edward F.Cassidy, were elected to municipal off ice* 
Unlike the case of Berger however no vote wa3 taken to deny them 
their seat, rather by diverse methods they were prevented from taking 
off ice u n t i l nearly two years later , only two months before the i r 
terms of off ice were to expire. 3* 
Such anti-radical hysteria, however, waned af ter the election of 1920 
by this time the MarMsts i n the Socialist Party had broken away from the i r 
conservative comrades, so as to be beyond reconciliation. Many of these 
dissidents were members of the Slavic federations who i n 1917 boasted a 
membership of 57,248 or 55$ of the party's t o t a l membership. 
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The members of these language federations were to have an overwhelming 
majority i n the Communist Party i n the early days, and a significant 
membership i n the Communist Labour Party* 
The leadership of the Lef t Wing, as the Marxists were known pr ior to 
the i r s p l i t with the Socialists, was not unlike that of the old G-uard i n 
ethnio origin and social posit ion. I t inluded such unlikely Socialists 
as John Seed, a wel l to do Harvard graduate, who once advocated the 
storming of the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary i n order to free Debs, 
and the millionaire William Ross Lloyd, 1 . 
Prior to the Russian revolution, however, though both Lef t Wing and 
conservative old guard factions had existed, the i r differences were l i t t l e 
more than academic* I t was not u n t i l November, 1918, when the Slavic 
Federations of Chicago formed the Communist Propaganda League, that the 
l e f t began to organise actively against the Old Guard* About a week la ter 
the Lett ish Federation of Boston issued the f i r s t copy of i t s radical 
periodical "Revolutionary Age* edited by one Louis Fraina,whose la te r 
dubious act iv i t ies were a factor i n the disruption of the American L e f t . 
I n 1919, seven Language Federations, wi th a t o t a l membership of 
25,000-30,000 were expelled from the party f o r associating with the 
Lef t Wing* The Michigan Socialist organisation was also expelled f o r 
similar reasons* These two groups met at the National Conference of 
the Lef t Wing i n New York on June 21st*, where they advocated the 
immediate formation of a Communist party. The rest of the delegates 
wanted to preserve party unity, not by forming a splinter party, but by 
winning oontrol of the Socialist Party at i t s Emergenoy Convention 
to be held i n Chicago on August 50th. 
When the Conference defeated by a vote of 55 to 58, a motion 
to organise immediately a new parly, 51 delegates from Michigan and 
the Language Federation bolted the meeting. 2. 
1 . "The Socialist Party of America". David A.Shannon. ^x«*7 
2. "Socialism and American L i f e " . Donald Drew Egbert and Stow 
Persons. 
127. 
Within three weeks a f te r the olose of the Conference the seceeders 
announced i n "Novy Mir", the Chicago publication of the Russian Federation, 
the formation of the Communist Party of Amerioa, and called the new Party's 
f i r s t convention f o r Chicago on September 1st, Such an action could not 
expect, nor did i t get f u l l Le f t Wing support, thus the last week i n 
August 1919 saw a l l varieties of Marxists converging on Chicago to hold 
national conventions. 
The Machinists Hal l was the scene f o r the batt le f o r control of the 
Emergency Convention of the Socialist Party, beginning on 30th August, 
This was expected to be a struggle f o r control of the party between the 
Old G-uard and the Lef t Wing. The convention at the h a l l of Chicago Russian 
Federation, now renamed the Smolny Ins t i tu te was that of the Communist 
Party of America, and was by comparison, expeoted to be more sedate. 
The r i f t at the Socialist Convention ended i n Joseph Coldwell of 
Rhode Island urging a l l Le f t Wing delegates to bolt the Convention, 
wi thin hours a l l but 26 of these delegates had done so, and from these 
a committee was appointed to confer with the Communist Party, i t did not 
however oommit i t s e l f to a merger with that party. 1 , 
Proceedings at the Communist Party Convention were themselves 
confused. 
The convention opened with a resolution that they meet with the 
bol t ing delegates from the Sooialist convention. This motion was 
defeated by 75 votes to 51, and i t was not i n fac t u n t i l the next 
year that the two groups were able to agree upon a common programme, 
whereupon they founded the United Communist Party. 
1 , '^Socialism and American L i f e " . Donald Drew Egbert and 
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The Michigan delegates were la ter expelled f o r f a i l i n g to agree 
to p o l i t i o a l revolution being included i n the party programme, being 
more inclined towards evolution. Their expulsion caused greater 
confusion f o r the nMiohigan Mensheviks" aa they beoante known, then 
formed their own party, the Proletarian Party. 1 . 
To fur ther complicate the position, however, Coldwell*s group, 
having f a i l e d to get any satisfaction at Smolny Ins t i t u t e , had by th i s 
time formed yet another new party, the Communist Labour Party. Extremists 
were more to the fore i n thi3 group, and when the revolutionists i n the 
party defeated a p o l i t i c a l action plank by 41 votes to 28, some delegates 
bolted f o r the second time within a week. 
Personalities rather than ideologies forestalled a merger between 
the Communist and Communist Labour parties, f o r whilst the i r party 
programmes were similar, personal animosities kept them at eaoh other* s 
throats f o r months. 
Despite such large-soale defections, the Socialist Party was 
s t i l l the strongest party of the American L e f t . The party's swing 
to the l e f t , however, had alienated the more conservative dissenters 
from sooial order. Western agrarian Socialists joined the new farmer 
movements, while Eastern urban Socialists moved towards the progressive 
Demoorats, and eventually sought fusion wi th the progressive groups i n 
the country. 2. 
That the Old Guard looked towards the past, and were reluctant 
to release the i r grip on the party i s shown i n the 1920 party convention. 
I t met at the Finnish Socialist Ha l l , i n Harlem, New York, i n May, 1920. 
Debs was nominated by William H. Henry of Indiana and seconded by Morris 
H i l l q u i t . The Socialists were thus forced to turn to a man who had 
deolined the nomination four years earl ier , and who at the time of his 
1 . "The Socialist Party of Amerioa*. David A.Shannon. 
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nomination was serving a prison sentenoe. I t was not that Debs was 
the ideal Socialist candidate, rather that he was the only Socialist 
qualif ied to be Presidential oandidate. 
The Left-Wing then wanted to nominate Kate Richards O'Hare, who 
was also i n prison, f o r Vice-president. Her nomination was defeated 
by 106 votes to 26 i n favour of Seymour Stedman, a Chicago lawyer, on 
the grounds that one candidate at least should be f ree to oampaign. 
Another factor i n favour of Stedman was that being a lawyer, i t was 
thought that he himself was unlikely to f a l l f o u l of the law, and so 
be imprisoned. 1 . 
An enoour aging occasion f o r the Socialists came during the campaign 
when f i r s t the Montana Non-Partisan League, an i n f l u e n t i a l lef t-of-centre 
organisation not only urged Debs* release, but endorsed his actions, and 
secondly when Parley P. Christensen, oandidate of the newly-formed 
Farmer - Labour Party, suggested that he and the two major candidates, 
Harding and Cox, should unite i n asking President Wilson to release Debs.2. 
I t oould be argued that Debs actually gained votes purely out of 
sympathy, because of his imprisonment, but th is factor can soon be 
outweighed by the loss suffered to the Socialist cause by the non-
appearance of Debs, the orator, on a Socialist platform. As i t stood, 
the Socialist presidential oandidate was restricted to a 500 word weekly 
press statement, th is being a concession granted only i n the September 
before the eleotion. 5. 
Debs polled 915,502 votes on Eleotion Day, the largest popular vote 
ever received by a Socialist Presidential candidate. His percentage 
of the p o l l , however, was only 5. 5$, compared to the Gfo he received i n 
1912. This increase i n voting figures can be explained by the fac t 
that the election of 1920 was the f i r s t i n which women i n a l l states 
i n the Union were allowed to vote. Nevertheless Debs' vote was an 
impressive one f o r a federal prisoner. I t should also be remembered 
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that the Socialist party had a mere 26,766 members, and spent less 
than $50,000 on the whole campaign* I t oannot be denied however 
that the Socialists los t many votes beoause they no longer possessed 
an organisation capable of running a v i r i l e presidential campaign* 
Nor were they capable of increasing the i r representation i n 
Congress* They made one gain when Meyer London regained his Manhattan 
d i s t r i c t from Flore l lo l a Guardia, conqueror of London i n 1916, but 
Victor Berger f i n a l l y lost his seat i n Milwaukee* A seat so long 
denied him by Congress.l* 
The years 1920 to 1922 saw many former Western agrarian Socialists 
assimilated in to the many farmer p o l i t i c a l movements* One such movement 
was the Non-Partisan League founded by A*C*Townley, himself a former 
Socialist, whilst the League's newspaper was edited by Charles Edward 
Russell, aspirant to the Socialist presidential nomination i n 1916,2* 
Urban reformers seemed to f i n d more satisfaction i n the new 
Conference f o r Progressive Po l i t i c a l Action, an organisation described 
i n greater de ta i l elsewhere i n th is paper* The Socialist Party 
i t s e l f was a founding member i n th i s organisation, wi th Morris H i l l q u i t 
s i t t i ng on the Committee of Fifteen, the organisation's executive 
committee* There can be l i t t l e doubt that a genuine attempt was made 
by the Socialist Party to co-operate i n t rying to bring about a new 
alignment i n American p o l i t i c s , and looking at the constituent organisations, 
as the Socialists themselves must have done, i t seems l i k e l y that the 
Socialists were hoping to form a new party, very much on the lines of the 
B r i t i s h Labour Party* 5* 
1* "Socialism and American L i f e "* Donald Drew Egbert & 
Stow Persons* PJ' 7 
2* "The P o l i t i c a l Career of Floyd B»01son"* George H.Mayer. Pfi '^/ic 
5* "The Socialist Party of Amerioa"* David A .Shannon, Pf '^t/'Jo David A .Shannon. P?
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To achieve that end the Socialists practically gave the C.P.P.A. 
a blank cheque f o r the 1924 Presidential oampaign. I n convention 
at Cleveland, they endorsed l a FoUette*s candidacy and even 
granted the i r National Exeoutive Committee discretion to endorse the 
Vice-Presidential oandidate of the C.P.P«A., when selected by the 
National Committee of the l a t t e r body. During the campaign the 
Socialists performed useful service f o r l a Fol le t te , t o the detriment 
of the i r own state and local campaigns* This i s exemplified by 
eleotion returns i n New York State where one could vote f o r l a 
Follet te on either the Progressive or the Sooialist t i cke t . He did 
i n f ac t p o l l more as a Sooialist than as a Progressive, whilst the 
Socialist candidates f o r state off ice did poorly, no doubt beoause 
they campaigned harder f o r l a Follette than f o r themselves* Norman 
Mattoon Thomas running against *A1* Smith f o r Governor received 
s l ight ly less than 100,COO votes, whils t the high man on the Socialist 
t ioket , Charles Soloman, the candidate f o r Lieutenant - Governor, polled 
only 126,679 votes* 1. 
Sooialist disappointment i n gubernatorial elections was not 
confined to New York however, i n Wisoonsin the Sooialist candidate 
polled a mere 45,268 votes* The state of Wisoonsin did however have 
a Sooialist s i t t i n g i n Congress* Victor Berger regained his seat by 
a 500 vote margin i n a straight f i g h t wi th a Republican, however, Leo 
RrzyckL, i n the other Milwaukee d i s t r i c t , was defeated.2. 
The enthusiasm that the Socialists once had f o r forming a broadly 
based t h i r d party, soon vanished however af ter the 1924 election* 
Their reasons were twofold, f i r s t l y , the American Federation of Labour, 
which had endorsed l a Follette*s candidature i n 1924, said that any 
th i rd party work f o r them i n future was wasted e f f o r t . They held that 
labour should i n future , fol low a non-partisan policy* Secondly the 
National Committee of the C.P.P.A. met soon a f te r the eleotion, and 
deoided to hold a Convention i n Chicago the following February, the 
1* "Congressmen and the Electorate"* Milton C*Cummings* /*SS*3L 
2. "The Sooialist Party of America". David A.Shannon. P*?^ 
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main business of which was t o consider the formation of a new 
p o l i t i c a l party. As has been said above, the Socialists favoured 
a party on B r i t i s h Labour Party l ines, with both a f f i l i a t e d membership, 
as i n th is way they could retain the i r own separate ident i ty as a 
wing er caucus of a national progressive party. There was no 
support from any other organisation and so the Socialists severed 
a l l connection with the C.P.PJU th i s action seems however to have 
been done with not a l i t t l e reluctance, f o r the Socialist allowed 
any state Socialist organisation to j o i n any state labour party as 
a uni t . Hone appeared, however, and the experiment of oo-operation 
with the progressivesended. 
From the election of 1924 u n t i l the Wall Street Crash of 1929, 
the Socialist party was l i t t l e heard of outside Lower Manhattan Island, 
Milwaukee, and Seeding, Pennsylvania. 1 . 
Debs, f o r so long the party* s national standard - bearer died i n 
1926. Berger continued his able leadership i n Milwaukee, u n t i l his 
accidental death when h i t by a street-car i n the Summer of 1929. 
London toe was k i l l e d i n a street accident the same year, whilst 
H i l l qu i t was having to devote much of his time to his law practice 
because of f inanc ia l d i f f i c u l t i e s fol lowing a bout of tuberculosis.2. 
The party thus lost four of i t s most prominent members ina 
period of three years. Nor was th is a l l . I n 1926, only 53 delegates 
attended the national convention of the party, and state parties became 
so small they had to be organised i n d i s t r i c t s , such as the New England 
Dis t r i c t , and the Rooky Mountain Di s t r io t . 5 . 
The only bright spot i n a very gloomy picture was the election, 
i n 1927, of a Socialist administration i n Reading, Pennsylvania. Since 
1912 i t had given approximately 19?o of i t s vote to Socialist Presidential 
candidates, and i n 1924 over one quarter of the electorate of Reading 
voted f o r l a Fo l le t te . The strength of the party i n Reading lay f i r s t l y 
1 . "Third Party Movements i n the United States". William B. 
2. "The Socialist Party of America". David A.Shannon. fi /*•*• / / 93 
Hesse I t ine. P 4tt 
V 
" I b i d " . P / t * 
133. 
i n a olose Unk with the A.F .L , , something which must have been envied 
by the Socialists nationally, and secondly i n the personality of James 
Hudson Maurer, a leader, who, whils t a conservative i n his Socialism 
once more provided the Socialists with a l i n k with labour, a major 
factor i n the success of the Reading Socialists* A fur ther important 
factor i n Reading was the f ac t that the electorate was disillusioned* 
Neither major party had governed Reading par t icular ly wel l , and so i n 
1927 the voters turned to the Socialists to give them, i f not a radical 
administration, at least a clean one* J.Henry Stump was elected 
May or, whilst Maurer and George W«Snyder both gained seats on the 
c i t y oounoil. Apart from these the Socialists could also claim the 
offioe of City Controller, and two school board members* 1* 
Despite th is isolated victory, however, i t oould not be denied 
that nationally the Socialist party was on the verge of extinction* 
Two factors prevented this* the f i r s t was the G-reat Depression, which 
served to furnish support f o r the Socialist analysis of the evils of 
capitalism. The seoond was the emergence of Norman Thomas as a 
national party leader* Whilst Debs had been a product of the labour 
movement, Thomas came from the Presbyterian ministry* He held college 
degrees, had been an editor of a magazine, and secretary of the pac i f i s t 
Fellowship of Reconciliation* He was thus able to appeal to not only 
the rank-and-file Socialists, but also the intel lectuals , progressive 
reformers and non-Socialist social groups which had previously received 
l i t t l e attention from the Socialist party* 2* 
1* "Socialism and American L i fe"* Donald Drew Egbert and 
Stow Persons* 
2* "The Sooialist Party of Anerioa". David A.Shannon, 
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With the help of the National Executive Committee, and especially 
i t s seoretary Clarence Senior, Thomas rebui l t the party and the party 
image* He established an e f f i c i e n t national o f f i c e , and i n 1928 gained 
the party 1 s Presidential nomination* I t must be emphasised, however, 
that the nomination went to Thomas largely by default* The logica l 
ohoioe would have been Dan Haan, but he was presently occupied as 
Mayor of Milwaukee, an of f ice i t would have been foo l i sh to resign 
i n favour of certain presidential defeat* The nomination thus went 
to Thomas, a man who, outside of New York, was unknown to the majority 
of Sooialiats* He had previously run f o r of f ice four times, as 
Governor of New York State, Mayor of New York City (against the corrupt 
nominee of Tammany Ha l l , Jimmy Walker), State Senator, and City Alderman, 
i n the period 1924 - 1927* He was not very successful i n any of these 
contests, and had even run behind the rest ef his t i cke t i n 1924*1* 
Thomas did , however, i n 1928 oonduot a vigorous high-level 
campaign, although i t suffered from the party's lack of strong and 
e f f i c i e n t local organisations* The Socialists got onto the ba l lo t 
i n eleven states and polled a t o t a l cf 267,420 votes* 2* As regards 
percentages, th i s was even worse than the f i r s t time they had run a 
presidential candidate, i n 1900* Furthermore, over one t h i r d of th i s 
vote oame from New York State alone* Although the eleotion result 
did oauae some revival of party interest , i t also showed that the 
American electorate was more concerned wi th prohibit ion, Protestantism, 
and prosperity, than the possible remedies to an already growing 
unemployment percentage* Nevertheless, the result did revive a l i t t l e 
1* "She Socialist Party of Amerioa"* David A .Shannon* 
2* "Amerioah Socialism 1900-60". H*Wayne Morgan* 9 
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of the previous interest i n the Sooialist party, par t icular ly i n 
Oklahoma, where the party organisation was rebu i l t , and i n Minnesota, 
where Sooialist candidates polled 18,000 votes i n the Municipal elections, 
without anywhere making a strong oamgaign,l. 
Minority p o l i t i o a l parties thrive on eoonomic and social 
misfortune, as they must, to disoredit the i r opponents, and so achieve 
power, Thus the Wall Street Crash, followed by the Great Depression, 
made many Sooialist leaders think that the i r party would benefit from 
such a catastrophe, to emerge as a major, i f not dominant, p o l i t i o a l 
organisation. Under the new National Secretary, Clarence Senior, 
the party b u i l t up membership f igures , u n t i l they were the highest 
than at any time since 1923* I t also improved i t s newspaper and 
pamphlet circulations, and, most important of a l l , strengthened 
i t s position f inanc ia l ly . 
The growing strength of the party was also reflected i n the 
mildly successful mid-term eleotion results of 1950, 
I n Milwaukee the party increased i t s representation i n the lower 
house of the Wisconsin state legislature from three to nine members, 
whilst also adding a second state senator. However, these gains were 
balanced by the loss of Victor Serger*s former congressional seat,2. 
I n Reading also, the party experienced both success and f a i l u r e , 
electing Darlington Hoopes and L i l i t h Wilson to the state legislature 
i n 1930, but losing oontrol of the municipal administration to a 
fusion t icket the following year. Except f o r a few small town 
administrations, these were the only American Socialists holding public 
o f f i c e . Elsewhere Sooialist candidates, such as Upton Sinclair (who 
polled over 50,000 votes i n California 's gubernatorial eleotion), 
1 , "American Socialism 1900-60", H.Wayne Morgan. ^ / f t o / ' o / 
2 , "Third Party Movements i n the United States*, William B , f> g>gr 
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and Louis Waldman (who received over 120,000 votes running against 
Franklin D. Roosevelt f o r Governor of Hew York), increased previous 
votes but oame nowhere near to electoral v i c t o r y . 1 . 
By 1952 the Socialists had rebui l t the i r party organisation, u n t i l 
i t s strength was comparable t o that of 1908* The new members, however, 
did not oome from the working olasses, but from the more academic 
members of sooiety. Hor had the wound between the mi l i tan t Marxists 
and the progressive nan-Marxists healed, i n f a c t , i f anything, i t 
was deeper. This could mainly be attributed to the outlook of two 
groups who were a generation apart, f o r by th is time the Old Guard 
were i n the i r late f i f t i e s and early s ixt ies , whi l s t the new members 
of the party were young men and women, some of them s t i l l college 
undergraduates, converted to socialism by the Depression. 
Despite many differences, Thomas was renominated as the party's 
presidential candidate i n 1932. His nomination was unopposed, not 
because he offered a compromise between the two factions i n the 
party, but because the Old Guard had no e l ig ible candidate of 
eqgual standing. His running mate was James HJIaurer, who also 
gained nomination without opposition, but only a f te r Meta Berger, the 
widow of the late Congressman, declined nomination to avoid a s p l i t i n 
the party.2. 
The most b i t t e r f i g h t of the Convention, however, oame i n the 
election of the party's national chairman. There were two candidates 
f o r the o f f i ce , Morris H i l l quit and Daniel ¥ . Hoan, the Mayor of 
Milwaukee* Both Hoan's sponsors, William F . Quick and Haywood Broun, 
1 . "The Socialist Party of America'". David A* Shannon. P2o<} 
2 . " I b i d " . 
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said that the Chairman should not be a Sew Yorker, but someone 
recognisible as 'American* • There was no doubt that Thomas, p r i o r 
to the Convention wanted H i l l q u i t defeated, but now re alined that the 
statements of (Juick and Broun could endanger the image of the party. 
Charges of anti-Semitism could be levelled at the Socialists i f 
H i l l q u i t , a foreign-*crn Jew resident i n New York, were defeated, 
Thomas must therefore have been relieved when H i l l q u i t was elected by 
108 votes to 81 , 1 , 
The main Socialist campaign theme of 1952 was of course the 
Depression, although i t was noteworthy that Thomas preferred t o o f fe r 
a programme of r e l i e f , reform and recovery, instead of the orthodox 
socialist assaults upon the capi ta l i s t system, and, although defeated, 
Thomas did have the satisfaction of seeing many planks of th i s 
platform enacted by Roosevelt and the New Deal, 
The Sooialist domestic programme included the socialisation of 
banking (the term 'Nationalisation* had l i t t l e appeal i n the United 
States, hence the term •social isat ion ' ) , the establishment of a federal 
marketing agenoy f o r the purchasing and marketing of agricultural 
products, the provision of supplementary federal aid to local and 
state r e l i e f schemes, and federal expenditure on a public works 
programme,2, 
Nor was Thomas content to merely praise his own party's programme, 
f o r he attacked both the incumbent Republican, Herbert Hoover, and the 
Democratic nominee Franklin D. Roosevelt, f a r more than any previous 
Sooialist presidential candidate: had done. This showed that the 
Socialists realised that to succeed i n po l i t i c s i t i s not only necessary 
1 , "The Sooialist Party of America11. David A, Shannon. ^ 7 
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to stress your own strengths, but to fur ther emphasise your opponents 
weaknesses* I t showed a fur ther step i n the *Amerioanisation> of the 
Sooialists, the change from an idealogioal sect to a p o l i t i o a l movement.1* 
The Sooialists i n 1952 also had more labour support than i n 
previous years, although the t o t a l was s t i l l a meager one* The main 
support f o r Thomas once more oame from intel lectuals, organised in to the 
"Thomas and Maurer Committee of Ten Thousand", which was la ter renamed 
the "Thomas and Maurer Committee of One Hundred Thousand" because of 
the increased support i t received* Thomas was also popular wi th in 
the colleges, where 125 "Thomas f o r President" Clubs had been organised 
by the month before the election* 
Such support enabled the Sooialists, by pe t i t ion and a number of 
court enactments, to get Thomas and Maurer on the ba l lo t i n a l l but 
f i v e states of the union* However, although the states of Jfevada, 
Idaho, Louisiana, Florida, and Oklahoma denied the electorate the 
opportunity of a vote f o r a Socialist candidate, write - in*s were 
possible i n some of these states.2* 
The Sooialists themselves never expected to win i n 1952, although 
some of the i r more optimistic supporters thought a Socialist vote of 
three mi l l i on to be possible* Thomas would have been content with one 
and e half mi l l i on , whioh i n i t s e l f was a highly optimistic f igure when 
one considers his eventual t o t a l vote was 884*781* Whilst he f a i l e d to 
emulate his predecessor Debs* Thomas did however increase by almost 200fo 
his vote of four years ear l ier , and this vote did give the promise that 
the party was out of the doldrums*5* 
1* "American Socialism 1900-60". HJTayne Morgan. 
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Further to th is there were two immeasurable factors of the Sooialist 
vote at the 1932 election* F i r s t l y i n d i s t r i c t s without voting machines, 
the count of votes of candidates considered to have no chance of being 
eleoted was hurried and thus probably inaccurate* Secondly many people 
thought Hoover might be eleoted i f they voted f o r Thomas rather than f o r 
Roosevelt* There was thus a swing away from the Socialists at the most 
crucial time of a l l , when elect ore-.were i n the voting booth* ( i n f ac t 
any fears of a Hoover victory being possible because of a Socialist 
intervention were soon dispelled when Roosevelt was returned wi th a 
popular majority of over seven m i l l i o n ) . 
These factors however would not have s ignif icant ly changed the 
election resul t , which pla in ly showed that the Socialist party had l i t t l e 
popular fo l lowing . l* 
I n spite of th is result the Socialists.oould s t i l l look to the 
future wi th optimism, f o r the campaign had done more to rebuild, the 
party than had the t o t a l e f fo r t s of the proceeding twelve years* 
However, i n the years t o come, Roosevelt, who i n 1932 was able to o f fe r 
to the electorate hope and sympathy, but l i t t l e else, was to champion a 
programme of social reform that out the ground from under the fee t of the 
Socialist party* Such as i t was, the 1952 election was the high tide 
of the Socialist party of Norman Thomas»2* 
The Socialist, who declined as the New Deal succeeded, concentrated 
thei r attack upon two specific measures i n the New Deal programme* These 
were the National Industr ial Recovery Act , and the Agricultural Adjustment 
Aot, which the Socialists said t r i ed to solve the paradox of poverty i n 
the midst of plenty, by eliminating the plenty* Basically the Socialists 
1 . 
2* 
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were c r i t i c a l of the New Deal, not because i t was not a sooialist 
programme, but beoause i t was building a form of state capitalism, 
which they held, contained dangerous tendencies towards fascism* To 
substantiate this claim they pointed out the s imi lar i t ies i n the European 
Cartel system, the I t a l i a n Corporate state, and the New/ Deal* Despite 
these attacks the New Deal gained the support of many Socialists, and also 
the people whom the socialists themselves would have to attract i f they 
hoped te become a s ignif icant p o l i t i o a l force* This was borne out by 
the results of the 1954 Congressional eleotions, where there was a 
noticeable swing towards Roosevelt* This i n i t s e l f was rare, f o r 
mid-term eleotions i n the United States t radi t ional ly serve as a means 
f o r the defeated party to recoup some of the losses sustained at the 
previous Presidential eleotion* l e t Roosevelt was able to consolidate 
his posit ion, whilst the Socialists, who, two years before were so 
confident of the future , made no spectacular electoral gains*l* 
She dismal economic posit ion, instead of oreating a new national 
party of workers and farmers, only led to a strengthening of the New Seal 
wing of the Democratic party, whils t also draining the Sooialist party 
of some of i t s most able leaders* Upton Sinclair , the defeated Sooialist 
candidate f o r the Governorship of Cal i fornia i n 1950, joined the Democrats 
i n the autumn of 1955* The following year he ran fox* Governor as a 
Democrat, only to be beaten by the Republican candidate* Another 
California Social ist , Jerry Voorhis, l e f t the party at the same time 
as Sinclair* He too joined the Democratic party, a party he la te r served 
1 . "The Sooialist Party of America". David A.Shannon* 
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as a Congressman, Nor were a l l the defections Individual ones* 
Labour unions, whioh had been traditionally Socialist, also turned 
to the New Deal* Bather than join the Democrat machine the majority 
of these former - Socialist unions preferred to join the American 
Labour Party, whioh was formed in 1956 to try to gain New York State 
for Roosevelt by aiming direotly at the working-class vote* She 
constitution of the .American Labour Party allowed i t to nominate those 
Democrats i t considered worthy of labour's vote, i t did not offer however 
a blanket endorsement of the Democratic ticket* She American Labour 
Party, i t must be stressed, whilst an ally of the Northern liberal 
Democrat, never endorsed the Southern white supremists in the Democratic 
party, nor the big-oity machine politicians* She needle trades, under 
David Dubinsky and Sidney Hillman, chose to support the New Deal in this 
way, leaving the socialists with l i t t l e labour support*1* 
At the same time, during the presidential election year of 
1956, the Old Guard split with the party to form the Social Democratic 
Federation, which chose to withold support from Thomas, again the 
Socialist nominee, whilst not actively supporting Roosevelt* 
To further trouble the Socialists, the same year the "Trotskyite" 
Workers Party chose to dissolve i t s e l f and join the Socialists, an 
accesion whioh brought Thomas and his supporters more trouble than 
voters* it year later in fact the Trotskyites were expelled from the 
Socialist Party, although they retained their identify as a group, 
f orming the Socialist Workers Party*2* 
I n 1956, Thomas had as his running-mate George Nelson of 
1. "The Socialist Party of America"* David A*Shannon* 
2* "Third Party Movements in the United States*"' 
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the Farmers Union, in a tdd to recover the agrarian and labour vote. 
The fight for this vote was hopeless however, as the party was hacked 
by neither rich unions nor powerful ones. 
The 1936 election results were disastrous for the Socialist 
Party, Thomas even ran behind the newly-formed Union Party which 
polled over four times the Socialist vote. Thomas polled 137,342 
votes and not since 1900 had a Socialist candidate polled so low, 
and even on that occasion Debs polled a better percentage of the 
popular vote than did Thomas in 1936. 
In Hew York seemingly large numbers of former socialist voters 
turned to the American Labour Party* where Roosevelt polled 274»924-
votes as American Labour Party candidate, more than three times the 
Social i s t vote in that state. 1. 
Thomas threw a l l the blame for the Socialist decline squarely 
upon the shoulders of Roosevelt, thus leading one to believe that the 
decline of the Socialist party was caused by the New Deal.2. In fact 
the decline had begun long before the New Deal, and was caused by the 
Socialists themselves. They never really determined whether they were 
a revolutionary sect, a political party, or merely a pressure group, 
tilth the exception of Milwaukee, Reading, Pennsylvania and a few 
other cities, they avoided showing concern with local issues, 
an omission which cost them strong local organisations, a basic necessity 
of any political party. Instead they tried to use the labour unions as 
"grass roots11 of the party, a move which failed, mainly because American 
labour has had litt le class consciousness, and secondly because the 
1. "The Socialist Party of America11. David A. Shannon. ^^*^7 
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Socialists blundered on so many oooasions in their attempts to convert 
the unions to their way of thought* The Socialist leadership was itself 
split regarding the means by which they should take over organised labour*!* 
The more moderate among them, such as Maurer, Berger, and Max S*Hayes 
of Cleveland wanted to work within the American Federation of Labour* 
trying to convert the majority of the membership to the Socialist 
viewpoint* Suoh methods were too slow for both the radicals in the 
Socialist party, and the Communists* The latter tried to impose their 
viewpoint upon the unions, rather than convert them, by the simple* 
i f indelioate procedure, of securing the election of their members 
to as many of the key positions in the union as was possible. The 
more radical Socialists, Debs among them, tried a third method, which 
appeared to be at least the simplest way of fusing Socialism and 
organised labour, and that was to organise labour yourself* Aooordingly 
in 1905 the Socialists helped found the Industrial Workers of the World, 
as a rival to the A.F.L*, whilst at the same time trying to organise 
seotions of labour wbloh the A.P.L. had long ignored* The wisdom of 
the radicals move oan best be demonstrated by showing the progress made 
where Socialists worked with what was basically a non-partisan labour 
organisation^* 
The state federations of the A.F .L . in Wisoonsin, Pennsylvania 
and Montana, a l l had Socialist officials* In return for financial 
help during eleotion oampaigns, the Socialists gave the unions 
contributions towards the fighting fund during particularly lengthy strikes* 
! • "The Socialist Party of America"'* David A*Saannon* •? *V 
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Nor was benefit oonfined to one side in this partnership* She unions 
gained strength and security from their alliance; whilst the Socialists 
could point to the election results in those three states to show 
the benefits of co-operation to the Socialist party* Socialist 
Administrations were elected in Milwaukee (Wisconsin), Butte (Montana), 
and Reading (Pennsylvania), the last-named governing that community 
long after socialism was dead as a national force.1* 
Socialist views were never themselves a draw-back within the 
A.F.L* as was seen in the A.P.L. presidential vote of 1912, when the 
Socialist Hayes gained almost one third of the votes oast in his 
contest with Samuel &ompers; however, the sporadic attacks made 
upon the A . F . L . by the radioala in the Socialists did l i t t l e to 
reform, or attract that body, as a national entity rather than several 
state federations, to the Socialist Party* She size of the Socialists 
mistake can be shown by the fact that the A.F.L* s t i l l exists today, 
albeit in a new labour ooalition, wheraaa the Socialist party i s 
long since dead* 2* 
Similarly the American voter has preferred to concern himself 
with parties and policies that held out the hope of visible, practical, 
and above a l l fast, results* She social theory of Debs was rejected 
at i t s zenith in favour of the immediate results promised by Theodore 
Roosevelt and the. Progressives* 5* 
Lastly the Socialists failed in their bid to win over the 
two minority groups for which i t had so long striven, the European 
immigrant, and the negro* 
The negro, so long shackled with the disadvantage of being 
1* 
2. 
5. 
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born with a black skin, was unwilling to add the further disadvantage 
cf 'red* tendencies to his burden, whilst the immigrant generally 
wanted to leave a l l vestiges of his European past behind Mm on 
entering America, these often included his political beliefs which 
he considered would hinder him in his desire to become •American* • 
1* "The Socialist Parly of America". David ^.Shannon. fiJif 
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I f the party was dying in 1956, i t was a l l but buried ten years later 
following the Second World War* Shis was oaused by the party fail ing 
to adopt a clear statement on the war, and, although Thomas did poll 
139,521 votes in 1948, the corpse oould not be revived* 
Thomas refused to run again as Presidential candidate in 1952, 
and even recommended to the party that no Socialist be nominated for 
President* This suggestion was rejeoted, many feeling that a Socialist 
Presidential oandidate would lend prestige to the party tickets in 
Heading and Milwaukee*1* 
Accordingly Darlington Hoopes, a Reading lawyer was chosen as 
Presidential candidate, although whether he lent prestige to the 
municipal tickets i s extremely doubtful* He gained a mere 20,189 
votes to be beaten even by the candidate of the Prohibition Party* 
With this disastrous result, the Socialist Party of America 
was dead both as a polit ical entity, and as a medium for the 
spreading of social revolution, although whilst never i tself attaining 
national power, i t was s t i l l able to see many of i t s party aims 
put into practice after their adoption by one of the major parties* 
Where i t did achieve power, the party oould reflect upon i t s record 
of giving the electorate a clean, i f hardly radioal, administration* 
I t i s for these reasons I fee l the Socialist Party wi l l be remembered* 
these plus the fact that for f i r s t generation immigrants i t provided 
a useful political bridge between European Socialism, and the 
meaningless terms of American party politics* 
1* "The Decline of American Communism"* David A.Shannon* PJ&l 
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Thus so f a r i n th is paper we have confined ourselves to minority 
parties which have fa i l ed i n their bids f o r national recognition. I n 
th is chapter we are to look at a party which confined i t s e l f to the 
Mid-West of the United States, and more specifically to the State 
of Minnesota, and by thus confining i t s e l f to a comparatively small 
area, gained the confidence of the majority of the electorate i n that 
area. I n that i t was successful at the polls , i t d i f fered from minority 
parties. I t did however possess one common l i n k with the majority of 
t h i r d parties, the Farmer - Labour Party was very much dependent upon 
the charismatic appeal of one man, Floyd B. Olson. 
During the period 1922 - 1939, the party experienced two periods 
of success at the polls i n the state of Minnesota. I t was the second 
of these, 1931 - 1939, that coincided with the rise to power of Olson, 
and i t was Olson's death i n 1936 which marked the beginning of the 
end f o r the Farmer-Labour Party. 1. 
The Farmer-Labour Party had i t s origins i n the Nonpartisan 
League, a movement which echoed the charges of the Grangers, the 
Greenbackers, and the Populists, The League, which was founded i n 
1915 by a group of North Dakota farmers led by A.G.Townley, a former 
Socialist propagandist and bankrupt f l a x farmer, soon secured the 
agrarian imagination of the Mid-West. In 1916 League candidates 
entered the Republican primaries i n North Dakota and effect ively took 
over that party i n the state, to the extent of winning the elections 
of 1916 and 1913 under a Republican guise.2. 
1. "Polit ics i n Minnesota". G.Theodore Mitau. ^ /Jm/$" 
2. "The Republican Party 1854-1954". George H. Mayer. / V ? ^ 
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In 1917 national headquarters of the League were opened in St .Paul, 
Minnesota, and highly trained politioal organisers were sent to the 
Red River Valley and Western Minnesota, where the spirit of Populism 
was dormant, but by no means dead.l. The new movement was soon to 
suffer political persecution, before i t had hardly gained a hold in 
the state. This was largely beoause of a very large German membership 
and because of the anti-war stand taken by a number of i t s leaders before 
the united States entered World War One* To these reasons could be added 
possibly the greatest blunder of a l l , the choioe of former Congressman 
Charles A* Lindbergh as the Nonpartisan candidate for Governor in the 
1918 Republican primary* Lindbergh was notable for his outspoken anti-
war views, views whioh only helped to s t ir up the anti-league hysteria 
campaign oonduoted by the Minnesota Public Safety Commission^, Despite 
this hysteria however, and despite injunctions being issued in nineteen 
counties to prevent the League holding meetings, Lindbergh s t i l l received 
150,000 votes* The incumbent governor Joseph A*A,Burnquist, a leading 
member of the Public Safety Commission, won renomination by over 50,000 
votes, but the result did at least show the extent of the reform agrarian 
vote in Minnesota*3* 
Townley realised, however, that in Minnesota the farm vote alone 
would not be enough: the state's urban vote, especially that concentrated 
in the twin towns of Minneapolis and St*Paul, needed exploitation* The 
programme of the League was accordingly broadened to encourage the urban 
vote, and on August 24, 1918, at a Conference in St*Paul, the f i r s t urban-
agrarian links were forged when delegates representing the Minnesota 
1. "The Populist Revolt"* John D* Hicks. S>'CJ 
2. "The Politioal Career of Floyd B. Olson"* George H.Mayer. 
5. "Politics in Minnesota". G-.Theodore Mitau. 
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Federation of Labour, and the Non-Partisan League agreed to support a 
joint slate of candidates for state office. They nominated David Evans 
for Governor, and Tom Davis for Attorney-General, and to satisfy the 
state electoral laws, both oandidates f i led as members of a Farmer-
Labour Party. Such a designation however was adopted purely to get on 
the ballot; the party had no independent existence, nor did i t exist 
as a complete entity, such an arrangement was merely a marriage of 
convenience, as there was no attempt at a merger at this stage. Such 
a coalition did not bring victory, but the foundations were laid for 
increased farmer—labour oo—operation.l. 
At the 1919 convention of the Minnesota Federation of Labour, 
the coalition came even closer together, when a Working - People's 
Nonpartisan Political League was organised on lines similar to Townley's 
movement. 2. In 1920, a joint slate was again proposed, and again 
defeated, although decisively establishing itself as a major influence 
in the state.3. The labour element in the coalition now became eager 
to run a f u l l slate of i t s own as a third party, whilst Tcwnley s t i l l 
1. "The Politioal Career of Floyd B.Olson". George H.Meyer. 
2. Ibid. Pi I 
3. The party emerged as an important force in Minnesota 
through the gubernatorial campaign of Henrik Shipstead, 
a former Republican dentist. The f u l l voting figures 
were as follows t-
J.A.0.Preus (Republican) 415,805 votes. 
Henrik Shipstead 281,402 
(Farmer Labour) 
L.C.Hodgson (Democrat) 81,293 
("Politics in Minnesota11. Theodore Mitau). 
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preferred a system of endorsement of major party candidates favourable 
to the League programme for agriculture.1* 
Two years later, however, following an attempt to fuse with the 
Democrats, League supporters finally campaigned independently as the 
Farmer-Labour Parly. Their candidate for Governor, Magnus Johnson, came 
within 14,000 votes of seouring eleotion, polling 14,000 votes more than 
Shipstead two years previously. 2 and increasing the percentage vote:, 
albeit in a lower total poll , of the Farmer-iabour Party from 55.9$ in 
1920, to 43.1$ in 1922. 
In Congressional eleotions, the party was more suooessf ul however, 
winning a total of three seats. Knud Wefaid and O.J.Kvale were eleoted 
to the House of Representatives, whilst Henrik Shipstead, defeated two 
years previously in the state gubernatorial election, secured a seat in 
the Senate . 5 . 
1. "The Populist Revolt". John D. Hicks. P/5'7 
2. J .A.0 . Preus (Republican) 309,756 votes. 
Magnus Johnson (Farmer-Labour) 295,479 
Edward Indrehus (Democrat) 79,905 
("Politics in Minnesota". G.Theodore Mitau). P "<} 
5. Shipstead defeated Frank B. Kellogg, who although a 
notable Republican Senator, wi l l be remembered more as 
Seoretary of State under Calvin Coolidge, co-author of 
the Kellogg - Briand Pact (1928) and a Nobel Peace Prize 
Winner (1929). The f u l l voting figures were as follows:-
Henrik Shipstead (Farmer - Labour) 325,372 votes. 
Frank B. Kellogg (Republican) 241,833 votes. 
A.Olesen (Democrat) 123,624 votes. 
("Politics in Minnesota". G»Theodore Mitau). ^S* 7 
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The f o i l owing year the Parmer - Labourities experienced greater 
success, when, at a speoial eleotion following the death of Senator 
Ehute Nelson, Magnus Johnson, a Swedish immigrant, secured the seoond 
Minnesota seat in the Senate. Unfortunately, this success was short-
lived, for the following year Johnson was defeated by the Republican 
candidate Thomas D. Sohall, by a margin of 8,000 votes out of the 
760,000 votes cast.l* 
The 1924 elections, although tainted by the attempts of the Communists 
Party to infiltrate the Conference for Progressive Polit ical Aotion, and 
the Farmer-Labour movement in Minnesota 2, one of the C.P.P.A* greatest 
allies in the Mid - West, also marked the end of Townley,s influence in 
Mid-Weatern agrarian politics, and the emergence of a new political figure 
in Minnesota state politics, Floyd B. 01son» 
Olson had a l l the characteristics necessary for success in American 
politics, being of the right ethnic stock, a Scandinavian, a former miner 
and labourer, he had eventually become a lawyer in private practice and 
then Attorney of Hennepin County* A crusader against big-city 
racketeering, he was also the champion of organised labour against the 
conservative elements typified in big business*5* 
In 1924 Olson was chosen to head the Farmer - Labour tioket in the 
state - wide eleotions* His opponent for Governor was not the unpopular 
incumbent Governor Pre us, but Theodore Christians on, who, whilst no match 
1. "Politios in MinnesotaM. G-.Theodore Mitau, W / % • f 
2* "Facts about the Presidents". Joseph Nathan Kane* 3 
3. "Minnesota A* History of the State". Theodore C* Blegen* / ' f'2 J 
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for Olson as an orator, did have characteristics whioh marked him as an 
ideal candidate. He had graduated from college with the ooveted grading 
of Phi Beta Kappa, possessed a dignified and sober manner which i f i t did 
not arouse enthusiasm, commanded respect, and lastly he had a record as 
Speaker of the state House of Representatives as a campaigner for tax 
reduction, a fact which swiftly endeared him to the agrarian communities 
of the state*1» 
At this point therefore the candidates were evenly balanced. The 
eleotion was won and lost during the campaign itself , i f not at the Farmer-
Labour convention. I t was at this convention that the Farmer-Labourites 
were f i r s t accused, by Robert M. la Follette, the C.P.P.A. presidential 
candidate, of Communist infiltration.2. Olson neither discouraged nor 
enoouraged Communist support, and like Henry Wallace in 1948, his 
ambiguous stand did him l i t t l e good. The votes he gained from the 
Communists were more than balanced by those lost in the middle-classes. 
This issue in fact, more than any other, tipped the scales against 
Olson. The Farmer-Labourites were defeated by a popular candidate 
with a sound political instinct. When the votes were oounted, Olson 
had lost by 40,000 votes out of a total of 865,000, the f u l l electoral 
result being as follows:-
Theodore Christians on (Republican) 406,692 votes. 
Floyd B. Olson (Farmer - Labour) 566,029 votes. 
Carlos Avery (Democrat) 49,555 votes. 
1. "The Political Career of Floyd B. Olson". George H.Meyer. ^3* 
2. "Third-Party Movements in the United States". William BJHesseltim .tine 
5. n G.Theodore Mitau. /->/• "Politics in Minnesota 
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Quite apart from costing Olson the election, the infiltration of 
the Communists into the Farmer Labour Federation, so discredited the 
movement that i t was considered neoessary to disband the movement, 
and replaces i t with another movement with a new image, but nevertheless 
loyal to the ideals of the old federation* The new organisation, formed 
at St*Paul on March 20th 1925, was known as the Farmer Labour Association* 1* 
The constitution of the association speoif ioaUy barred the admission 
of communists to membership, nevertheless i t followed closely the basio 
socialist principles of the Nonpartisan League* The constitution 
stated that "every person i s entitled to an opportunity to earn a living, 
and should be secure in the enjoyment of the fruits of his or her toil"* 
I n order to further the implementation of these rights two radical steps 
were advocated* These were f i r s t l y a union of "all persons in agrioulture 
and other useful industry" te provide for the economic security of those 
who produced the wealth of the nation, and seoondly the abolition of 
private monopolies which were to be replaced by a system of public 
ownership designed not only to increase the total wealth of society, 
but also to abolish unemployment, a consideration of l i t t l e importance 
during the boom period of the mid-twenties, but whioh was to have 
increasing importance before the end of the deoade.2* 
As with the Labour Party in Great Britain, membership of the 
association could be attained on an individual or a corporate basis* 
The grass roots unit of organisation was the Farmer Labour club 
1 
2, 
"The Politioal Career of Floyd BwOlson"* George H*Mayer, /*^7 
Ibid* P i j 
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whloh represented those members in a particular township or village 
regardless of i t s geographioal relationship to the looal government 
boundaries of the area. The annual membership fee was three dollars, 
of which half went to the off ic ial newspaper of the association, "The 
Farmer Labour Advocate"', the remainder going to the looal (50 cents), 
to the county (25 oents) and to the state (75 cents}* Using this 
simple means, effeotive power was thus oonfined to the most politically 
oonsoious citizens of the oommunity* Affiliated membership waa also 
open to trade unions and farmers* oo-operatives who paid a two per oent 
per capita tax* Like the clubs, the affiliated organisations were 
entitled to participate in the oounty conventions of the association, 
which had the threefold purpose of endorsing candidates for looal office, 
passing resolutions which served to advise the upper eohelons of the 
hierarchy of grass roots sentiment, and selecting delegates to the biennial 
convention of the association*!* In 1950, the constitution waa amended 
to allow the affiliated organisations to send delegates direotly to the 
meetings of the association* Suoh a change did not increase the voting 
strength of any one oounty however which was strictly apportioned at one 
oounty delegate •» at - large; plus one additional delegate for each 
thousand votes cast for the Farmer - Labour oandidate in the preoeeding 
gubernatorial eleotion*2* 
1* "The Political Career of Floyd B, Olson". George H* Mayer* ^Jf 
2* The convention was thus largest following Benson's successful 
campaign of 1936 when he polled over 680,000 votes* The 
total number of delegates at the 1938 convention must thus 
have been well in excess of 700, as 87 of these were automatic 
delegate - at - large appointments* 
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She convention existed to endorse candidates for state offices 
and United States senator, thereby avoiding the direct primary, a 
move whioh caused many to attack the system on the grounds that i t 
was undemocratic* Convention also drafted the association platform, 
amended the constitution, and appointed the executive committee* 
Thus i t was the dues-laying members, and not the electorate who controlled 
the association and their nominees* Only on rare occasions did a 
oandidate seoure the party nomination without endorsement by the association 
convention* Such precautions on the part of the Farmer Labourites was 
undoubtedly to prevent raiding and infiltration into the movement such as 
happened to the North Dakotan Republicans in 1916, and also to the Farmer 
Labourites themselves on the oooaslon of the wide-open primary of 1924*1* 
1* "She Politioal Career of Floyd B* Olson1"* George H* Hayer. P 
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During the next six years the Farmer - Labour Party fought 
four major elections in Minnesota* One of these they won, thanks to 
the charismatic appeal of their senatorial candidate, Henrik Ship stead* 
They failed however to seoure the governorship, both in 1926 and 1928, 
the Republicans being able to keep the state - house in their possession 
thanks to an era of continued prosperity and the respected leadership 
of Governor Christianson.l* In 1950 they also failed in their bid to 
unseat Thomas D.Schall by two years, the junior Senator from the state, 
being relegated to third position on the ballot, this being the only 
1* The f u l l eleotoral results in this period weret-
1928 Election for United States Senator 
Henrik Shipstead (Farmer - Labour) 
Arthur B* Nelson (Republican) 
665,169 
342,992 
votes* 
votes* 
1950 Election for United States Senator 
Thomas D* Schall (Republican) 
Einar Hoidale (Democrat) 
Ernest Lundeen (Farmer - Labour), 
Charles Lund (Independent by Petition) 
293,626 
282,018 
178,671 
20,669 
votes* 
votes* 
votes* 
votes* 
1926 Election for Governor of Minnesota 
Theodore Christiansen (Republican) 
Magnus Johnson (Farmer - Labour) 
Alf red Jaques (Democrat) 
595,779 
266,845 
38,008 
votes* 
votes* 
votes* 
1928 Election for Governor of Minnesota 
Theodore Christians on (Republican) 
Erne at Lundeen (Farmer - Labour) 
Andrew Nelson (Democrat) 
549,857 
227,195 
215,734 
votes* 
votes* 
votes* 
("Ptlitios in Minnesota" G.Theodore Mitau). Pfi " v "7 
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ocoasion i n the h i s t o r y of the Farmer - Labour Par ty that they were 
defeated by a Democratic candidate i n e i t h e r a United States 
Senate or gubernatorial e l e o t i o n . l , 
At t h i s time however the Farmer - Labouri tes were w i l l i n g to 
forget t h i s r e s u l t i n favour of the r e s u l t of the e l e c t i o n f o r state 
governor. F o r the f i r s t time, a candidate of the Farmer-Labour P a r t y , 
Floyd B .Olson , was eleoted to the state house of Minnesota.2. 
What therefore was the cause of such a dramatio change i n fortunes 
f o r the Parmer—Labourites? B a s i c a l l y i t must be that the people of 
Minnesota looked l o c a l l y , as d id Americans n a t i o n a l l y , f o r a down—to-earth 
man who was not only able to show compassion to the poor and the unemployed 
at the time of the G-reat Depression, but who was a l so capable of showing 
to the people that he had a programme of reforms which would l i f t that 
Depression* Olson was almost c e r t a i n l y b e t t e r off than Roosevelt , i n 
that the Farmer-Labour Par ty had been preaching a r a d i c a l platform f o r many 
years , Olson i n 1930 merely had to take i t over ,3 . The Democrats had 
been advocating no such platform, F r a n k l i n Roosevelt i n 1932 could o f f e r 
the American people l i t t l e more than sympathy and hope,4, 
A second f a c t o r i n favour of the Farmer-Labourites was the non-
appearance of the incumbent governor, Theodore Chr i s t i anson , who chose 
instead to run f o r the United S ta tes Senate ,5 , 
1. " P o l i t i c s i n Minnesota". G.Theodore Mitau. & S'*/"<f 
2 . I b i d . fiP tf<? 
3 . "Building Minnesota". Theodore C.Blegen. ^ * 
4 . "The S o c i a l i s t P a r t y of America". David A.Shannon, d 
3 , Only to be thwarted i n h i s ambition by Senator S o h a l l who 
won a surpr i s ing v i c tory i n the Republican Primary E l e c t i o n , 
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The absence of C h r i s t i a n a on, whom Olson knew from personal experience 
to be a very strong opponent, f u r t h e r strengthened the hand of the 
Farmer-Labour P a r t y , Ins tead of C h r i s t i a n s on, the Republicans 
nominated Ray P . Chase, who f o r the previous twleva years, had served 
as State Audi tor , Thi s i n i t s e l f was an unfortunate ohoioe, f o r 
Chase had been campaign manager f o r G-ovemor Pre us i n the 1920 
gubernatorial e l e c t i o n , during the course of which he had made a 
number of w i l d accusations against the Non-Partisan League* Such 
statements were now being used against him* The Democratic candidate 
was Edward Indrehus, a candidate not expected to run Olson very close .1* 
The vote f o r Olson i n 1930 however was not b a s i c a l l y a vote f o r the 
Farner-Labour P a r t y , and indeed i t i s debatable whether a vote f o r Olson 
was ever a show of confidence i n the Farmer-Labour P a r t y , so wide was h i s 
appeal; i n 1950 the vote f o r Olson was a protest against the Depression*2* 
The f i n a l vote i n the 1930 oampaign f o r Governor of Minnesota was 
as f o l lows:-
Floyd B.Olson (Parmer - Labour) 473,154 votes* 
Ray P . Chase (Republican) 289,528. 
Edward Indrehus (Democrat) 29,109, 5* 
Olson, who received 59,5$ of the t o t a l p o l l , c a r r i e d 82 of the s ta t e s ' 
eighty-seven counties , and pol led heaviest i n the former strongholds 
of the Non-Partisan League, the German counties , and the large 
conurbations. Chase even succeeded i n l o s ing those counties bordering 
the state of Iowa, long considered to be t r a d i t i o n a l Republioan strongholds. 
1 . "The P o l i t i o a l Career of F l o y d B , Olson". George H.Mayer. ^ V ? 
2 . "Minnesota - A History of the State" , Theodore C , Blegen, 
3 . " P o l i t i c s i n Minnesota". G-.Theodore Mitau. 
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The new Governor, however, f a i l e d to c a n y many Farmer - Labour 
o f f i c e seekers i n on h i s ooat - t a i l s , f o r the party captured only 
one of the s t a t e ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o f f i c e s , and t h e i r supporters 
secured only 29 s tate senatorships and 40 representat ives* 1 in the 
s tate*s t r a d i t i o n a l l y non-partisan l e g i s l a t u r e * 
& notable f a c t which emerged from the 1930 e l ec t ions was the 
attempt at an e l e c t o r a l pact between the Democrats and the Farmer -
Labourites* 
The Democratic Party was to u n o f f i c i a l l y support Olson f o r 
Governor, w h i l s t i n return the Farmer - Labour Par ty was to a id 
E i n a r Hoidale, the Democratic candidate f o r the Senate* T h i s d e a l , 
engineered by Olson and Joseph Wolf , the Democratic nat iona l committee 
man, obviously depended upon each party nominating a s a o r i f i o i a l oandidate 
f o r the o f f i c e i t did not p lan to s er ious ly oontest*2* Wolf, by M.3 
nomination of Indreb.ua, upheld h i s par t of the bargain , but Olson found 
himself unable to keep to the agreement* T h i s was because Olson's 
nominee f o r Senator, Ehud Wefaid was defeated i n the Primary by E r n e s t 
Lundeen, 5 , a man who was most unwil l ing to serve the party i n a 
s a o r i f i o i a l capacity* The dea l correspondingly f e l l through, and c o -
operation on a s tate - wide l e v e l between Farmer - Labouri tes and Democrats 
was shelved f o r another decade, although, oo—operation d id e x i s t on a 
1* Out of a t o t a l of 67 Senators and 131 Representatives 
( " P o l i t i o s i n Minnesota"* G-,Theodore Mitau*) f f t 
2* "The P o l i t i c a l Career of F loyd B* Olson"* George H* Mayer. 
3* A r e s u l t a t tr ibuted to a low p o l l of 75,900 votes i n the 
Farmer-Labour primary* Many vo ter s , ex i ted by the S o h a l l -
Chr i s t ianson c l a s h , ohose to vote i n the Republioan primary 
ra ther than that of the Farmer-Labour Party* 
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nat iona l l e v e l i n the Olson-Roosevelt e r a . l . 
The l a c k of a majori ty i n the s tate l e g i s l a t u r e during Olson's f i r s t 
two y e a r s i n o f f i c e , d id mean that h i s r a d i c a l programme was ser ious ly 
c u r t a i l e d . The new governor knew that there was l i t t l e chance of 
securing the passage of controvers ia l measures i n the pro-Republican 
l e g i s l a t u r e . He pre ferred to increase h i s pres t ige by winning a 
s e r i e s of minor v i c t o r i e s on h i s own terms, on h i s own batt legrounds.2 . 
I n 1932 however, the year that F r a n k l i n D. Roosevelt was eleoted 
Pres ident Olson was returned to the State House.3. t h i s time w i t h a p r o -
Farmer - Labour caucus who represented the majori ty of the l e g i s l a t u r e . 
That y e a r , Olson found himself opposed, r e l u c t a n t l y , by E a r l e Brown 
who headed the State Highway P a t r o l , of the Republican p a r t y , and 
eagerly by John E . Regan, the Democratic nominee.4. The reluctanoe 
of Brown to stand was understandable, as not only was Olson a formidable 
opponent, but the Republican party n a t i o n a l l y was d i s c r e d i t e d , i n that 
Pres ident Hoover had f a i l e d to remedy the malady of the Great Depression. 
On the other hand the Democrats were opt imist ic of a na t iona l v i c t o r y 
p lus a s e r i e s of l o c a l v i c t o r i e s , as s t a t e w i d e candidates were pu l l ed 
in to of f ioe on the coat - t a i l s of t h e i r P r e s i d e n t i a l oandidate. 
1 , "The P o l i t i o a l Career of F l o y d B!.01son"> George H.Mayer, P'O/ 
2 , ."Building Minnesota", Theodore C , Blagen. ^«/6© 
3 , The r e s u l t of the 1932 e l e c t i o n f o r Governor of Minnesota, 
was as f o l l o w s : -
Floyd B.Olson (Fanner - Labour) 522,438 votes , 
E a r l e Brown (Republican) 334,081 votes , 
John E , Regan (Democrat) 176,928 votes* 
( " P o l i t i c s i n Minnesota". G. Theodore Mi tau) , 
4 , "The P o l i t i o a l Career of F loyd B ,01s on". George H, Mayer, 
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Competition f o r the Democratic nomination was thus great . The main 
contestants were John E.Regan, and Dr«A*A«Van Dyke, whose oampaign 
soon deter iorated into one of pirns mud-slinging. Regan eventual ly 
won, but h i s supporters were refused seats as delegates at the 
Demooratio n a t i o n a l convention, being replaced by a delegation l e d 
by nat iona l committee man Joseph Wolf . 1 . T h i s l a t t e r dec i s ion , 
coupled wi th the P r e s i d e n t i a l nomination of F r a n k l i n D . Roosevelt 
once more c leared the way f o r oo-operatlon between the Demooratio 
and Farmer - Labour P a r t i e s . There was. never any suggestion at a 
fus ion of t i c k e t s , f o r f e a r that each p a r t y ' s supporters might be 
fr ightened i n t o not vot ing due to the presence of the other party 
on the t i c k e t , the agreement was merely that the nat iona l Demooratio 
leadership was to keep i t s hands of f the state campaign, w h i l s t Olson 
was to d e l i v e r to Roosevelt as many Farmer - Labour votes as poss ible* 
Whils t co-operation was thus so f a r confined to the wards and prec inc t s 
i t d id lay the foundations of good re la t i ons between the Democrats 
na t iona l ly , and Farmer - Labourites i n Minnesota, and sowed the seeds 
of mutual respect between Olson and Roosevelt .2* Furthermore, the 
nomination, and, subsequent e l e c t i o n of Roosevelt helped to o a l l off 
the extremists i n the Farmer - Labour party who were po l l ing f o r a 
nat iona l t h i r d party*5* Olson had seen i n the l a F o l l e t t e oampaign 
of 1924, the d i f f i c u l t i e s of a P r e s i d e n t i a l campaign without the grass 
roots of organisat ion. Roosevelt 's nomination undoubtedly helped Olson 
out of t h i s corner, saving the Farmer - Labour p a r t y , and Olson himsel f , 
from the humil iat ions t r a d i t i o n a l l y reserved f o r nat ional t h i r d p a r t i e s 
and t h e i r P r e s i d e n t i a l candidates* 
As i t was; Roosevelt and Olson both seoured e l e c t i o n with healthy 
1* "The P o l i t i o a l Career of F loyd B*01son"* George H* Mayer* /°?f 
2 . I b i d . ^ / O / 
3 . "Minnesota - A History of the State" , Theodore C . Blegen, ^S'lf 
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major i t i e s* Olson gained large m a j o r i t i r e i n the b i g c i t i e s , and 
the Red R i v e r V a l l e y , winning every county north of the Minnesota 
R i v e r w i t h the exception of S tearns . Only on the Iowa border 
d id he lose Votes* I n 1950 the prosperous farmers of the Southern 
counties had oast what was a sp i te vote against the Republicans, by 
1952 the majori ty ° f them had returned to the Republican f o l d , or 
chose to vote Democrat, few remained wi th the Parmer - Labour party* 
No doubt t h i s was due to Olson's l e f t -w ing views on the role of 
government i n the economy, and h i s f l i r t a t i o n s w i th the r a d i c a l Farm 
Holiday Assoc iat ion*!* 
This r e s u l t marked the end of Olson the compromiser* From now on, 
w i th the knowledge that he had the backing of the state l e g i s l a t u r e , 
Minnesota saw the emergence of Olson the r a d i c a l * 
Immediately the Governor set out to enact the more important 
par t s of h i s programme: a mortgage moratorium b i l l was passed during the 
e a r l y months of 1955, as a means of protec t ing farmers badly h i t by 
the Depression, from foreclosure*2* On the revenue side of the state 
budget, Olson introduced a s tate inoome tax, w h i l s t i n s o c i a l expenditure 
a beginning was. made i n the sphere of old-age pensions w i t h the f i r s t 
Minnesota 0ld-Age pensions Aot, 1955* Labour in junct ions and "yellow 
dog"' oontracts were prohibited* 5 , a step taken i n the course of j u s t i c e 
as w e l l as the i n t e r e s t s of the Farmer - L a b o u r i t e s * ^ 
However, the l e g i s l a t u r e , doubtless due to a majori ty of the 
Senate being i n the conservative oaucus, re jec ted b i l l s demanding 
the publio ownership of u t i l i t i e s and f a c t o r i e s , the prov i s ion of 
unemployment and hea l th insurance, the outlawing of loan sharks , the 
1* "The P o l i t i c a l Career of F loyd B.01son". George H . Mayer* 
5* A Contract whereby a prospective employee agrees not 
to j o i n a trade union* 
4* "Minnesota - A History of the State"* Theodore C . Blegen* 
I b i d * PJ> /-? 5' / / 19 
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f r e e d i s t r i b u t i o n of sohool textbooks, and the reduction of i n t e r e s t 
r a t e s . 
Olson's frequent v i s i t s to Washington where: he often represented 
the s ta te , soon earmarked him as both a l i b e r a l and a respected s tate 
governor. I t i s i ron io however to think that i t was not one of Olson's 
own p o l i c i e s which gained him nat iona l prominence, but the Hew Deal of 
F r a n k l i n D. Roosevelt . Fol lowing the autumn of 1953, Olson emerged 
as a supporter, and probably more important, a constructive o r i t i c of 
the New Deal recovery programme, both i n the need f o r widespread farm 
r e l i e f , and the publio ownership of indus tr i e s of stategio importance to 
the American economy.1. 
Relat ionships between the Democratic and Farmer - Labour p a r t i e s 
oould be seen to f a l l in to a b i e n n i a l c y c l e . The y e a r fo l lowing an 
e l e c t i o n was a year of c r i t i c i s m f o r the Farmer - Labour i tes , w h i l s t 
the next y e a r they oould be seen a c t u a l l y p r a i s i n g the Administrat ion. 
Olson r e a l i s e d that both he and Roosevelt were headed i n the same 
general d ireot ion , and h i s p o l i t i c a l experience t o l d him i t was b e t t e r 
to support suoh a candidate as Roosevelt, ra ther than a candidate of one 
of the minor p a r t i e s who had l i t t l e chance of success . I t was f o r these 
reasons that he discouraged a l l e f f o r t s to put him at the head of a nat iona l 
t h i r d party t i o k e t . 2 . 
Whi ls t Olson did not seek the ultimate i n American p o l i t i c s , he 
d id however seek the more rewarding pastures of Washington. Few 
were therefore surprised when i n the l a t e summer of 1955, i n the 
midst of h i s t h i r d term of office 5 , Olson announced h i s intent ion of 
1. "The P o l i t i c a l Career of F loyd B . Olson". George H . Mayer. 
2 . I b i d . P*ljf 
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opposing Thomas S o h a l l f o r the p o s i t i o n of United S ta tes Senator the 
fo l lowing y e a r , 1 . So expected was the announcement, i n f a c t , Farmer-
Labour leaders had already been contemplating f o r some: s i x months 
as to who should succeed Olson as governor.2. I n t h i s respect , Olson, 
by h i s own q u a l i t i e s and a t t r i b u t e s , had contributed to the l a c k of 
any one h e i r . The e l d e r - statesmen of the party , the contemporaries 
of Khud Wefald and Magnus Johnson were e i t h e r too old or lacked voter 
appeal, w h i l s t the younger generation suffered from negleot, due to 
the overshadowing e f f eo t of the governor. Lieutenant-Governor Hjalmar 
Petersen was regarded by many as the obvious successor, an ambition that 
was thwarted by Olson h imse l f , no doubt due to Petersen's a t t i tudes and 
a complete d i s t r u s t of urban r a d i c a l s . The profess iona l s i n the p a r t y , 
f e a r i n g the exchange of the s t r i c t contro l of Olson f o r that of Petersen , 
then decided to look f u r t h e r a f i e l d f o r a more malleable candidate . 
1 . "The P o l i t i c a l Career of F loyd B .Ol son 1 1 . George H.Mayer# 
2 , I n 1934 he had once more secured e l e c t i o n w i t h the fo l lowing 
re s u i t : -
F loyd B#01son (Farmer-Labour) 468,812 votes . 
Martin A.Nelson (Republican) 596,359 votes . 
John E.Regen (Democrat) 176,928 votes . 
A.C.Townley (independent) 4,454 votes . 
Olson's majori ty of 1952 was thus halved i n 1934, w h i l s t h i s 
3hare of the vote f e l l from 59.5$ i n 1950 to 50 # 6$ i n 1952, 
u n t i l i n 1954 he f a i l e d to gain an o v e r a l l major i ty , seouring 
only 44.6$ of the vote . 
An ana lys i s of t h i s vote showed a l l too w e l l that organised 
labour had re -e l ec t ed the Governor, the farmers were s lowly 
returning t o t h e i r old al legiance as the depression was reoeeding. 
The vote i n Hennepin, Ramsey and S t .Lou i s counties was heav i ly 
pro-Olson, w h i l s t r u r a l Minnesota, w i th the exceptions of the Red 
R i v e r V a l l e y , and the north-oentral count ies , provided a s o l i d b loc 
of votes against the governor. 
The farmer-labour a l l i a n c e was breaking up, that Olson survived 
thus so f a r can only be a t tr ibuted to the le f tward trend i n the 
conurbations, and Olson's own personal appeal . - . 
( T h e P o l i t i o a l Career of F loyd B .01son w . George H . Meyer,) 
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Tills they found i n Elmer A . Benson, the f o r t y years old Commissioner 
of B a n k s . l . 
I n t e r n a l Farmer-Labour struggles had taken up a large proportion 
of Olson's time as Governor, and the comparative sereni ty of a Senate 
seat probably explains h i s i n d i f f e r e n c e , r a t h e r than h i s n e u t r a l i t y 
towards the gubernatorial nomination. Benson seemed r e l i a b l e and w e l l -
q u a l i f i e d , but not outstanding enough to warrant a publ ic endorsement 
from the governor h imse l f . 
Olson's indif ferenoe however was shattered however, when on 
December, 22nd, 1955, Senator S o h a l l was f a t a l l y i n j u r e d i n a 
Washington S t r e e t acc ident . His death d id remove a major obstacle 
to the Farmer-Labourites i n the s ta t e , but a lso added f u r t h e r complications 
which at one time threatened to s p l i t the p a r t y . 2 . The vacant seat had 
to be f i l l e d as soon as poss ib le , and although Olson intended to contest 
1. 
2 . 
"Building Minnesota". Theodore C . Blegen. 
"Minnesota - A History of the S ta te" . Theodore C . B l e g e n . / ^ 5 ' J p 
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the seat i n 1936, he pre ferred to serve out h i s t h i r d term as governor 
f i r s t * Thus an immediate statement by Olson that he did not intend 
to appoint himself to the vaoanoy, provoked a scramble by pro fe s s iona l 
p o l i t i c i a n s , each eager to promote the claims of one of many aspirants* 
The most dedicated and determined group of p e t i t i o n e r s were those Farmer-
Labour i t e s , who saw i n the S e n a t o r i a l vacancy, a golden opportunity t o 
b u i l d up t h e i r gubernatorial candidate Elmer A , Benson* I f he were 
appointed a Senator, the prest ige gained from such an appointment would 
prao t i c a l l y guarantee h i s endorsement f o r Governor at the 1936 Farmer-
Labour Convention* Such an appointment would, of oourse, protect Olson, 
f o r Benson had no thoughts of running f o r Senator i n 1956, Any other 
appointee might be tempted to o f f e r himself f o r e leot ion the fo l lowing 
y e a r , thus diminishing the governor's own chances of e l e o t i o n . l , 
Olson was not to be swayed, however, and considering Benson too 
inexperienced f o r such a post , decided to appoint h i s former secre tary , 
Municipal Court Judge Yince Bay, to the vacancy* He made a c a r d i n a l 
e r r o r however, when i n t r y i n g to s t a l l the party pro fe s s iona l s , he 
allowed them to p r i n t an i s sue of the "Minnesota Leader 1 1 announcing 
Benson*8 appointment, f o r re lease only I f Olson decided to name 
Bens on, 2 , Unknown to Olson, t h i s i s sue was not only prepared, but 
a c t u a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d , Olson r e a l i s e d he had been t r i c k e d , and, although 
he t r i e d to escape from the corner, r e a l i s e d i t was impossible* To 
have repudiated the appointment would have s p l i t the party i n t o two 
warring f act ions w i t h i n a y e a r of the statewide e l e c t i o n s , a p o s s i b i l i t y 
that Olson could i l l - a f f o r d * He accordingly appointed Benson to the 
vacancy* , 
1* "The P o l i t i o a l Career of F l o y d B « 0 1 s o a w * George H« Bayer* 
2 . i b i d . />/>.*>r?/j9C 
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By t h i s time, however, Olson's hea l th was causing i n c r e a s i n g 
oonoern, u n t i l treatment at the Mayo C l i n i c i n January, 1936, revealed 
that the Governor had an incurable cancer, ihe had no more than e ight 
months to l i v e , a forecas t that proved astonishingly accurate• Had any 
announcement been made regarding Olson's true s tate of hea l th , i t would 
have p r e c i p i t a t e d a straggle f o r oontrol of the p a r t y , and a race f o r the 
gubernatorial and senator ia l nominations* She l a c k of an announcement 
from the Mayo C l i n i c regarding Olson, meant that f o r the time being the 
reformers and the party profes s iona l s were divided on only one i s s u e : 
the party oandidate f o r the 1936 e l e c t i o n f o r Governor of Minnesota . l . 
She prel iminary excursions emerged as a t r i a l of strength between the 
profes s iona l s ohoioe, Senator Elmer A* Benson, and the man who considered 
himself the true h e i r of Olson, despite having s p l i t w i th the governor at 
both a p o l i t i c a l and a personal l e v e l , Lieutenant-Governor Hjalmar Petersen* 
Despite a p l e a from Olson f o r an open primary, Benson supporters secured 
a majority of convention delegates , many of them jobholders, long before 
the convention assembled* Such t a c t i c s , w h i l s t ensuring Benson's 
nomination, a l so looked to an outs ider to be very f a i r and demooratio, 
seeming as they d id to be an expression of grass-roots sentiments* Such 
manoeuvres, however, providing f o r the Senator's nomination i n 1936, only 
oaused deep resentment from the crusading element i n the p a r t y , who saw 
the reform movement being turned in to a patronage machine by a small 
number of pro fe s s iona l spoilsmen*2* 
1 , "She P o l i t i c a l Career of F loyd B* Olson"* George H* Mayer* 
2 . I b i d . P f l » / 
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Suoh considerations were f a r removed i n the November of 1956 
however when Elmer A* Benson offered himself f o r e l e c t i o n as Governor 
of Minnesota. I n a s t ra ight t i g h t w i th Republican. Martin A . Nelson. 
Benson secured 60.7$ of the t o t a l p o l l , the f u l l vot ing f i g u r e s being;** 
Elmer A . Benson (Farmer - Labour) 680,542 votes . 
Martin A . Ifelson (Republican) 451,841 votes . 1 . 
Nor was t h i s an i s o l a t e d r e s u l t , f o r i n the S e n a t o r i a l e l e c t i o n of 1956, 
E r n e s t Lundeen, who was chosen as the new Farmen-Labour oandidate fo l lowing 
Olson's death on 22nd August, 1956, po l l ed an even l a r g e r percentage, 62.2$, 
against former Governor Theodore C h r i s t i a n s e n , the oomplete r e s u l t being:— 
E r n e s t Lundeen (Farmer - Labour) 665.565 votes . 
Theodore C h r i s t i a n s on (Republican) 402.404 votes . 2 . 
I f the Farmer-Labour party of Minnesota was t r u l y the party of 
F loyd B . Olson, then how does one begin to exp la in these two r e s u l t s 
which came three months a f t e r the death of the Governor? 
I n the instance of the S e n a t o r i a l contest , one explanation f o r the 
high Farmer-Labour vote i s that the e lectorate was more favourable t o the 
i s o l a t i o n i s t p o l i o i e s of Lundeen, e s p e c i a l l y i n the more pro - German 
areas . There i s no doubt that the e l e c t i o n was strongly contested on 
the i ssue of f ore ign p o l i c y . T h i s , however, would only exp la in , or help 
to explain , the reasons f o r Lundeen* s success . What f a c t o r s contributed 
then to Benson's v i c t o r y , and a l so poss ib ly inf luenced Lundeen's o amp s ign? 
The major f a c t o r , I would a s s e r t , was the legacy of Olson , who had 
l e f t behind him a ooa l i t i on that he alone had been able to w i e l d i n t o one 
f i g h t i n g f o r c e . That ooa l i t i on i n November 1956 had only one or two 
surface scratches , the oraoks were to appear i n the fo l lowing two y e a r s . 
1. " P o l i t i c s i n Minnesota". G.Theodore Mitau. ^ / , f f 
2 . I b i d . 
169. 
That both Benson and Lundeen faced no Demooratio candidate i n 
1936 was t r ibute to the p o l i t i o a l s k i l l of Olson, who am the f u t i l i t y 
of f i g h t i n g a nat iona l t h i r d party oampaign, and the p r a c t i c a b i l i t y 
of a loose e l e o t o r a l paot w i t h the Democrats• Thus both Benson and 
Lundeen faced only opposition from the Republican p a r t y , an organisat ion 
whose morale was low both n a t i o n a l l y and statewide, thanks to the combined, 
i f hardly united, e f f o r t s of F r a n k l i n D . Roosevelt, and F loyd B . Olson,1* 
The l a s t , i f somewhat dubious, reason f o r the higher Farmer -
Labour vote i n 1936, was that i t was a sympathy vote f o r Olson* Such 
votes , of course, cannot be accurate ly computed, neverthe less , i t cannot 
be denied that the v a s t major i ty of Minnesotans were grieved at Olson's 
death, which, ooming as i t d id so near to the e leot ions , must have affeoted 
some of the e lectorate i n a manner favourable to the Farmer-Labour party* 
The year 1936 has a two-fold s ign i f i cance i n Minnesota p o l i t i c a l 
h i s t o r y , each undeniably l inked to the other* F i r s t l y i t marked the 
death of the champion of the masses, F loyd B* Olson* Secondly i t 
proved the l a s t occasion on which a candidate of the Farmer-Labour 
party would win o f f i c e as e i t h e r Governor of Minnesota, or United 
States Senator* The party was to f i g h t on two more occasions f o r 
the o f f i c e of United States Senator, and on three more occasions f o r 
! • "Facts about the Presidents 1"* Joseph Nathan Sane* ^ 2 * 1 
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Governor of Minnesota, but on each occasion they were defeated.1 . 
1 . The f u l l r e s u l t s of these f i n a l e l ec t ions contested by 
the Farmer-Labour party were as f o l lows: -
1940 E l e c t i o n f o r united S ta tes Senator 
Henrik Ship stead (Republican) 
Elmer A . Benson (Farmer-Labour) 
John E . Regan (Democrat) 
* 641,049 votes 
310,875 votes 
248,658 votes 
* Ship ate ad rejo ined the Republican party i n 1940* 
1942 E l e o t i o n f o r United S ta tes Senator 
Joseph H . B a l l (Republican) 
Elmer A . Benson (Farmer-Labour) 
Martin A* Nelson (independent Progress ive ) 
E d Murphy (Democrat) 
1938 E l e o t i o n f o r Governor of Minnesota 
Harold B . Stassen (Republican) 
Elmer A . Benson (Farmer-Labour) 
Thomas Gal lagher (Democrat) 
1940 E l e o t i o n f o r Governor* «P ffl^p&ota 
Harold E . Stassen (Republican) 
Hjalmar Petersen (Farmer-Lab our) 
E d Murphy (Democrat) 
1942 E l e o t i o n f o r Governor of Minnesota 
Harold E« Stassen (Republican) 
Hjalmar Petersen (Farmer-Labour) 
John D* S u l l i v a n (Democrat) 
356,297 votes 
215,965 votes 
109,226 votes 
78,959 votes 
678,839 votes 
387,263 votes 
65,875 votes 
654,686 votes 
459,609 votes 
140,021 votes 
409,800 votes 
299,917 votes 
75,151 votes 
( " P o l i t i c s i n Minnesota". G . Theodore Mi tau) . 
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What therefore caused the slump from a seemingly impregnable 
position i n 1936 to disaster i n the years to come? 
A major reason f o r this decline, was the lossto the party of 
i t s two best vote-getters, Floyd B.Olson and Henrik Shipstead, between 
1936 and 194°» Olson died of cancer, whilst Senator Shipstead returned 
to his former Republican allegiance, to represent them fo r a further 
term of o f f i ce on Capitol H i l l . The isola t ionis t Lundeen was also lost 
to the party, being k i l l e d i n an air-crash i n 194£>> but by then the party 
structure was crumbling badly. 
The actual break up of the constituent elements of the party was a 
further contributing factor i n the party's loss of electoral success. 
Benson lacked the s k i l l of Olson, who was able to forge one organisation 
from rura l agrarians and urban indus t r ia l workers. The constituent 
halves of the party were allowed to d r i f t their separate ways. Nor was 
the sp l i t confined to the rank-and-file members of the party, fo r the 
party hierarchy was i t s e l f sp l i t . The 193S Farmer-Labour primary f o r 
Governor of Minnesota, between incumbent Governor Elmer A.Benson, and 
former Lieutenant-Governor Hjalmar Petersen, emerged as l i t t l e more 
than a f i r s t class mud-slinging match, which could only harm rather 
than cleanse the party. Benson secured the nomination, but any vote-
getting appeal that he once possessed had been irreparably damaged.1. 
Thus the Farmer-Labour party had only i t s e l f to blame as i t 
now stood awaiting the f a t a l knock-out blow. This was mercifully 
swi f t , and l e f t the people of Minnesota i n no doubt that Farmer-
Labour rule was ended. I t was delivered by Harold E, Stassen, who 
1. See Kar l F. Rolvaag (Himself DFL Governor of Minnesota ,^63-7) 
i n "Minnesota - A History of the State". p f l j 
Theodore C.ELegen. 
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i n defeating Elmer A, Benson by the largest majority received by a 
Minnesota governor up to that time, to become, at thirty-one years 
of age, the nation's youngest governor.1. 
The party of Floyd B.Olson was now dead. However, one more 
of his dreams was yet to be f u l f i l l e d , the s t i l l closer co-operation 
with the Democratic party. Since 1932 Farmer-Labourites had co-operated 
with the Democrats on a national leve l . In 1944 the twj r i v a l organisations 
joined to form the Democratic-Farmer-Jjabour party as the one united f ront 
against Republicanism 2, and immediately found what they had been searching 
fo r , a new attractive vote-getter. His name was Hubert H. Humphrey, and 
so attractive did he prove to the electorate that he served as Vice-
President of the United States from 1965-9, and i n 1963 i n the closest 
Presidential Election of the Century lost to Former Vice-President Richard 
M.Nixon by only a few thousand votes, each candidate being credited with 
43.9$ of the popular vote, t ru ly a sign that the much needed fusion of 
the two parties has produced a new generation of radical pol i t ic ians, 
whom the Republicans of Minnesota must now fear as they did their 
predecessors, t h i r t y years ago. 
1. "Polit ics i n Minnesota". G.Theodore Mitau. 
2. "An Introduction to American Pol i t ics" . D.W. Brogan. P j / 
CHAPTER I I 
States' Rights Po l i t i cs i n the South 
Introduction 
Prior to 1966, the Republican Party, the party of Lincoln 
and the abolition of slavery, held only a preoarious foothold 
i n the Southern states. The Demooratic Parly, the party of "Dixie* 
reigned supreme* The f i f t e e n Southern and border states remained 
f o r nearly eighty years a one-party t e r r i t o r y . This waa not to say, 
however, that the national Demooratic party could depend on Southern 
support at a l l times, i t could not, and neither can i t do so today. 
This chapter therefore i s a study of the one ocoasion when part 
of the South has refused to support the national Democratic presidential 
oandidate, 1, and the recent state of a f fa i r s whereby former Governor 
George C. Wallace of Alabama, a man whom many p o l i t i c a l columnists 
contemptuously wrote o f f as •Alabama*s Apostle of Discontent*2, gained 
the largest vote ever reoeived by a th i rd party candidate, i n the 
Presidential Election of 1968. 
1 . I n 1948 when Governor Strom Thurmond of South Carolina 
opposed the incumbent Democrat, Harry S. Truman. 
2. "The Observer1*. November, 12, 1967. 
I - The Disieorat Rebellion of 1948 
So the casual observer, the Dixieorat bol t i n 1948 was a hasty 
a f f a i r , whereby the Democratic convention delegations of South Carolina, 
Alabama, and Mississippi quite suddenly decided to quit the Demooratio 
Party and nominate the i r own oandidate f o r President* I n faot the 
seeds of revolt were sown i n the Presidential campaign of four years 
ear l ier , when groups opposed to Franklin D. Roosevelt i n the states 
of Mississippi, Taxaa, and South Carolina, succeeded i n blocking the 
re-nomination of Henry Wallace as Demooratio Vice-*re sidential oandidate, 
and reduced the popular vote margin i n the November election to the 
narrowest f o r twenty-eight years* 1 # 
E£y 1947* under the influenoe of President Truman, a Southerner 
generally considered to be more conservative than hl3 predecessor, 
Roosevelt, the country seemed to be moving to the right* However* 
there were many undercurrents. She most important was the increasing 
restivenesa of the negro, fol lowing World War I I , and whilst many 
Southerners had crusaded f o r Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms", no-one had 
ever considered that they should be extended to the negro race* 
Coupled wi th t h i s restiveness was the f ao t even larger numbers of 
negroes followed those who had previously migrated t o the North*2* 
HOT was the negro alone i n pleading his case, f o r he was 
aided by such diverse groups as Communists, labour leaders, newspapermen, 
minority leaders and Northern pol i t ic ians , including former VioeHPresident 
Henry Wallace, the presidential oandidate of the People's Progressive 
Party* She Northern Negro vote became p o l i t i c a l l y more important than 
/ ° / / S 
1* "She Demooratio Party i n American Pol i t i cs" • Ralph M.Goldman* 
2* "She South Since 1865". John Samual Ezall* P/<ft 
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that of the White South 1* I t was thus to appease the negro, and also 
to combat the Wallace movement, that President Truman appointed a Committee 
an C i v i l Rights*2* whose report was published on 29th October, 1947* 
She report made four basic recommendations* F i r s t l y , sweeping 
aotion by the Truman Administration to end most forms of rac ia l segregation* 
Secondly, a Federal anti-lynching law, f o r although lynohings were 
d-fwrfri^Mng i n number, few attempts had ever been made by Southern 
authorities to convict any white c i t izen of lynching a negro, and 
as Cabell Ph i l l ips noted i n 1946, "There has never been a successful 
federal proseoution of lynching per see*" 5* Thirdly i t recommended 
the aboli t ion of p o l l taxes and the end of "white" primary elections, 
and l a s t ly i t proposed a Federal Fa i r Employment Praotioes Act* 
Truman referred to these recommendations as an "American Charter 
of Human Freedom" and asked f o r immediately Congressional Implementation, 
a decision welcomed nationally, although not i n the South* To 
Southerners these recommendations seemed l i t t l e less than a declaration 
1 . "The South since 1865"* John Samuel Ezell* 
2* The composition of th is committee, thir teen Northerners 
against two Southerners, alienated many people i n the South, 
who considered the Committee's f indings a foregone conclusion, 
even before i t had met* 
5* Ar t i c l e by Cabell Ph i l l ips i n the "New York Times"1 - August 5, 
1946. 
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of war against the region, by one of their own native sons.l. 
Governor William M. Tuck of Virginia declared that federal policy, 
i f continued, would result "in the virtual abolition of the states", 
whilst Governor Fielding Wright in his inaugural address as the chief 
executive of the state of Mississippi went so far as to cal l for a 
break with the Democratic Party i f i t s leaders continued to try 
"to wreck the South and our institutions".2. Such opinions were backed 
by the oi l interests of the region who were unhappy with federal 
efforts to regulate the industry, and also the Supreme Court decision 
in the tidelands o i l cases, whereby offshore o i l deposits were deemed 
to be federal property.3. 
White Southern militancy took a further step when Governor Wright 
took the fight to the Southern Governor's Conference, a body organised 
in 1937 to secure co-operation in the solution of common regional 
problems. Wright demanded that the Conference take a stand against 
any further efforts to enact c iv i l rights legislation, and cal l a 
"Southern Conference of true Democrats" to plan a course of action.4. 
The majority of Governors however were not as extreme as Wright, and 
decided f i r s t to approach the Chairman of the Democratic National 
Committee to see i f he would consider using his influence to have 
the controversial legislation withdrawn, and secondly i f he would favour 
a return to the two-thirds rule.5. On. both these counts the Governors' 
1. Prior to his nomination as Vice-Presidential candidate in 
1944* Truman had represented his home state, Missouri, in the 
Senate. 
2. "The South since 1865". John Samuel Ezel l . ^ 
3. "Third Party Movements in the United States". William B.Hesseltine. 
4. "The South since 1865". John Samuel Ezel l . P ^ / f 
5. The rule whereby candidates at the Democratic Convention had 
to secure two-thirds of the delegates votes, before nomination. 
I t was abolished in 1936. Southerners saw in i t a chance to 
block any nomination which they themselves did not favour. 
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requests were turned down. 
Southern anxiety was temporarily relieved, however, when Congress 1 
f a i l ed to pass, the desired laws. Jubilation turned to despair when 
Truman announced his intention to campaign f o r re-election on the 
issue. The Southern Governor's having t r i ed moderation now decided 
to back Wright* s policy of militancy, and recommended state Demooratic 
conventions to go on record as opposing the nomination, i n 1948 of 
Truman, or any other candidate known to favour c i v i l r ights .2 . 
Such an announcement served only to cause internal s t r i f e i n 
the Democratic organisations of the Southern states, between those 
who yielded to pressure from the Southern Governor*s Conference, and 
those who did not. 
The Alabama delegation was pledged to vote against any nominee 
unsatisfactory on c i v i l r ights , half of them pledging themselves to 
walk out of the National Convention i f the platform included a c i v i l 
rights plank similar to that already proposed by the Truman Adndnistration.S. 
Meanwhile the Mississippi State Democratic Executive Committee 
oailed a regional meeting of " a l l true white Jeffersonian Democrats.*, 
those who supported the policy of states* r ights , and opposed the trend 
of the national party.4. At the Conference, held on May 10th, 1948, 
at Jackson, Mississippi, and dominated by delegations from the home state 
and South Carolina, i t was resolved to oa l l upon each state to choose 
delegates and presidential electors opposed to the objectives of the 
Truman Administration. Should the c i v i l rights programme be adopted 
at the Democratic national convention i t was resolved to hold another 
1 . Referred to by Professor D.W.Brogan as the 'Do-Nothing* 
Congress. "An Introduction to American Poli t ios" ' . D.W.Brogan. 
2. "The South since 1865". John Samuel Eze l l . 
3. I b i d . 
4 . I b i d . & *f<) 
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meeting, to be held i n Birmingham, Alabama, i n order to plan future 
3trategy.l. 
The National Demooratio Convention of 1948, held i n Philadelphia 
was ably controlled by Truman*3 managers, who were unwilling to y i e l d 
to the demands of the Southern fac t ion , but who were w i l l i n g to compromise 
with the Dixieorats, by offering a weak c i v i l rights plank. Even 
th i s was unacceptable to both Southerner, and at the other extreme, 
radio a l Northerner, and was accordingly defeated by 651^ votes to 582^. 
The majority of delegates then supported a more radical plank, proposed 
by Hubert H. Humphrey, the Mayor of Minneapolis seconded by representative 
Andrew J . Beimiller of Wisconsin and endorsed by other l iberals , 
including that powerful new pressure group, "Americans f o r Democratic 
Action*, which urged Truman to enact his once-rejected c i v i l rights 
programme.2. 
Even moderate Southerners, and J.Strom Thurmond was considered by 
many Southerners to be a moderate, were stunned at this action, which 
provoked a walk-out of 35 delegates, mainly from the states of Alabama 
gnd Mississippi»2. I t must be stressed that not a l l of the Southern 
delegations at f i r s t bolted the party, indeed many delegates s t i l l 
considered i t the i r duty to t ry to impose the i r w i l l upon the party 
u n t i l the l as t . Accordingly this group f i r s t t r i ed to block the 
renomination of Truman by unit ing behind Richard B. Russell of Georgia.4. 
This however f a i l e d , as did the i r e f fo r t s to diotate the Vice-Pre sidential 
nomination, the vacant half of the Democratic t i cke t . This went to 
Senator Alben Barkely of Kentucky, who, l ike Truman, was a Southerner 
w i l l i n g to support the national party platform. 
1 . "The South Since 1865". John Samuel Eze l l . ^ 
2. "The Democratic Party i n AmeriomPolitios .Ralph M. Goldman. 4 
3. "Sinoe 1900". O.J.Barok and N.M.Blake. Pjif 
4. "The South Since 1865". John Samuel Eze l l . / V / ^ 
On July 17th, 1948, two days af ter the end of the National 
Convention, a conference was held i n Birmingham, Alabama, mainly 
attended by many of Mississippi's p o l i t i c a l leaders, a group of 
Alabama conservatives, a number of supporters of J.Strom Thurmond 
of South Carolina, and several curious local c i t izens .1 . The 
majority were; themselves p o l i t i c a l l y unimportant, these being the 
average Southern segregationists who considered the national Democratic 
party to be anti-Southern, whilst the Republicans, led by Governor 
Thomas Dewey of New York, were l i t t l e better regarding c i v i l r ights, 
as well as being handicapped by i t s , then, t radi t ional stigma i n the 
region.2. The group thus deoided to run an independent t icket i n the 
ooming Presidential eleotion, and, wi th this end i n mind, the States' 
Rights Party was formed. Af t e r manoeuvres that indicated l i t t l e of 
democracy, but much behind the scenes control, Governor J .Strom 
Thurmond of South Carolina and Governor Fielding Fright of Mississippi 
were unanimously nominated as Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates 
respectively, of the new party.3. The programme was contained i n a 
"Declaration of Principles", whose main theme was the rejeotion of 
1 . "Since 1900". O.J.Barok and N.M.Blake. /* 
2. A stigma which i s now reoeeding, especially following the 
mid-term elections of 1966. Even J.Strom Thurmond now 
represents South Carolina i n the Senate as a Republican. 
3. "The South since 1865". John Samuel Eze l l . / V / ? 
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national interference into what the South considered were solely state 
affairs. 
The Dixiecrats, as they became known, never seriously considered 
they could win the election, having, as they did, the support of 
only half of the former Confederacy, let alone the entire United 
States. Their actual aims however have never been clearly resolved, 
although i t i s known that they were hoping for a close election, with 
no candidate gaining an overall electoral college majority, thus 
throwing the election into the House of Representatives.l. Some 
authorities suggest that the Dixieorats would then rest content 
on their laurels, having persuaded the national Democratic party that 
i t needed Southern votes to secure the popular eleotion of a President. 
A further contention i s that having thrown the election into the 
House, the Dixiecrats hoped to elect one of their number President. 
Such a manoeuvre could only succeed of course i f the Democrats were 
convinoed that a Southern Democrat was preferable to a Republican.2. 
These however were mere hypotheses. Such a strategy only had a 
chance i f Henry Wallace, oandidate of the People's Progressive Party, 
and himself a former Democrat, bit heavily into the left-tfing Democratic 
vote, whilst the states of the former Confederacy united behind Thurmond.5. 
Despite the unpopularity of Truman in the South, the Dixieorats 
f aoed a hard task. First ly Thurmond was neither personally nor 
politically strong outside his home state of South Carolina. Further, 
the States' Rights Party was suspected by Southern liberals, who 
1. "Third Party Movements in the United States". William B.Hesseltine. 
2. "The South sinoe 1865". John Samuel Eze l l . P ¥ x o 
5. "Third Party Movements in the United States". William B. Hesseltine. 
1948 Presidential Election. 
States marked Red cast ballots 
in the Electoral College for 
the States' Sights Party Ticket. 
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themselves were usually segregationists, of being reactionary. Thirdly 
many Southerners considered the movement wa3 flouting the most sacred 
Southern tradition: the necessity for the Democratic Party, and 
lastly, and perhaps most important of a l l , politicians remembered 
the political fate of the leaders who had bolted in the so-called 
•Hooverorat* rebellion of 1928, and shuddered at the possible loss 
of patronage.l. 
On many ocoasions the Dixieorats insisted that they were not a 
third party, but as Governor Wright said they were "the true Demoorats 
of the Southland and these United States.2. Even so they were s t i l l 
unable to unite the Southern wing of the Demooratio party behind them. 
I n view of these faotors, why then did the movement fa i l ? Doubtless 
i t was because Thurmond failed to appeal to the South as a whole, only 
succeeding in the "Black Belt", that is the areas of greatest Negro 
concentration, whose people were agriared at Truman1 s polioies on race 
and agriculture, and in the large industrial oentres, where the electorate 
was dismayed at the Administrations policies on labour and business.3. 
1. "The South sinoe 1865". John Samuel E z e l l , ^V*?o 
2. Nor was this untrue for in the states oarried by the 
Dixieorats at the 1948 election, the bolters were legally 
the offioial Democratic party of the South of the state, 
differing from the national Democratic tioket only in the 
ohoioe of emblem, choosing the Rooster rather than the more ^ / f 
usual Ass. (D.W.Brogan - "An Introduction to Amerioan Politics"). 
5. "An Introduction to Amerioan Politios". D.W.Brogan. />/> 7^ / 
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Z& general the people of the South were not yet ready f o r a f u l l scale 
revolt against the Democratic party. Despite the unre l iab i l i ty of the 
Truman Administration on the race issue, the electorate was unwilling 
to go to the Republicans, or vote f o r a t h i rd party. The Dixieorat 
revolt never real ly existed, f o r i n the four states carried by Thurmond 
and Wright, the Dixiecrats had been successful i n having the i r 
candidates declared the representatives of the Democratic p a r t y . l . 
Even had Thurmond surmounted a l l the previously mentioned 
obstacles, he s t i l l f a i l e d to surmount the biggest obstacle of a l l , 
the p o l i t i c a l apathy of the Southern electorate. Due to the t rad i t ion 
of the South being a one-party region, the basic characteristic of 
elections i n the area has been one of non-participation. Even i n 
the b i t t e r election of 1948 the highest voting percentage of any 
Southern state was the 39$ shared j o i n t l y by the states of Florida 
and North Carolina.2. 
I n 1967, Grover CHal l i n "The Richmond News Leader* 3. 
recalls the Thurmond candidature of 1948 as "a foredoomed Impotent 
wheeze", a statement which ably sums up the s i tuat ion. Such then are 
the basic reasons f o r Thurmond*s f a i l u r e , but we must now turn to 
1* Thurmond carried South Carolina, Mississippi, Louisiana, 
and Alabama* The f i r s t two voted f o r the Dixieorats 
because Thurmond and Wright were favourite - son candidates* 
Professor V.O.Key i n his book "Southern Poli t ics" ' considers 
Thurmond oarried Alabama and Louisiana only because of 
manoeuvres making him the Democratic nomine 
2. Compared to a national average of 52^. 
3. Reprinted i n "The Montgomery Independent" May 17, 1967* 
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I I The Candidature of George C. Wallace 
"George Corley Wallace of Alabama i s a candidate f o r the 
presidency of the united States. 
He leaves himself an out — " i f " either of the two major 
national parties adopts a platform embodying the position he 
advocates, then he w i l l withdraw/. But as; of now he intends to 
run". 
I t was with these words that "The Birmingham News", one of 
Alabama's major newspapers 1 . introduced an ar t ic le headed 'George 
Wallace: candidate f o r President** Whilst the majority of this 
paper has been ooncerned with evaluating the role of past minority 
movements, th i s ohapter mainly deals with contemporary po l i t ios wi th in 
the United States. 
Nine months af ter the publication of th i s a r t i c l e , Wallace 
appeared at a press conference i n Washington, where he announoed 
his not unexpected candidacy f o r the off ice of President of the 
United States 2. Suoh an announcement had real ly been a formali ty 
since A p r i l , 1967, when on a television interview he considered the 
proposed oandidatures of such conservative Republicans as former 
Vice-President Richard M.Nixon, and Governor Ronald Reagan of 
California as p o l i t i c a l l y unacceptable to him.5. From that moment 
Wallace was a candidate i n the 1968 Presidential Election* 
1. "The Birmingham News". May 21st, 1967. 
2. February, 8th, 1968. 
5* Reply to Mr.David Broder on N.B.C's "Meet the Press*, 
25rd A p r i l , 1967, 
1 8 4 . 
George C •Wallace was eleoted Governor of Alabama, as a 
southern Democrat strongly i n favour of segregation of whites and 
negroes, i n 1962, and served the maximum period allowed within the 
state constitution, one term of four years* Unable to succeed 
himself, and unable to amend the constitution to provide f o r any 
succession, Wallace supported the candidature of his wi fe , Lurleen, 
f o r Chief Exeoutive of the state* Mrs.Wallace won an overwhelming 
viotory, and served as head of state of Alabama u n t i l her death i n 
May, 1968* Her husband, who drew an annual salary of one dollar a 
year as the Governor's chief advisor, s t i l l remained f i r m l y i n command 
a 3 head of the government* 
One month a f te r his wi fe ' s successful candidature, Wallace said 
" I have made no f i r m plans regarding my future p o l i t i c a l e f f o r t s except 
that I have no intention of relenting my e f f o r t s to reverse the trends 
i n th is oountry which are detrimental to our constitutional government 
and state*a severeignty n*l* Such a statement of course i s open to a 
wide amount of interpretations, but even then there was l i t t l e doubt 
that should no oandidate suitable to Wallace be proposed by either the 
Republican or Democratic party then he, himself, would stand* 
Nor i s Mr J? a l l ace a stranger to Presidential party pol i t ics* 
Prior to the Republican nomination of Senator Barry Goldwater i n 1964, 
the Alabamian had every intention of running f o r President that year* 
Although he did not eventually run, the votes he gained i n the Democratic 
1* Letter to C.K*Sumner, December, 28th, 1966* 
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primaries i n 1964, may hare prompted him to ran i n 1968* Two 
important results favourable to Wallace, ooourred i n the primary 
elections of Wisconsin and Maryland* I n Maryland, a border 
Southern state wi th a large Roman Catholio vote, which might have 
been expected to oppose him, Wallace gained 45$ of the t o t a l vote 
oast, i n a contest involving three candidates.1* I n the state of 
Wisconsin, the home-state of both the l ibe ra l l a Follette family 
and the "red-*aiting" Senator Joe McCarthy, Wallace took 54JS of the 
vote i n the Democratic primary,2. whilst i f one takes into consideration 
the combined to t a l of the Republican and Demooratic primaries, Wallace 
gained an outstanding 25$ of the popular vote, with three candidates 
running* Both of these results were achieved with a minimum of 
organisation. I n the four years to 1968 Wallaoe, i f anything, 
gained inpopularity outside of his home region and by now he had 
the well-oi led machinery of the "Wallace Campaign"' behind him* 
Early public opinion polls showed Wallace capable of securing 
the largest number of Electoral College votes ever gained by a t h i r d 
party candidate i n the twentieth century* A ga l l up Po l l taken i n 
October, 1966, gave Wallace 1% of the national vote, by A p r i l , 1967, 
th is f igure had risen to 15$, 5* Naturally such a f igure was a national 
average. I n his Southern homeland Wallace emerged not as a t h i r d party 
1* "The Montgomery Independent? May 17th, 1967. 
2. I b i d . 
S. These figures were quoted by Mr .James J*Kilpatriok 
of the "Richmond News Leader" on N.B.C*s "Meet the 
Press", A p r i l 23rd, 1967. 
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candidate but aa a oandidate of the f r o n t rank* The same 
Gallup Po l l showed that i n a three-cornered f i g h t between Wallace 
and Governor George Romney of Michigan, and incumbent President 
Lyndon B«Johnson, both of whom were to re t i re from the contest 
early i n 1968, the former Governor of Alabama stood to win a l l 
the former Confederate states, including Johnson's own state of 
Texas, plus the states of Oklahoma and Kentucky, a t o t a l of thir teen 
states, and 145 electoral oollege votes.1, Some commentators might 
oonsider th is p o l l to be now of l i t t l e value, fol lowing the withdrawal 
of both Johnson and Romney, however, i t does serve to show Wallace's 
potential i n a three-cornered contest wi th a l i b e r a l and a conservative. 
Failure to gain the votes of the border states, and only take the 
Solid South, l e f t a very real poss ib i l i ty that Wallace's intervention 
would force the Presidential eleotion into the House of Representatives 
f o r only the t h i r d time i n American history. 
Some psephologists disagreed with t h i s , considering that should 
Wallace stand, his oandidature would have harmed the Republican 
candidate, Richard Nixon, so much aa to ensure the election of 
Hubert H#Humphery, the Demooratio oandidate. Wallace himself 
always considered such an assumption to be wrongly based, saying, 
"We are going to hurt the Republicans i n the South, but we're going 
to hurt the Democrats i n the North, beoause my strongest support comes 
1* Quoted by Mr*James J . Kilpatriok of the "Richmond News 
Leader" on N.B.C's "Meet the Press"1, A p r i l , 23rd, 1967. 
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from organised labour, working people, i n the North, and they nave 
t radi t ional ly voted the Democratic tioket*" 1* 
When he announced his independent oandidacy at Washington, 
Wallace said he was a oandidate beoause "'the typical Amerioan of a l l 
races i s t i r e d of r io ts - of crime running rampant i n every c i t y of 
our nation* • • • • • We must have a nation where-in our States are able 
to run thei r a f f a i r s . . . . . without receiving directives from Washington* 
We must have a nation which w i l l not tolerate defiance of i t s national 
security by those wi th in who of fe r aid and comfort to our enemies1'• 
He claimed he would also "keep the peace i f I had to keep 50,000 troops 
standing on the streets, two feet apart and with twonfoot-long bayonets".2. 
Such cal ls tended to be popular with the conservative, G-od-fearing 
and law abiding sector of the Amerioan community which i s ever anxious 
to preserve a peaceful status quo i n a violent society* Many Amerioans 
however did not have too much d i f f i c u l t y i n separating genuine e f fo r t s 
at urban peace through racial harmony, from Wallace's blusterings wi th 
their oblique States' Rights references. Inference i s not one of 
Wallace's more noted s k i l l s , he I s too abrupt, as when he goes on to 
say that the "so-called c i v i l rights laws are real ly an attack on the 
property rights of th i s country, and on the free enterprise system and 
1 . "The Birmingham News". May 21st, 1967* 
2* Keesings Contemporary Archives, A p r i l 27th - May 4th, 1968* 
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looal government .... and I would try to have them changed i n Congress".1, 
Almost immediately following his Washington Press Conference, 
supporter Si of Wallace i n several states formed a group under the 
t i t l e of the American Independent Party, i n an effort f i r s t of a l l 
to get their candidate on the ballot of a l l 50 states.2. 
For many months before his announced candidacy he had a 
flourishing campaign headquarters i n Montgomery, Alabama* His 
financial support, he claimed came from the man i n the street, and 
not from any of the great Southern millionaires such as H.L.Hunt. He 
omits however that of the jL 396,000 raised for his oampaign i n 1964, 
large sums of money were contributed not by w orking-ol as a men, but by 
some of the mora prominent Southern bankers* Wallace quite obviously 
has the Southern financial connections* 
Whilst denying large-scale financial contributions to his 
oampaign, Wallace did not deny that his campaign was- not one of 
faceless men without leaders* He did not however say specifically 
who these leaders were, short of saying his candidature was bacted by 
a number of Congressmen and Senators»5* His major support, however, 
came from the man i n the street, or as P o l i t i c a l Analyst Richard Scammon 
1* Bee sing's Contemporary Archives, A p r i l 27th - May 4th, 1968* 
2* She Distriot of Columbia*s requirements proved too tough and 
not conducive to the growth of Third Parties ("Time" March, 1st, 
1968). 
3* Strom Thurmond refused to support Wallace, preferring to 
endorse the candidature of Richard Nixon, who reciprocated 
by naming as. his running-mate, Governor Spiro T*Agnew of 
the border state of Maryland* 
1963 P r e s i d e n t i a l E l e c t i o n . 
States marked i n Red are those 
won try the American Independence 
Party. 
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pointed out, the low-inoome white voters .1* Undoubtedly Wallace 
made large inroads into the Northern vote, but his p o l i t i c a l views 
were s t i l l abhorred by many liberals who talk of George Wallace and 
the Selma March i n the same breath; and i n the year that the Reverend 
Martin Luther King J nr., and Senator Robert Kennedy were both 
assassinated, t h i s association could have been eapeoially damaging 
to Wallace • 
I n the f i n a l analysis Wallace gained over 9 minion popular 
votes for a total of 46 electoral oollege votes* I n a year that 
favoured the conservative Wallace and his running mate, former Mr-
Force General Curtis le May, were out manoeuvred by Richard Nixon 
who managed to gain many of the votes Wallace hoped to take on the 
issue of law and order, whilst doubtless i n the end Wallace lost many 
votes because of his continued references to states rights* 
Nothing daunted, however, Wallace campaigns on* He i s now 
looking towards 1972 and a further confrontation with Richard Nixon* 
There i s l i t t l e to suggest, however, that a Wallace oandidature i n 
1972 w i l l have the same worrying affect upon major party professionals 
as i t did i n 1968* The main reason for this i s that the somewhat 
antique Electoral College eleotion system w i l l probably be changed i n 
time for the next Presidential eleotion* Tentative suggestions for 
changing the system have been put forward by the defeated Demooratio 
Vice-Presidential candidate, Senator Edmund Muskie* 
Wallace has already secured a niche i n Amerioan history, i t 
now remains for the public and the historians to say whether his name 
be immortalised as Wallace of Selma or Wallace the man who almost 
preoipitated a constitutional c r i s i s i n 1968* 
1. Time" - March 1st, 1968. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the most part, this paper has concerned i t s e l f with failure, 
the failure of a succession of parties to impose their w i l l and ideals 
upon the majority of the electorate of the United States* I t i s the 
intention here to try and find out why no third party succeeded i n 
gaining the oonfidenoe of the majority of the American electorate so 
far this century. 
American politioal parties oannot be judged i n British, or 
European terms, mainly because of the rapid disappearance i n the United 
States of the kind of issue that provided the raw material of European 
politios. She United States has never had a dispute concerning the form 
of the American state as each party has sought to defend that institutional* 
Thus a new party has always had to be conscious of the faot that whilst i t 
could advocate reform, i t could not advocate reform of the state* This 
of course proved a l i a b i l i t y to the more socialist minded parties* 
However, one could not even remotely associate the oandidature of 
Theodore Roosevelt with the revolutionary principles of left-wing 
socialism* What then was the cause of the complete failure en bloc 
of American third parties? 
The answer to this question I f e e l i s provided i n a statement 
made i n 1910 by the Socialist, Morris H i l l quit, who was quoted as 
saying:-
"But what makes i t (American politics) s t i l l more di f f i c u l t i s 
1* "American Politioal Parties: Their Natural History 0. Wilfred E. Binkley* flp / y 
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the system of 'party tickets' i n elections Local, state and 
national eleotions are most frequently held together, and the tioket 
handed to the voter sometimes oontains the names not only of candidates 
for the state legislature or congress, but also for a l l local and state 
affairs and even for President of the United States* And since a 
new party rarely seems to have the chance of prospect of electing 
i t s candidate for governor or president of the country, the voter 
i s inclined i n advance to consider i t s entire tioket as hopeless* 
The fear of 'throwing away* the vote i s thus a peouliar product of 
American pol i t i c s and i t requires a voter of exceptional strength 
of conviction to overcome i t * " 1* 
Hilquit thus blames the long ballot for the i l l s of third party 
movements, and the present writer would certainly agree with him with 
regard to national third parties with continuous aspirations of taking -
over the government of the country* Such a conclusion i s emphasised 
by the number of occasions a third party wins a by-election where l i t t l e 
i n the way of electing a government i s at stake, only to lose i t at the 
next general eleotion when the voter considers he has a greater 
responsibility. 
With regard to the Socialists, Hilquit also considered state 
autonomy to have hindered their growth, because the most v i t a l industrial 
and social problems of the oountry were being dealt with by the separate 
legislatures, and not by the federal authorities as a corporate body* 
1* "American Socialism 1900-1960". H*Wayne Morgan. * 4>Jy( "'7 A 
1,92, 
The failure of many parties and presidential candidatures of 
course can be attributed to lack of 'grass roots' organisation, 
a bolting faction often finds i t has gifted and able leaders, but 
few rank-and-file members, and because of the haste i n which i t i s 
organised, l i t t l e i n the way of precinct, ward, county, or even state 
organisations. This lack of organisation also meant that for the most 
part many of the third parties were financially poor.! To launch a 
Presidential campaign of serious proportions, even f i f t y years ago, 
cost more than any third party, with the possible exception of the "Ball 
Moose" Progressives, possessed. The whole p o l i t i c a l and constitutional 
make-up of the United States works against the gradual growth, or decline 
of p o l i t i c a l parties. Break-up of parties are swift, with the broken 
parts often forming the nucleus of a new party. Thus many third 
parties, as we have seen, have fought one or possibly two campaigns, 
and then faded back into p o l i t i c a l obscurity-, the exception of course 
being that of the Socialists, who declined gradually, with one brief 
respite during the Great Depression, i n the years following the F i r s t 
World War. Just as third parties were formed from dissenting factions 
of one of the major parties, so were they eventually absorbed back into 
the fold. Some factions pleaded for re-admittance because they saw 
that a better way of influencing American politics was not by forming 
a new party, but by striving to influence the members of an existing 
party. Such politicians realised i t was easier to try and take over 
an existing organisation, than to build a new one from scratch. The 
major parties for their part were equally eager that such movements 
should quickly rejoin the parent organisation, and could be seen to 
offer compromises and rewards, to tempt the dissidents into restoring 
the two-party balance. Thus both major and minor parties could be 
seen striving to compromise, and i n doing so, AUnrf rig the at-once 
ir r i t a t i n g third party. I n what spheres therefore, i f any, did the 
third parties succeed? As with minority parties i n a l l democracies, 
the third parties i n the United States served a useful function i n 
promoting new government ideas and programmes, the sum total of which 
are too numerous to mention. I n fact i n this respect third parties 
are the laboratories of politics, serving as pilot plants for new ideas 
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which are invariably stolen and patented by one of the major parties. 
Had William Jennings Bryan seen the New Deal he would li k e l y have been 
satisfied with i t s intentions and achievements. Eugene 7. Debs would 
have likewise no doubt expressed satisfaction i f he could see today 
the results of the combined efforts of the C.I.G. - A.F.L., whilst I 
do not consider i t wild to predict that had many of the Old Chard 
Socialists, "Wobblies" and New Nationalism Progressives seen the New 
Deal, the majority would have voted Democrat. 
Apart from promoting new policies, there have been occasions 
when lesser parties have spawned leaders for either of the two major 
parties. The more anient of these were essentially products of 
the nineteenth century, Thurlow Weed, Thaddeus Stevens, and Charles 
Sumner, although there have been a number of instances i n this century, 
notably William Jennings Bryan, former Presidential candidate of both 
the Populist and Democratic parties, Upton Sinclair, who contested the 
Californian gubernatorial election, as f i r s t l y a Socialist, and l a t t e r l y 
a Democrat, and f i n a l l y Henrik Shipstead, the former Minneaotan Republican, 
who secured p o l i t i c a l fame as a Farmer-JLabour Senator, before returning 
to the Republican fold. The converse i s also true, i n that i t has 
enabled former leaders of the major parties, either embittered or 
frustrated, to lead revolts against their former colleagues, this theme 
being the essence of the three Progressive parties, and, i n that he 
revolted against the national leadership of his party, Governor Thurmond. 
Most of a l l , however, the third parties have, albeit unwittingly, 
served to strengthen the two party system. Each of the major parties 
i n American politics, because of their loose organisation and composition, 
represented many ideas, interests and purposes* Because of this, opinions, 
programmes, and often candidates, were compromises arranged by the party-
leaders. I t was through such compromises and considerations that the 
United States retained i t s unified image. Essentially i t was government 
by unanimity, and i n their curious way the third parties contributed to 
the p o l i t i c a l and governmental harmony which has brought success to the 
American democratic system. 
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The conscience of the people, i n a time of grave national problems, 
has c a l l e d into being a new party, born of the nation's sense of j u s t i c e . 
We of the Progressive party here dedicate ourselves to the f u l f i l l m e n t 
of the duty l a i d upon us by our fathers to maintain the government of the 
people, by the people and f o r the people whose foundations they l a i d .... 
The Old P a r t i e s 
P o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s e x i s t to secure responsible government and to 
execute the w i l l of the people. 
From these great tasks both of the old p a r t i e s have turned aside. 
Instead of instruments to promote the general welfare, they have become 
the tools of corrupt i n t e r e s t s which use them i m p a r t i a l l y to serve t h e i r 
s e l f i s h purposes. Behind the ostensible government s i t s enthroned an 
i n v i s i b l e government owing no allegiance and acknowledging no r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 
to the people. 
To destroy t h i s i n v i s i b l e government, to dissolve the unholy 
a l l i a n c e between corrupt business and corrupt p o l i t i c s i s the f i r s t task 
of the statesmanship of the day. 
The deliberate betrayal of i t s t r u s t by the Republican party, the 
f a t a l incapacity of the Democratic party to deal with the new i s s u e s of 
the new time, have compelled the people to forge a new instrument of 
government through which to give e f f e c t to t h e i r w i l l i n laws and 
i n s t i t u t i o n s . 
Unhampered by t r a d i t i o n , uncorrupted by power, undismayed by the 
magnitude of the task, the new party offers i t s e l f as the instrument of 
the people to sweep away old abuses, to build a new and nobler commonwealth. 
The Rule of the People 
.... I n p a r t i c u l a r , the party declares f o r d i r e c t primaries f o r the 
nomination of State and National o f f i c e r s , for nation-wide p r e f e r e n t i a l 
primaries f o r candidates f o r the presidency; f o r the d i r e c t election of 
United States Senators by the people; and we urge on the States the 
policy of the short ballot, with r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to the people secured by 
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the i n i t i a t i v e , referendum and r e c a l l .... 
Equal Suffrage 
The Progressive party, believing that no people can j u s t l y claim 
to be a true democracy, which denies p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s on account of sex, 
pledges i t s e l f to the task of securing equal suffrage to men and women a l i k e . 
Corrupt P r a c t i c e s 
We pledge our party to l e g i s l a t i o n that w i l l compel s t r i c t l i m i t a t i o n 
of a l l campaign contributions and expenditures, and detailed p u b l i c i t y 
of both before as well as a f t e r primaries and elections. 
P u b l i c i t y and Public Service 
We pledge our party to l e g i s l a t i o n compelling the r e g i s t r a t i o n of 
lobbyists, p u b l i c i t y of committee hearings except on foreign a f f a i r s , 
and recording of a l l votes i n committee; and forbidding federal appointees 
from holding o f f i c e i n State or National p o l i t i c a l organizations, or taking 
part as o f f i c e r s or delegates i n p o l i t i c a l conventions for the nomination 
of e l e c t i v e State or National o f f i c i a l s . 
The Courts 
The Progressive party demands such r e s t r i c t i o n of the power of the 
courts as s h a l l leave to the people the ultimate authority to determine 
fundamental questions of s o c i a l welfare and public policy. To secure 
t h i s end, i t pledges i t s e l f to provide: 
1. That when an Act, passed under the police power of the State, i s 
held unconstitutional under the State Constitution, by the courts, 
the people, a f t e r an ample i n t e r v a l for deliberation, s h a l l have an 
opportunity to vote on the question whether they desire the Act to 
become law, notwithstanding such decision. 
2. That every decision of the highest appellate court of a State 
declaring an Act of the Legislature unconstitutional on the ground 
of i t s v i o l a t i o n of the Federal Constitution shall, be subject to the 
same review by the Supreme Court of the United States as i s now 
accorded to decisions sustaining such l e g i s l a t i o n . 
Administration of J u s t i c e 
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.... We believe that the issuance of injunctions i n cases a r i s i n g out 
of labor disputes should be prohibited when such injunctions would not apply-
when no labor disputes existed. 
We believe also that a person c i t e d for contempt i n labor disputes, 
except when such contempt was committed i n the a c t u a l presence of the 
court or so near thereto as to i n t e r f e r e with the proper administration 
of j u s t i c e , should have a r i g h t to t r i a l by jury. 
S o c i a l and I n d u s t r i a l J u s t i c e 
The supreme duty of the Nation i s the conservation of human 
resources through an enlightened measure of s o c i a l and i n d u s t r i a l j u s t i c e . 
We pledge ourselves to work unceasingly i n State and Nation for: 
E f f e c t i v e l e g i s l a t i o n looking to the prevention of i n d u s t r i a l 
accidents, occupational diseases, overwork, involuntary unemployment, 
and other innurious e f f e c t s incident to modern industry. 
The f i x i n g of minimum safety and health standards for the various 
occupations and the exercise of the public authority of State and Nation 
including the Federal Control over i n t e r s t a t e commerce, and the taxing 
power, to maintain such standards. 
The prohibition of c h i l d labor. 
Minimum wage standards f o r working women,to provide a " l i v i n g wage" 
i n a l l i n d u s t r i a l occupations. 
The general prohibition of night work f o r women and the establishment 
of an eight hour day for women and young persons. 
One day's r e s t i n seven for a l l wage workers. 
The eight hour day i n continuous twenty-four-hour i n d u s t r i e s . 
The abolition of the convict contract labor system; substituting 
a system of prison production for governmental consumption only; and the 
application of prisoners' earnings to the support of t h e i r dependent 
families. 
P u b l i c i t y as to wages, hours and conditions of labor; f u l l reports 
upon i n d u s t r i a l accidents and diseases, and the opening to public 
inspection of a l l t a l l i e s , weights, measures and check systems on labor 
products. 
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Standards of compensation f o r death by i n d u s t r i a l accident and 
i n j u r y and trade disease which w i l l transfer the burden of l o s t earnings 
from the f a m i l i e s of working people to the industry, and thus to the 
community. 
The protection of home l i f e against the hazards of sickness, 
i r r e g u l a r employment and old age through the adoption of a system 
of s o c i a l insurance adapted to American use. 
The development of the creative labor power of America by l i f t i n g 
the l a s t load of i l l i t e r a c y from American youth and establishing 
continuation schools for i n d u s t r i a l education under public control and 
encouraging a g r i c u l t u r a l education and demonstration i n r u r a l schools. 
The establishment of i n d u s t r i a l research laboratories to put the 
methods and discoveries of science a t the service of American producers. 
We favor the organization of the workers, men and women, as a means 
of protecting t h e i r i n t e r e s t s and of promoting t h e i r progress .... 
Currency 
.... The issue of currency i s fundamentally a Government function 
and the system should have as basic p r i n c i p l e s soundness and e l a s t i c i t y . 
The control should be lodged with the Government and should be protected 
from domination or manipulation by Wall Street or any s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t s . 
We are opposed to the so-called Aldrich currency b i l l , because i t s 
provisions would place our currency and c r e d i t system i n private hands, 
not subject to e f f e c t i v e public control .... 
Conservation 
.... We believe that the remaining for e s t s , coal and o i l lands, 
water powers and other natural resources s t i l l i n State or National 
control (except a g r i c u l t u r a l lands) are more l i k e l y to be wisely conserved 
and u t i l i z e d for the general welfare i f held i n the public hands. 
I n order that consumers and producers, managers and workmen, now and 
hereafter, need not pay t o l l to private monopolies of power and raw 
material, we demand that such resources s h a l l be retained by the State 
or Nation, and opened to immediate use under laws which w i l l encourage 
development and make to the people a moderate return for benefits conferred. 
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The great i s s u e before the American people today i s the control 
of government and industry by private monopoly. 
For a generation the people have struggled patiently, i n the face 
of repeated betrayals by successive administrations, to free themselves 
from t h i s i n t o l e r a b l e power which has been undermining representative 
government. 
Through control of government, monopoly has steadily extended 
i t s absolute dominion to every basic industry. 
I n v i o l a t i o n of law, monopoly has crushed competition, s t i f l e d 
private i n i t i a t i v e and independent enterprise, and without fear of 
punishment now exacts extortionate p r o f i t s upon every necessity of l i f e 
consumed by the public. 
The equality of opportunity proclaimed by the Declaration of 
Independence and asserted and defended by Jefferson and Lincoln as the 
heritage of every American c i t i z e n has been displaced by spec i a l p r i v i l e g e 
for the few, wrested from the government of the many. 
Fundamental Rights i n Danger 
The t y r a n n i c a l power which the American people denied to a king, 
they w i l l no longer endure from the monopoly system. The people know 
they cannot y i e l d to any group the control of the economic l i f e of the 
nation and preserve t h e i r p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t i e s . They know monopoly has 
i t s representatives i n the h a l l s of Congress, on the Federal bench, and 
i n the executive departments; that these s e r v i l e agents barter away the 
nation's natural resources, n u l l i f y acts of Congress by j u d i c i a l veto 
and administrative favor, invade the people's r i g h t s by unlawful a r r e s t s 
and unconstitutional searches and seizures, d i r e c t our foreign policy i n 
the i n t e r e s t s of predatory wealth, and make wars and conscript the sons 
of the common people to fi g h t them. 
The usurpation i n recent years by the federal courts of the power 
to n u l l i f y laws duly enacted by the l e g i s l a t i v e branch of the government 
i s a p l a i n v i o l a t i o n of the Constitution ... 
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Distress of American Farmers 
The present condition of American agriculture constitutes an 
emergency of the gravest character. The Department of Commerce report 
shows that during 1923 there was a steady and marked increase i n dividends 
paid by the great i n d u s t r i a l corporations. The same i s true of the steam 
and e l e c t r i c railways and p r a c t i c a l l y a l l other large corporations. On 
the other hand, the Secretary of Agriculture reports that i n the f i f t e e n 
p r i n c i p a l wheat growing states more than 108,000 farmers since 1920 have 
l o s t t h e i r farms through fore-closure or bankruptcy; that more than 122,000 
have surrendered t h e i r property without l e g a l proceedings, and that nearly 
375,000 have retained possession of t h e i r property only through the 
leniency of t h e i r creditors, making a t o t a l of more than 600,000 or 26 
percent of a l l farmers who have v i r t u a l l y been bankrupted since 1920 
i n these f i f t e e n states alone. 
Almost unlimited prosperity f o r the great corporations and ruin 
and bankruptcy for agriculture i s the di r e c t and l o g i c a l r e s u l t of 
the p o l i c i e s and l e g i s l a t i o n which deflated the farmer while extending 
almost unlimited cr e d i t to the great corporations; which protected with 
exorbitant t a r i f f s the i n d u s t r i a l magnates, but depressed the prices of 
the farmers* products by f i n a n c i a l juggling while greatly increasing the 
cost of what he must buy; which guaranteed excessive f r e i g h t rates to the 
railroads and put a premium on wasteful management while saddling an unwar-
ranted burden on to the backs of the American farmer; which permitted 
gambling i n the products of the farm by grain speculators to the great 
detriment of the farmer and to the great p r o f i t of the grain gambler. 
A Covenant with the People 
Awakened by the dangers which menace t h e i r freedom and prosperity 
the American people s t i l l r e t a i n the right and courage to exercise t h e i r 
sovereign control over t h e i r government. I n order to destroy the economic 
and p o l i t i c a l power of monopoly, which has come between the people and t h e i r 
government, we pledge ourselves to the following p r i n c i p l e s and p o l i c i e s : 
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1. We pledge a complete housecleaning i n the Department of Justice, 
the Department of the Interior, and the other executive departments. 
We demand that the power of the Federal Government be used to crush 
private monopoly, not to foster i t . 
% f r f f f l l Resources 
2. We pledge recovery of the navy's o i l reserves and a l l other 
parts of the public domain which have been fraudulently or i l l e g a l l y 
leased, or otherwise wrongfully transferred, to the control of private 
interests; vigorous prosecution of a l l public o f f i c i a l s , private citizens 
and corporations that participated i n these transactions; complete 
revision of the water-power act, the general leasing act, and a l l other 
legislation relating to the public domain. We favor public ownership 
of the nation's water power and the creation and development of a national 
super-water-power system, including Muscle Shoals, to supply at actual 
cost light and power for the people and nitrate for the farmers, and s t r i c t 
public control and permanent conservation of a l l the nation's resources 
Including coal, iron and other ores, o i l and timber lands, i n the interest 
of the people. 
R a i l Roads 
3. We favor repeal of the Esch Cummins railroad law and the fixing 
of railroad rates upon the basis of actual, prudent investment and cost 
of service ..... 
Tax, Reduction, 
4. We favor reduction of Federal taxes upon individual incomes and 
legitimate business, limiting tax exactions s t r i c t l y to the requirements 
of the government administered with rigid economy, particularly by the 
curtailment of the eight hundred million dollars now annually expended 
for the army and navy i n preparation for future wars; by the recovery 
of the hundreds of minions of dollars stolen from the Treasury through 
fraudulent war contracts and the eorrupt leasing of the public resources; 
and by diligent action to collect the accumulated interest upon the 
eleven b i l l i o n dollars owing us by foreign governments. 
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We denounce the Mellon tax plan as a device to relieve multi-
ndllionaires at the expense of other tax payers and favor a taxation 
policy providing for immediate reductions upon moderate incomes, large 
increases i n the inheritance tax rates upon large estates to prevent 
the indefinite accumulation by inheritance of great fortunes i n a few 
hands, taxes upon excess profits to penalize profiteering, and complete 
publicity, under proper safeguards, of a l l Federal tax returns. 
The Courts 
5. We favor submitting to the people, for their considerate judgment, 
a constitutional amendment providing that Congress may by enacting a 
statute make i t effective over a ju d i c i a l veto. 
We favor such amendment to the constitution as may be necessary 
to provide for the election of a l l Federal Judges, without parly 
designation, for fixed terms not exceeding ten years, by direct vote 
of the people. 
Farmers 
6. We favor drastic reduction of the exorbitant duties on manufactures 
provided i n the Fordney-McCumber t a r i f f legislation, the prohibiting of 
gambling by speculators and profiteers i n agricultural products, the 
reconstruction of the Federal Reserve and Federal Parts Loan Systems, so 
as to eliminate control by usurers, speculators and international financiers 
and to make the credit of the nation available upon f a i r terms to a l l and 
without discrimination to businessmen, farmers and home-builders. We 
advocate the calling of a special s easion of Congress to pass legislation 
for the r e l i e f of American agriculture. We favor such further legislation 
as may be needful or helpful i n promoting and protecting co-operative 
enterprises. We demand that the Interstate Commerce Commission proceed 
forthwith to reduce by an approximation to pre-war levels the present 
freight rates on agricultural products, including l i v e stock and upon 
the materials required upon American farms for agricultural purposes. 
La&r. 
7. We favor abolition of the use of injunctions i n labor disputes and 
declare for complete protection of the right of farmers and industrial 
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workers to organize, bargain collectively through representatives of their 
own choosing and conduct without hindrance co-operative enterprises. 
We favor prompt ratification of the Child Labor amendment, and 
subsequent enactment of a Federal law to protect children i n industry .... 
Peace on Earth 
12. We denounce the mercenary system of foreign policy tinder recent 
administrations i n the interests of financial imperialists, o i l monopolies 
and international bankers, which was at times degraded our State 
Department from i t s high service as a strong and kindly intermediary of 
defenseless governments to a trading outpost for those interests and 
concession-seekers engaged i n the exploitations of weaker nations, as 
contrary to the w i l l of the American people, destructive of domestic 
development and provocative of war* We favor an active foreign 
policy to bring about a revision of the Versailles treaiy i n accordance 
with the terms of the armistice, and to promote firm treaty agreements 
with a l l nations to outlaw wars, abolish conscription, drastically reduce 
land and naval armaments, and guarantee public referendum on peace and war. 
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Progressive Party Platform 
Preamble, 
Three years after the end of the second world war, the drams are 
beating for a third* C i v i l l i b e r t i e s are being destroyed* Millions 
cry out for r e l i e f from unbearably high prices. The American way of 
l i f e i s i n danger. 
The root cause of this c r i s i s i s Big Business control of our 
economy and government. 
tftth t o i l and enterprise the American people have created from 
their ri c h resources the world's greatest productive machine. This 
machine no longer belongs to the people. I t s ownership i s concentrated 
i n the hands of a few and i t s product used for their enrichment. 
Never before have so few owned so much at the expense of so many. 
Ten years ago Franklin Delano Roosevelt warned: "The liberty of 
a democracy i s not safe i f the people tolerate the growth of private 
power to a point where i t becomes stronger than their democratic state. 
That, i n i t s essence, i s fascism". 
Today that private power has constituted i t s e l f an invisible 
government which pulls the strings of i t s puppet Republican and Democratic 
parties. Two sets of candidates compete for votes under the outworn 
emblems of the old parties. But both represent a single program - a 
program of monopoly profits through war preparations, lower living 
standards, and suppression of dissent. 
For generations the common man of America has resisted this 
concentration of economic and p o l i t i c a l power i n the hands of a few. 
The greatest of America's p o l i t i c a l leaders have led the people into 
battle against the money power, the railroads, the trusts, the economic 
royalists. 
We of the Progressive Party are the present-day descendants of these 
people's movements and fighting leaders. We are the p o l i t i c a l heirs of 
Jefferson, Jackson and Lincoln - of Frederick Douglass, Altgeld, and Debs -
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of "Fighting Bob" La Follette, George Norris, and Franklin Roosevelt. 
Throughout our history new parties have arisen when the old 
parties have betrayed the people* As Jefferson headed a new party 
to defeat the reactionaries of his day, and as Lincoln led a new party 
to victory over the slave-owners, so today the people, inspired and led 
by Henry Wallace, have created a new party to secure peace, freedom, 
and abundance 
Betrayal of the Old Parties 
The American people want peace. But the old parties, obedient 
to the dictates of monopoly and the military, prepare for war i n the name 
of peace. 
They refuse to negotiate a settlement of differences with the Soviet 
Union. 
They reject the United Nations as an instrument for promoting world 
peace and reconstruction. 
They .use the Marshall Plan to rebuild Nazi Germany as a war base and 
to subjugate the economies of other European countries to American Big 
Business. 
They finance and arm corrupt, fascist governments i n China, Greece, 
Turkey and elsewhere, through the Truman Doctrine, wasting billions i n 
American resources and squandering America's heritage as the enemy of 
despotism. 
They encircle the globe with military bases which other peoples 
cannot but view as threats to their freedom and security. 
They protect the war-making industrial and financial barons of 
Nazi Germany and imperial Japan, and restore them to power. 
They stockpile atomic bombs. 
They pass legislation to admit displaced persons, discriminating 
against Catholics, Jews, and other victims of Hitler. 
They impose a peacetime draft and move toward Universal Military 
Training. 
They f i l l policy-making positions i n government with generals 
and Wall Street bankers. 
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Peace cannot be won - but profits can - by spending ever-increasing 
billions of the people's money i n war preparations. 
Yet these are the policies of the two old parties - policies 
profaning the name of peace. 
The .American people cherish freedom. 
But the old parties, acting for the forces of special privilege, 
conspire to destroy traditional American freedoms. 
They deny the Negro people the rights of citizenship. They impose 
a universal policy of Jim Crow and enforce i t with every weapon of terror. 
They refuse to outlaw i t s most bestial expression - the crime of lynching. 
They refuse to abolish the poll tax, and year after year they deny 
the right to vote to Negroes and millions of white people i n the South. 
They aim to reduce nationality groups to a position of social, 
economic and p o l i t i c a l inferiority. 
They connive to bar the Progressive Party from the ballot. 
They move to outlaw the Communist Party as a decisive step I n 
their assault on the democratic rights of labor, of national, r a c i a l 
and p o l i t i c a l minorities, and of a l l those who oppose their drive to 
war. In this they repeat the history of Nazi Germany, Fascist I t a l y 
and Franco Spain. 
They support the House Committee an Un-American Activities i n i t s 
v i l i f i c a t i o n and persecution of citizens i n total disregard of the B i l l 
of Bights. 
They build the Federal Bureau of Investigation into a p o l i t i c a l 
police with secret dossiers on millions of Americans. 
They seek to regiment the thinking of the American people and to 
suppress p o l i t i c a l dissent. 
They strive to enact such measures as the Mundt-Nixon B i l l which 
are as destructive of democracy as were the Alien and Sedition Laws against 
which Jefferson fought. 
They conooct a spurious "loyalty 4 1 program to create an atmosphere 
of fear and hysteria i n government and industry. 
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They shackle American labor with the Taft=Hartley Act at the 
express command of Big Business, while encouraging exorbitant profits 
through uncontrolled inflation. 
They restore the labor injunction as a weapon for breaking strikes 
and smashing Unions. 
This i s the record of the two old parties - a record profaning 
the American ideal of freedom. 
The American people want abundance. 
But the old parties refuse to enact effective price and rent 
controls, making the people victims of a disastrous inflation which 
dissipates the savings of millions of families and depresses their 
living standards. 
They ignore the housing problem, although more than half the nation's 
families including minions of veterans, are homeless or living i n rural 
and urban slums. 
They refuse social security protection to millions and allow only 
meagre benefits to the rest. 
They block national health legislation even though mill ions of men, 
women and children are without adequate medical care. 
They foster the concentration of private economic power. 
They replace progressive government o f f i c i a l s , the supporters of 
Franklin Roosevelt, with spokesmen of Big Business. 
They pass tax legislation for the greedy, giving only insignificant 
reductions to the needy. 
These are the acts of the old parties - acts profaning the American 
dream of abundance. 
No glittering party platforms or election promises of the Democratic 
and Republican parties can hide their betrayal of the needs of the American 
people. 
Nor can they act otherwise. For both parties, as the record of the 
dOth Congress makes clear, are the champions of Big Business. 
The Republican platform admits i t . 
The Democratic platform attempts to conceal i t . 
But the very composition of the Democratic leadership exposes the 
demogogy of i t s platform. I t i s a party of machine politicians and 
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Southern Bourbons who veto i n Congress the l i b e r a l planks "won11 i n 
convention. 
Such platforms, conceived i n hypocrisy and lack of principle, 
deserve nothing but contempt. 
Principles of the Progressive Party 
The Progressive Party i s born i n the deep conviction that the 
national wealth and natural resources of our country belong to the people 
who inhabit i t and must be employed i n their behalf; that freedom and 
opportunity must be secured equally to a l l ; that the brotherhood of 
rw\n can be achieved and scourge of war ended. 
The Progressive Party holds that basic to the organization of world 
peace i s a return to the purposes of Franklin Roosevelt to seek areas of 
international agreement rather than disagreement. I t was his conviction 
that within the framework of the United Nations different social and 
economic systems can and must l i v e together. I f peace i s to be achieved 
capitalist United States and communist Russia must establish good relations 
and work together. 
The Progressive Party holds that i t i s the f i r s t duty of a just 
government to secure for a l l the people, regardless of race, creed, color, 
sex, national background, p o l i t i c a l belief, or station i n l i f e , the 
inalienable rights proclaimed i n the Declaration of Independence and 
guaranteed by the B i l l of Rights. The government must actively protect 
these rights against the encroachments of public and private agencies. 
The Progressive Party holds that a just government must use i t s 
powers to promote an adundant l i f e for i t s people. This i s the basic 
idea of Franklin Roosevelt's Economic B i l l of Rights. Heretofore every 
attempt to give effect to this principle has failed because Big Business 
dominates the key sectors of the economy. Antitrust laws and government 
regulation cannot break this domination. Therefore the people, through 
their democratically elected representatives, must take control of the main 
levers of the economic system. Public ownership of these levers w i l l 
enable the people to plan the use of their productive resources so as to 
develop the limitless potential of modern technology and to create a true 
American-Commonwealth free from poverty and insecurity. 
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The Progressive Party believes that only through peaceful 
understanding can the world make progress toward reconstruction 
and higher standards of living; that peace i s the essential condition 
for safe-guarding and extending our traditional freedoms; that only by 
preserving liberty and by planning an abundant l i f e for a l l can we 
eliminate the sources of world conflict. Peace, freedom, and abundance -
the goals of the Progressive Party - are indivisible. 
Only the Progressive Party can destroy the power of private monopoly 
and restore the government to the American people. For ours i s a party 
uncorrupted by privilege, committed to no special interests, free from 
machine control, and open to a l l Americans of a l l races, colors and creeds. 
The Progressive Party i s a party of action. We seek through the 
democratic process and through day-by-day activity to lead the American 
people toward the fulfillment of these principles ..... 
SOCIALIST PARTY PLATFORM OF 1Q12 
Indianapolis. Indiana. Mav 12. 1912 
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The Socialist party declares that the capitalist system has 
outgrown i t s historical function, and has become utterly incapable 
of meeting the problems now confronting society. We denounce this 
outgrown system as incompetent and corrupt and the source of unspeakable 
misery and suffering to the whole working class. 
Under this system the industrial equipment of the nation has passed 
into the absolute control of a plutocracy which exacts an annual tribute 
of hundreds of millions of dollars from the producers. Unafraid of any 
organised resistance, i t stretches out i t s greedy hands over the s t i l l 
undeveloped resources of the nation - the land, the mines, the forests, 
and the water powers of every State of the Union. 
In spite of the multiplication of labor-saving machines and 
improved methods i n industry which cheapen the cost of production, 
the share of the producers grows ever less, and the prices of a l l the 
necessities of l i f e steadily increase. The boasted prosperity of this 
nation i s for the owning class alone. To the rest i t means only greater 
hardship and misery. The high cost of living i s f e l t i n every home. 
Millions of wage-workers have seen the purchasing power of their wages 
decrease u n t i l l i f e has become a desperate battle for mere existance. 
Multitudes of unemployed walk the streets of our c i t i e s or trudge 
from State to State awaiting the w i l l of the masters to move the wheels 
of industry. 
The farmers i n every state are plundered by the increasing prices 
exacted for tools and machinery and by extortionate rents, freight rates 
and storage charges. 
Capitalist concentration i s mercilessly crushing the class of small 
business men and driving i t s members into the ranks of propertyless wage-
workers. The overwhelming majority of the people of America are being 
forced under a yoke of bondage by this soul "less industrial despotism. 
I t i s this capitalist system that i s responsible for the increasing 
burden of armaments, the poverty, slums, child labour, most of the insanity, 
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crime and prostitution, and much of the disease that a f f l i c t s mankind. 
Under this system the working class i s exposed to poisonous 
conditions, to frightful and needless perils of l i f e and limb, i s 
walled around with court decisions, injunctions and unjust laws, 
and i s preyed upon incessantly for the benefit of the controlling 
oligarchy of wealth.. Under i t also, the children of the working class 
are doomed to ignorance, drudging t o i l and darkened l i v e s . 
I n the face of these evils, so manifest that a l l thoughtful observers 
are appalled at them, the legislative representatives of the Republican 
and Democratic parties remain the f a i t h f u l servants of the oppressors. 
Measures designed to secure to the wage-eamers of this Nation as humane 
and just treatment as i s already enjoyed by the wage-earners of a l l other 
civilized nations have been smothered i n committee without debate, the 
laws ostensibly designed to bring r e l i e f to the farmers and general 
consumers are juggled and transformed into instruments for the exaction 
of further tribute. The growing unrest under oppression has driven 
these two old parties to the enactment of a variety of regulative 
measures, none of which has limited i n any appreciable degree the power 
of the plutocracy, and some of which have been perverted into means of 
increasing that power. Anti-trust laws, railroad restrictions and 
regulations, with the prosecutions, indictments and investigations based 
upon such legislation have proved to be utterly f u t i l e and ridiculous. 
Nor has this plutocracy been seriously restrained or even threatened 
by any Republican or Democratic executive. I t has continued to grow i n 
power and insolence alike under the administration of Cleveland, McKinley, 
Roosevelt and Taft. 
We declare, therefore that the longer sufferance of these conditions 
i s impossible, and we purpose to end them a l l . We declare them to be 
the product of the present system i n which industry i s carried on for 
private greed, instead of for the welfare of society. We declare 
furthermore, that for these evils there w i l l be and can be no remedy 
and no substantial r e l i e f except through Socialism under which industry 
w i l l be carried on for the common good and every worker receive the f u l l 
social value of the wealth he creates. 
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Society i s divided into warring groups and classes, based upon 
material interests. Fundamentally, this struggle i s a conflict between 
the two main classes, one of which, the capitalist class, owns the means 
of production, and the other, the working class, must use these means of 
production, on terms dictated by the owners. 
The capitalist class, though few i n numbers, absolutely controls 
the government, legislative, executive and ju d i c i a l . This class 
owns the machinery of gathering and disseminating news through i t s 
organised press. I t subsidizes seats of learning - the colleges 
and schools - and even religious and moral agencies. I t has also 
the added prestige which established customs give to any order of 
society, right or wrong. 
The working class, which includes a l l those who are forced to 
work for a l i v i n g whether by hand or brain, i n shop, mine or on the 
s o i l , vastly outnumbers the c a p i t a l i s t class. Lacking effective 
organisation and class solidarity, t h i s class i s unable to enforce 
i t s w i l l . Given such a class solidarity and effective organisation, 
the workers w i l l have the power to make a l l laws and control a l l industry 
i n their own interest. A l l p o l i t i c a l parties are the expression of 
economic class interests. A l l other parties than the Socialist party 
represent one or another group of the ruling capitalist class. Their 
po l i t i c a l conflicts reflect merely superficial r i v a l r i e s between competing 
capitalist groups. However, they result, these conflicts have no issue of 
real value to the workers. Whether the Democrats or Republicans win 
politically, i t i s the capitalist class that i s victorious economically. 
The Socialist party i s the p o l i t i c a l expression of the economic 
interests of the workers. I t s defeats have been their defeats and i t s 
victories their victories. I t i s a party founded on the science and laws 
of social development. I t proposes that, since a l l social necessities 
today are socially produced, the means of their production and distribution 
shall be socially owned and democratically controlled. 
In the face of the economic and p o l i t i c a l aggressions of the capitalist 
class the only reliance l e f t the workers i s that of their economic 
organisations and their p o l i t i c a l power. By the intelligent and class 
conscious use of these, they may r e s i s t successfully the capitalist 
class, break the fetters of wage slavery, and f i t themselves for the 
future society, which i s to displace the capitalist system. The 
Socialist party appreciates the f u l l significance of class organisation 
and urges the wage-eamers, the working farmers and a l l other useful 
workers to organise for economic and pol i t i c a l action, and we pledge 
ourselves to support the toil e r s of the fields as well as those i n the 
shops, factories and mines of the nation i n their struggles for economic 
justice. 
In the defeat or victory of the working class party i n this new 
struggle for freedom l i e s the defeat or triumph of the common people 
of a l l economic groups, as well as the failure or triumph of popular 
government. Thus the Socialist party i s the party of the present 
day revolution which makes the transition from economic individualism 
to socialism, from wage slavery to free co-operation, from capitalist 
oligarchy to industrial democracy. 
Working Program 
As measures calculated to strengthen the working class i n i t s fight 
for the realization of i t s ultimate aim, the co-operative commonwealth 
and to increase i t s power against capitalist oppression, we advocate 
and pledge ourselves and our elected officers to the following program: 
Collective Ownership 
1. The collective ownership and democratic management of railroads, 
wire and wireless telegraphs and telephones, express service, 
steamboat lines, and a l l other social means of transporation and 
communication and of a l l large scale industries. 
2. The immediate acquirement by the municipalities, the states or the 
federal government of a l l grain elevators, stock yards, storage 
warehouses, and other distributing agencies, i n order to reduce the 
present extortionate cost of living. 
3. The extension of the public domain to include mines, quarries, o i l 
wells, forests and water power. 
4. The further conservation and development of natural resources for the 
use and benefit of a l l the people ..... 
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5. The collective ownership of land wherever practicable, and i n 
cases where such ownership i s impracticable, the appropriation 
by taxation of the annual rental value of a l l the land held for 
speculation and exploitation. 
6. The collective ownership and democratic management of the banking 
and currency system. 
Unemployment 
The immediate government r e l i e f of the unemployed by the extension 
of a l l useful public works. A l l persons employed on such works to be 
engaged directly by the government under a work day of not more than 
eight hours and at not less than the prevailing union wages. The 
government also to establish employment bureaus; to lend money to states 
and municipalities without interest for the purpose of carrying on public 
works, and to take such other measures within i t s power as w i l l lessen 
the widespread misery of the workers caused by the misrule of the capitalist 
class. 
Industrial Demands 
The conservation of human resources, particularly of the l i v e s and 
well-being of the workers and their families. 
1. By shortening the work day i n keeping with the increased 
productiveness of machinery. 
2. By securing for every worker a rest period of not less than a day 
and a half i n each week. 
3. By securing a more effective inspection of workshops, factories 
and mines. 
4. By the forbidding the employment of children under sixteen years 
of age. 
5. By the co-operative organization of the industries i n the federal 
penitentiaries for the benefit of the convicts and their dependants. 
6. By forbidding the interstate transportation of the products of child 
labor, of convict labor and of a l l uninspected factories and mines. 
7. abolishing the profit system i n government work and substituting 
either the direct hire of labor or the awarding of contracts to 
co-operative groups of workers. 
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8. By establishing minimi3m wage scales. 
9. % abolishing o f f i c i a l charity and substituting a non-contributaiy 
system of old age pensions, a general system of insurance by 
the State of a l l i t s members against unemployment, and invalidism 
and a system of compulsory insurance by employers of their workers, 
without cost to the latter, against industrial diseases, accidents 
and death. 
P o l i t i c a l Demands 
1. The absolute freedom of press, speech and assemblage. 
2. The adoption of a graduated income tax and the extension of 
inheritance taxes, graduated i n proportion to the value of the 
estate and to nearness of kin - the proceeds of these taxes to 
be employed i n the socialization of industry. 
3. The abolition of the monopoly ownership of patents and the 
substitution of collective ownership, with direct rewards to 
inventors by premiums of royalties. 
4. Unrestricted and equal suffrage for men and women. 
5. The adoption of the i n i t i a t i v e , referendum and recall and of 
proportional representation, nationally as well as locally. 
6. The abolition of the Senate and of the veto power of the President. 
7. The election of the President and Vice-President by direct vote of the 
people. 
8. The abolition of the power usurped by the Supreme Court of the 
United States to pass upon the constitutionality of the 
legislation enacted by Congress.' National laws to be repealed 
only by act of Congress or by a referendum vote of the whole people. 
9. Abolition of the present restrictions upon the amendment of the 
constitution, so that instrument may be made amendable by a majority 
of the States. 
10. The granting of the right of suffrage i n the District of Columbia 
with representation i n Congress and a democratic form of municipal 
government for purely local affai r s . 
11. The extension of democratic government to a l l United States territory. 
12. The enactment of further measures for the conservation of health. 
The creation of an independent bureau of health, with such restrictions 
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as w i l l secure f u l l liberty to a l l schools of practice. 
13. The enactment of further measures for general education and 
particularly for vocational education i n useful pursuits. 
The Bureau of Education to be made a department. 
14. The separation of the present Bureau of Labor from the 
Department of Commerce and Labor and i t s elevation to the rank 
of a department. 
15. Abolition of a l l federal d i s t r i c t s courts and the United States 
circuit court of appeals. State courts to have jurisdiction 
i n a l l cases arising between citizens of several states and 
foreign corporations. The election of a l l judges for short terms. 
16. The immediate curbing of the power of the courts to issue injunctions. 
17. The free administration of the law. 
18. The calling of a convention for the revision of the constitution 
of the U.S. 
Such measures of r e l i e f as we may be able to force from capitalism 
are but a preparation of the workers to seize the whole powers of 
government, i n order that they may thereby lay hold of the whole system 
of socialized industry and thus come to their rightful inheritance. 
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Presidential Election Results 1900 - 1968 
1900: McKinley (Republican). 7,218,491 Popular Votes 
292 Electoral College Votes 
Bryan (Democrat). 6,356,734 176 
Woolley (Prohibition). 209,157 
Debs (Social Democrat). 94*864 
Barker (Populist). 50,599 
MaHoney (Socialist Labour). 33,432 
E l l i s (Union Reform). 5,698 
Leonard (United Christian). 1,059 
1904: Roosevelt (Republican). 7,628,461 336 
Parker (Democrat). 5,084,223 140 
Debs (Socialist). #)2,460 
SwOlow (Prohibition). 259,257 
Watson (People's Party). 114,753 
Cosrregan (Socialist Labour). 33,724 
1908: Taft (Republican). 7,675,320 321 
Bryan (Democrat). 6,412,294 162 
Debs (Socialist). 420,820 
Chafin (Prohibition). 252,683 
Hisgen (independence Party). 83,563 
Watson (People's Party). 28,131 
Gilhaus (Socialist Labour). 13,825 
1912: Wilson (Democrat). 6,296,547 435 
Roosevelt (Progressive). 4,126,020 88 
230. 
Taft (Republican) 
Debs (Socialist) 
Chafin (Prohibition) 
Reimer (Socialist-labour) 
1916: Wilson (Democrat) 
Hughes (Republican) 
Benson (Socialist) 
Hanly (Prohibition) 
Reimer (Socialist-Labour) 
1920: Harding (Republican) 
Cox (Democrat) 
Debs (Socialist) 
Christensen (Farmer-Labour) 
WatkLns (Prohibition) 
Cox (Social-Labour) 
1924: Coolidge (Republican) 
Davis (Democrat) 
La Follette (Progressive) 
1928: Hoover (Republican) 
Smith (Democrat) 
Thomas (Socialist) 
Foster (Workers Party) 
Reynolds (Socialist-labour) 
Varney (Prohibition) 
Webb (Farmer-Labour) 
1932: Roosevelt (Democrat) 
Hoover (Republican) 
Thomas (Socialist) 
Foster (Communist) 
Upshaw (Prohibition) 
Harvey (Liberty Party) 
Reynolds (Socialist-Labour) 
Coxey (Farmer-Labour) 
3,486,720 8 
897,011 
209,923 
29,079 
9,127,695 277 
8,533,507 254 
585,113 
220,506 
13,403 
16,141,536 404 
9,128,488 127 
919,799 
265,411 
189,408 
31,175 
15,718,211 382 
8,385,283 136 
4,832,614 13 
21,391,993 444 
15,016,169 87 
267,420 
48,770 
21,603 
20,106 
6,309 
22,809,638 472 
15,758,901 59 
884,781 
102,991 
81,869 
53,425 
33,275 
7,309 
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Taft (Republican) 
Debs (Socialist) 
Chafin (Prohibition) 
Reimer (Socialist-Labour) 
1916: Wilson (Democrat) 
Hughes (Republican) 
Benson (Socialist) 
Hanly (Prohibition) 
Reimer (Socialist-Labour) 
1920: Harding (Republican) 
Cox (Democrat) 
Debs (Socialist) 
Christensen (Farmer-Labour) 
Watkins (Prohibition) 
Cox (Social-Labour) 
1924: Coolidge (Republican) 
Davis (Democrat) 
La Follette (Progressive) 
1928: Hoover (Republican) 
Smith (Democrat) 
Thomas (Socialist) 
Foster (Workers Party) 
Reynolds (Socialist-Labour) 
Varney (Prohibition) 
Webb (Farmer-Labour) 
1932: Roosevelt (Democrat) 
Hoover (Republican) 
Thomas (Socialist) 
Foster (Commanist) 
XJpshav (Prohibition) 
Harvey (Liberty Parly) 
Reynolds (Socialist-Labour) 
Coxey (Farmer-Labour) 
3,486,720 8 
897,011 
209,923 
29,079 
9,127,695 277 
8,533,507 254 
585,113 
220,506 
13,403 
16,141,536 404 
9,128,488 127 
919,799 
265,411 
189,408 
31,175 
15,718,211 382 
8,385,283 136 
4,832,614 13 
21,391,993 444 
15,016,169 87 
267,420 
48,770 
21,603 
20,106 
6,309 
22,809,638 472 
15,758,901 59 
884,781 
102,991 
81,869 
53,425 
33,275 
7,309 
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Roosevelt (Democrat) 27,478,945 523 
Landon (Republican) 16,674,665 8 
Lemke (Union Party) 882,479 
Thomas (Socialist) 187,572 
Browder (Communist) 80,159 
Colvin (Prohibition) 37,847 
Aiken (Socialist-iabour) 12,777 
Roosevelt's candidacy was endorsed by three state parties, the 
Farmer-Labour Party of Minnesota, the Progressive Party of Wisconsin, 
and the American Labour Party of New York. 
1940: Roosevelt (Democrat) 27,243,466 449 
WilMe (Republican) 22,304,755 82 
Thomas (Socialist) 99,557 
Balson (Prohibition) 57,812 
Browder (Coanainist) 46,251 
Aiken (Socialist-Labour) 14,861 
1944* Roosevelt (Democrat) 25,602,504 432 
Dewey (Republican) 22,006,285 99 
Thomas (Socialist) 80,426 
Watson (Prohibition) 74,754 
Teichert (Socialist-Labour) 45,335 
1948: Truman (Democrat) 24,105,695 303 
Dewey (Republican) 21,969,170 189 
Thurmond (States t Rights 
Democrat) 
1,169,021 39 » 
Wallace (People's Progressive) 
1,156,103 
Thomas (Socialist) 139,009 
Watson (Prohibition) 103,216 
Teichert (Socialist-Labour) 29,061 
The Communists did not nominate a candidate of their own, preferring 
to endorse the candidacy of Wallace. 
* Includes one vote from a Tennessee elector previously pledged to Truman. 
1952: Eisenhower (Republican) 33,824,351 442 
Stevenson (Democrat) 27,314,987 89 
HalHnan (People's 132,608 
Progressive) 
Hamblen (Prohibition) 72,768 
Haas (Socialist J^abour) 29,333 
Hoopes (Socialist) 18,322 
Dobbs (Socialist-Workers) 10,306 
Has s appeared as a candidate of the Industrial Government Party 
i n certain states. 
In Mississippi there was no Republican party ticket, however, 
Eisenhower did poll 112,966 votes i n that state on an independent 
candidacy. In South Carolina a similar ticket polled 153,289 votes 
of the Eisenhower total of 168,082. 
1956: Eisenhower (Republican) 35,582,236 457 
Stevenson (Democrat) 26,028,887 73 
Jones 1 * 
Andrews (States* Rights) 109,961 
Holtwick (Prohibition) 41,937 
Haas (Socialist-Iiabour) 41,159 
Jenner (Texas Constitution 30,999 
Party) 
Dobbs (Socialist Workers) 5,549 
KrajewskL (American Third 1,829 
Party) 
Hoopes (Socialist) 846 
* One electoral vote went to Judge Walter B.Jones of Alabama, from 
an Alabama elector who violated his pledge to Stevenson. 
1960: Kennedy (Democrat) 34,221,463 303 (a) 
Nixon (Republican) 34,108,582 219 
Byrd 15 (b) 
Hass (Socialist-Labour) 46,560 
Decker (Prohibition) 46,203 
Faubus (National States' 44,977 
Rights) 
Dobbs (Socialist-Workers) 39,541 
22% 
(a) Includes 406,176 votes gained as a candidate of the Liberal 
Party in New Tork. 
(b) Six unpledged Democratic electors from Alabama, one Republican 
from Oklahoma, and the entire Democratic, Mississippi electoral 
college representation of eight cast their votes for Virginia 
Senator Harry Byrd. 
1964: Johnson (Democrat) 43,128,873 482 
Goldwater (Republican) 27,176,873 56 
Aiqhqma listed no Democratic electors pledged to Johnson, the 
state cast 210,732 votes for unpledged electors: had these been for 
Johnson only 109,631 votes would have gone to minority party candidates, 
which would have been the lowest total for minority candidates this 
century. I W i n r H w g the votes from Alabama, minority candidates s t i l l 
polled only O.556 of the vote. 
1968: Nixon (Republican) 31,284,747 301 * 
Humphrey (Democrat) 30,948,643 191 
Wallace (American 9,820,896 46 
Independence Party) 
* One delegate pledged to Nixon, voted for Wallace. 
